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Chapter 1
Knowledge-Based Innovations and Social
Coordination
Three themes have been central to my research program: (1) the dynamics of science, tech-
nology, and innovation; (2) the scientometric operationalization and measurement of these
dynamics; and (3) the Triple Helix (TH) of university-industry-government relations. In this
introductory chapter, I relate these three themes first from an autobiographical perspective to
(i) Luhmann’s sociological theory about meaning-processing in communications with (ii)
information-theoretical operationalizations of the possible synergies in Triple-Helix rela-
tions, and with (iii) anticipation as a selection mechanism in cultural evolutions different
from “natural selection.” Interacting selection mechanisms can drive the development of
redundancy; that is, options that are available, but have not yet been used. An increasing
number of options is crucial for the viability of innovation systems more than is past perfor-
mance. A calculus of redundancy different from and complementary to information calculus
is envisaged.
1.1 The Spring of “1968” in Prague, Paris, and Amsterdam
On 21 August 1968, the Soviet Union and its allies invaded Czechoslovakia. In that
year I was a third-year student and went to Prague to attend discussions. During this
summer, Prague had become a meeting place for intellectuals. I left Prague the day
before the Russian invasion. Earlier that year, I had been in Paris in March, shortly
before the student revolt in May; and since 1967 I had been attending meetings of
the Critical University in Amsterdam on Sunday evenings. The various discussions
This chapter is partly based on: Leydesdorff (2010). Luhmann Reconsidered: Steps towards an
empirical research program in the sociology of communication. In C. Grant (Ed.),Beyond Universal
Pragmatics: Essays in the Philosophy of Communication (pp. 149–173). Oxford: Peter Lang.
© The Author(s) 2021
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focused on the changing role of science and technology in the dynamics of capitalism
from neo-Marxist and other perspectives.
In the Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (published on
April 5, 1968), the Central Committee of the Party formulated its reform program as
follows:
[…] it will be necessary to prepare the country for joining the scientific-technical revolution
in the world, which calls for especially intensive cooperation of workers and agricultural
workers with the technical and specialized intelligentsia, and which will place high demands
upon the knowledge and qualifications of people, on the application of science. (ČSSR, 1968,
at p. 3)
Why were these words considered as such a serious threat to the Soviet system
that the Russian orthodoxy thought they had to send in the army? The Czechoslovak
government had repeatedly stated that it did not intend to change existing alliances.
The reasons for the invasion were mainly ideological.
The issue of “the scientific-technical revolution” has a long history in Marxist
ideology. In a footnote to Capital I (at p. 393, note 89), Marx himself speculated:
“if technology could enable us to free man from work sufficiently, the nature of
capitalism would change, since the basis of this mode of production would fall
away” (Marx [1857] 1973, p. 709; italics in the original). In other words, Marx had
envisaged another possible regime change to a knowledge-based economy that is
different from and potentially an alternative to the communist revolution.
In Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Marx ([1857]
1973) elaborated on this question as follows:
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules
etc. These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the
human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human
brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of
fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of
production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have
come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it.
To what degree the powers of social production have been produced, not only in the form
of knowledge, but also as immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process. (at
p. 706).
Note that Marx proposed “the development of fixed capital” as an empirical
indicator of the transformation from political to a knowledge-based economy.
During the period 1850–1870,Marx spent most of his time studying in the Library
of the British Museum (Higgins, 2017). Among other things, he had set himself the
task to study the possibility that science and technology had become sources of
societal wealth more than labour. (A model with two independent variables was not
available in his time.) On the basis of his calculations, however, he rejected this
hypothesis and concluded that the main contradiction at the time remained the one
between capital and labour (e.g., Capital III [1894]; 1972, Chap. 5, p. 90 ff.).
In his time, Marx witnessed the prelude to the emergence of a knowledge-
based economy. For example, William Henry Perkin’s research on dye-stuffs in
England during the late 1850s developed into an industry in Germany (Beer, 1959;
cf. Braverman, 1974, pp. 161f.; Etzkowitz, 2008, p. 25). However, Capital I (1867)
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was written in a key period of the shaping of nation-states with their respective
political economies. The unifications of Germany and Italy in 1870, for example,
followed upon the Meji Restoration of Imperial Rule in Japan in 1868, the end of the
American Civil War in 1865, and the Commune de Paris in 1870.
For example, Noble (1977, at p. 7) argued—with a focus on the USA (Thomas
Edison)—that “the major breakthroughs, technically speaking, came in the 1870s.”
He dated “the wedding of the sciences to the useful arts” as the period between 1880
and 1920, that is, after Marx’s period of studies. Braverman (1974) used the term
“scientific-technical revolution” for this same period (1870–1910)when he described
the regime change as follows:
The scientific-technical revolution … cannot be understood in terms of specific innova-
tions—as is the case of the Industrial Revolution, which may be adequately characterized
by a handful of key inventions—but must be understood rather in its totality as a mode of
production into which science and exhaustive engineering investigations have been inte-
grated as part of ordinary functioning. The key innovation is not to be found in chemistry,
electronics, automatic machinery, aeronautics, atomic physics, or any of the products of
these science-technologies, but rather in the transformation of science itself into capital.
(pp. 166f.)
In summary, the Action Program of the Czechoslovak Communist Party reopened
a debate withinMarxism by suggesting the possible transformation of the communist
state into an open society oriented to science, technology, and innovation, while
guided by a socialist inspiration (fraternité). A think-tank at the Academy of Science
ofCzechoslovakia under the leadership of RadovanRichta formulated this possibility
as follows:
The productive forces should not be seen in the narrow and unhistorical pattern that stabilized
under the impression of industrialization (and in general accepted these conditions)—that
they conceived of them merely as the sum of the means of labor and the labor force—but
in the broad Marxian sense as a rich and variable multiplicity of production forces of the
human kind—thus including the social combination and science, the creative faculties of
man and the forces of nature which he has appropriated. (Richta et al., 1968, pp. 20f.; cf.
Richta, 1963)
The invasion of 1968 led to decades of stagnation. It would take until 1989,
before Alexander Dubček, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, who led
the reforms during the Spring of 1968, could be democratically elected as chairperson
of the federal parliament of Czechoslovakia.Might Czechoslovakia have found away
to realize a new form of Euro-communism if the Soviets had not intervened?
1.2 Science and Technology Policies in the West
In the very different context of western democracies, the changing role of science
and technology (S&T) in society was placed on the agenda of the Organization of
Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) in Paris—after its transformation
in 1962 from an organization for distributing Marshall help into a think-tank for
the development of science, technology, and innovation policies (Elzinga, 2012).
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The economic issue in the background was the so-called “residual factor” or, in
other words, the realization that the continuation of post-war growth could not be
explained in terms of the increased productivity of the traditional production factors
(Solow, 1957; OECD, 1964). Was this residual factor a reflection of scientific and
technological developments? For science-policy purposes, however, one needed to
understand the role of S&T in society beyond labeling it as “residual.”
An elaboration of other theoretical perspectives had becomeurgent after the Soviet
launch of the first Sputnik in 1957. Sputnik I came as a surprise, and was perceived
as a challenge not only to the U.S. but also to capitalism and democracy as economic
and social systems. The President’s Science Advisory Council and other mecha-
nisms such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in the Department
of Defense were established to insure U.S. technological competitiveness in the mili-
tary and space arenas (Eisenhower, 1965; York, 1970). During the 1960s, the OECD
took the lead in developing and coordinating S&T policies among themember states.
Science policies in these countries were shaped during the late 60s and early 70s
(OECD, 1963, 31976, 1971; Weinberg, 1963).
In theNetherlands, for example, the first minister for science policywas appointed
in 1971; in Sweden, S&T policies were initiated since 1965 (Elzinga, 1980). Initially,
these S&T policies were narrowly confined to budget allocations; but the so-called
“Harvey Brooks Report” of the OECD (1971)—entitled Science, Growth, and
Society: A new perspective—addressed the relations between science, technology,
and society more broadly. For example, “policy for science” and the use of “science
in policy” were distinguished.
In 1973, a left-wing government came to power in the Netherlands with the
program of democratizing knowledge, power, and income. The science-policy
component of this program was elaborated into a system of sectorial councils
including citizen representatives.1 The focus on external democratization led, among
other things, to the development of science shops at Dutch universities and there-
after elsewhere (Leydesdorff, 1980; Leydesdorff & Ward, 2005). The issue was to
articulate and democratize the demand for knowledge and innovations from perspec-
tives other than those of the state and large industries with their own R& D facilities
(Sclove, 1995).
1.3 Science Studies: The Sociological Perspective
At the Critical University in Amsterdam, discussions were pursued mainly in terms
of the debates about “critical theory” in neo-Marxism (Habermas, 1968b; Marcuse,
1964) and euro-communism (e.g., Althusser, 1965, 1975) as an alternative to, for
example, the “new industrial state” (Galbraith, 1967). We discussed among other
1Brief van de Minister voor Wetenschapsbeleid, Nota Sectorraden Wetenschapsbeleid. Den Haag:
Tweede Kamer, zitting 1977, 14623, nrs. 1–3.
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thingsMarcuse’s (1964) technocracy thesis inOne-Dimensional Man andHabermas’
(1968a and b) critique of this analysis. Marcuse’s (1955) book Eros and Civilisation,
for example, related the critical tradition of the Frankfurter Schule with the counter-
movements of the late 1960s such as the anarchistic “Provo”movement inAmsterdam
(cf. Hollak, 1966).
Against Marcuse, Habermas (1968a, b) argued that technocracy and bureaucratic
rationalization are not “natural forces,” but theoretical constructs that can be consid-
ered atmost as tendencieswhen operating in society.2 InHabermas’ opinion, it would
be mistaken to consider “rationalization” as a single force; one can for example
distinguish technical (means-ends) rationality from practical rationalization:
Above all, it becomes clear against this background that two concepts of rationalization
must be distinguished. […] Rationalization at the level of the institutional framework can
occur only in themedium of symbolic interaction itself, that is, through removing restrictions
on communication. Public, unrestricted discussion, free from domination, of the suitability
and desirability of action-orienting principles and norms in the light of the socio-cultural
repercussions of developing subsystems of purposive-rational action—such communication
at all levels of political and repoliticized decision-making processes is the only medium in
which anything like “rationalization” is possible. (p. 118)
As is well known, Habermas further developed a distinction between systemic and
“life-world” dynamics in his studies of the transformation of the public sphere (Struk-
turwandel der Oeffentlichkeit; Habermas, 1974) and then in the Theory of Commu-
nicative Action (1981). Less well known is his extensive study entitled Erkenntnis
und Interesse (Habermas, 1968b; translated as Knowledge and Human Interests)
about three knowledge interests—rationalities—operating in the different sciences.
The three “knowledge interests” distinguished byHabermas (1987 [1968b]) were:
(i) the technological one of the natural sciences, (ii) the historical-hermeneutical
one of understanding in the humanities, and (iii) an emancipatory interest in social
change on the basis of reflection and critique. According to the author, one can expect
scholars working in these three domains to develop different criteria for “objec-
tivity”: nomothetical, hermeneutic, and ideology-critical, respectively. From this
perspective, a sociology of science should not focus only on themicro-organizational
differences between disciplines, but also explore their relations with these macro-
socio-epistemic drivers. As amember of theFrankfurter Schule, Habermas, however,
remained at this stage neo-Marxist: he questioned the room for unrestricted discus-
sion (“Herrschaftsfreie Diskussion von allen mit allen”) from the perspective of the
critical tradition (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1969 [1947]).
2In the French discussion, Althusser (1974) would analogously formulate a “self-critique” arguing
for a “coupure épistémologique” (an epistemological turn) by turning away from an objectivistic
analysis of class structures (e.g., Althusser, 1970; Poulantzas, 1968) towards a focus on historical
processes of change.
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1.4 The Habermas-Luhmann Discussion
The relation between the micro-sociological and macro-sociological analysis of
science, technology, and innovation has been core to my research interests. However,
Habermas’ theorizing evolved increasingly in a normative direction given his claim
of counterfactual openness in the discourse (e.g., Habermas, 1987 [1985]). In this
context, it was an eye-opener to read Luhmann’s objections against Habermas’ argu-
ments in the so-called “Habermas-Luhmann discussion” (Habermas & Luhmann,
1971).
In addition to elaborating on the perspective of Parsons’ (1937; 1951) social-
systems theory, Luhmann (1980; cf. 1971, at p. 344 ff.) argued that (i) domi-
nance is structurally present in discussions; discussions cannot be “unrestricted”;
(ii) Habermas’ appeal to “rationality” might easily be used as a sanction against
contributions deemed undesirable and therefore labeled as “irrational”; (iii) language
structures discussions; and (iv) time constraints set inevitable limits to the discus-
sions.3 According to Luhmann, “critical theory” as advocated by Habermas had
increasingly become irrelevant since outdated. As he put it:
The portrayal by Habermas is consistent and true. Only the relevance of the analysis and
vocabulary can be denied. It is not a goal, but an important aspect of sociological system
theory that it uses a concept of action that no longer allows a fundamental separation of
practice and technology. (1971, p. 293; my translation)
Against Habermas’ analysis, Luhmann (1971, p. 21) proposed to abandon
(neo-Marxist) historicism—that is, drawing “lessons from history”—and turn to
constructivism:
What can no longer be presupposed (e.g., “historical facts”, L.) will have to be brought forth
in the construction of our basic categories. […] Their suitability will have to be judged using
different criteria, i.e., no longer from the point of view of the accurate repro-duction of what
is simply pregiven and waiting to be discovered, but from that of grasping and reducing this
contingency of possibleworlds.As the basic category for describing how this is accomplished
in consciousness and communication (and not merely physically or organically) I suggest
the concept of meaning.
Note that both Habermas and Luhmann called for a theory of meaning as founda-
tional to sociology. However, Habermas elaborated this theory in terms of commu-
nicative action, whereas Luhmann theorized communication structures. InMarxism,
action provides a way to change structures, but this relation between action and
intended changes had become less obvious given the increased complexity of an
increasingly knowledge-based economy. Reflexive systems can adapt innovatively
and be resilient against external steering. Luhmann formulated this at the time as
follows:
Social structures do not take the form of expectations about behavior (let alone consist of
concrete ways of behaving), but rather take the form of expectations about expectations.
(1990b, p. 45 [1971, p. 63])
3I have summarized Luhmann’s argument in Dutch in Leydesdorff (1977).
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From this perspective—that is, focusing on the dynamics of expectations—
“action” is no longer an explanans (Giddens, 1979; Latour, 1983 and 1988), but
action needs to be explained in relation to structures. However, expectations are not
obviously observable. The specification of structures of expectations operating selec-
tively and thus potentially interacting requires a theory at the macro-level (such as
Marxism).However, Luhmann turned for the elaboration of a structuralist perspective
to Parsons’ (1951) concept of double contingency in interhuman relations.
Double contingencymeans that each of us (Ego) expects the other (Alter) to enter-
tain expectations as we entertain them ourselves. This second contingency among
expectations comes on top of the first contingency of empirical processes in the phys-
ical and biological conditions. Sharing of meaning and communication of informa-
tion enable us reflexively to entertain and develop structures in our communications.
Note that this approach is sociological and not linguistic: communications can be
mediated symbolically providing meaning to reflections.
I agree with Parsons and Luhmann that double contingency can be considered as
the micro-operation of the social system. This basis is not grounded in observable
behavior, but in reflexive communications. I shall show in a later chapter that the
coding of the communications adds a hyper-reflexive layer at the supra-individual
level. From this perspective, both actions and texts are part of a first contingency; they
are historical and observable. From an evolutionary perspective these observables in
the first contingency provide the variation. However, inter-human communications
develop evolutionarily in terms of selection mechanisms. Selection criteria are not
immediately and unambiguously observable. As Luhmann (1995, at p. 164 [1984,
p. 226] formulated: “communications cannot be observed directly, only inferred.”
(italics in the original).
In other words, interactive rationality, which Habermas distinguished from
means/ends rationality, is shaped in terms of meanings provided and shared among
humans reflexively. Providing meaning to information can be considered as the
selection of a signal from the noise. Not all information is meaningful; and one
or more selections can be involved. However, the selection mechanisms cannot be
inferred from the observable variation. Unlike variations (which are phenotypical),
selection is “genotypical”—a system’s property—and may also be deterministic.
Habermas’ assumption that the social system of communications can be considered
as unrestricted (“herrschaftsfrei”) specifies a counterfactual; somewhat comparable
to “all men are born equal.” However, normative assumptions are not sufficient for
understanding the complex dynamics under study. We need research programs!
1.5 “Wertfreiheit”
The distinction between different rationalities (e.g., technocratic or capitalist ratio-
nalities) potentially operating upon one another—but not necessarily in a single
Marxian dialectics—finds its origin in Max Weber’s work and relates directly to
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Weber’s Marx-critique or, more generally, his critique of historicism.4 According
to Weber, values are ideal-typical constructs: they operate in history as coordina-
tion mechanisms. The Sinn der Wertfreiheit—the commitment to value-freeness—
in the social sciences serves our ability to study these values without an a priori
commitment to them. Value-freeness is an epistemic condition for the objectiva-
tion of “verstehende Soziologie” (Weber, 1913). Without Verstehen (“understanding
the meaning of action from the actor’s point of view”) the sociological analysis
remains substantively empty. Human agency is “intentional” (Searle, 1983). Both
understanding and explanation are needed in the sociological analysis.
For explaining the status of values, Weber used the metaphor of the Greek Gods
who operate above human history, but are present within it. History is then consid-
ered as a Kampfplatz (battlefield) of völlig unaustragbare (completely incompatible)
values (e.g., Weber, 1919, at p. 608f.). Weber (2015 [1904], at p. 203 ff.) opposed
(among others, Marx’s) historicism. He explained the analytical tension between
sociological analysis and historical studies as follows:
In the interest of the concrete demonstration of an ideal type or of an ideal-typical devel-
opmental sequence, one seeks to make it clear by the use of concrete illustrative material
drawn from empirical-historical reality. The danger of this procedure, which in itself is
entirely legitimate, lies in the fact that historical knowledge here appears as a servant of
theory instead of the opposite role. It is a great temptation for the theorist to regard this
relationship either as the normal one or, far worse, to mix theory with history and indeed to
confuse them with each other.
Seeking to understand the system’s dynamics, Luhmann’s (1971: 291 ff.) program
of studies was radically anti-historicist, as when he formulated, for example, as
follows:
Our flight must take place above the clouds, and we must reckon with a rather thick cloud
cover.Wemust rely on our instruments. Occasionally, wemay catch glimpses below of a land
with roads, towns, rivers, and coastlines that remind us of something familiar, or glimpses
of a larger stretch of landscape with the extinct volcanoes of Marxism. But no one should
fall victim to the illusion that these few points of reference are sufficient to guide our flight.
(Luhmann [1984, pp. 12–13]; 1995, p. l).5
Note that the “volcanoes ofMarxism” (e.g., Habermas?) are considered “extinct.”
From a systems perspective, history can be considered as morphogenesis (Archer,
1982 and 1995). The historical events provide variation, but the systems dynamics
are structural: they operate in terms of selection mechanisms (Hodgson & Knudsen,
2011). From Luhmann’s perspective, Weber’s values are not Greek Gods, but the
results of resonances among interhuman intentions and communications. These
structures, operating like “GreekGods” in the background, also need to be explained.
In my opinion, Luhmann’s contributions to the Habermas-Luhmann discussions
were very rich, and they are important for the argument to be developed in this
4Popper’s (1957) term “historicism” is not used by Weber.
5The metaphor of the airplane flying on the basis of instruments is taken from Maturana (1978,
p. 42). The flight metaphor refers also to the Preface of Hegel’s (1820) Rechtsphilosophie where he
wrote that “the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.”
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study about the dynamics of discursive knowledge as systems of rationalized expec-
tations. However, I will use Luhmann’s proposals without orthodoxy, and change
them when necessary, in my opinion. I will also emphasize some aspects differ-
ently from the scholarly reception of Luhmann’s work in Germany and elsewhere.
My main purpose is to operationalize this sociological theory and to proceed to the
measurement (Leydesdorff, 1995).
At the time of the debate with Habermas,6 Luhmann (1971, p. 34; 1990a, b, p. 27)
was ahead of his time when he drew the following conclusion about the dynamics
and evolution of meanings:
The function of meaning then does not lie in information, i.e., not in the elimination of a
system-relative state of uncertainty about the world, and it cannot, therefore, be measured
with the techniques of information theory. If it is repeated, a message or piece of news
loses its information value, but not its meaning. Meaning is not a selective event, but a
selective relationship between system and world—although this is still not an adequate
characterization. Rather, what is special about the meaningful or meaning-based processing
of experience is that it makes possible both the reduction and the preservation of complexity;
i.e., it provides a form of selection that prevents the world from shrinking down to just one
particular content of consciousness with each act of determining experience. (1990, p. 27)
In addition to this quest for the specification of social selectionmechanisms poten-
tially different from “natural selection,” the long-termprogramof theory construction
was at the time formulated as follows:
No matter how abstractly formulated are a general theory of systems, a general theory of
evolution, and a general theory of communication, all three theoretical components are neces-
sary for the specifically sociological theory of society. They are mutually interdependent.
[…]
The decisive questions now become: How are these various theories related to one another?
What unifies them? How must a theory that integrates them be constructed? (Luhmann,
1975, at p. 96; 1982a, b, at p. 261.)
This program was ambitious; further research questions were supposed to follow.
However, the program never took off in terms of empirical methods. For example,
Luhmann’s conclusion that “meaning cannot be measured with the techniques of
information theory” (1990a, b, p. 27) was, in my opinion, too hasty. As I shall show,
information theory can be extended with a theory of redundancy which enables us
to estimate the imprint of meaning processing on information processing, and thus
to take steps toward the operationalization of this program of studies.
6Habermas ([1985] 1987) revised his critique of Luhmann’s program after almost two decades, as
follows:
As Luhmann’s astonishing job of translation demonstrates, this language can be so flexibly
adapted and expanded that it yields novel, not merely objectivating but objectivistic descriptions
even of subtle phenomena of the life-world. […].
As a result, the critique of reason carried out as a critique of metaphysics and a critique of power,
which we have considered in these lectures, is deprived of its object. (p. 385).
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1.6 Meaning and Information
Meaning is provided to events and information with reference to “horizons of mean-
ings.” Providing meaning to information can be considered as the selection of a
signal from noise. The result is “meaningful information.” The additional dimen-
sion of other possible meanings potentially resounding in each local selection makes
the selection dynamics of processing meaning internally structured and non-linear,
with the noted potential of preventing “the world from shrinking” by selections. As
against Darwin’s “natural” selection, cultural selection may add options to a system
and thus not reduce complexity. I shall argue below that the sharing of meanings
among human beings can generate redundancy by operating as a feedback against
“the arrow of time” differently from the generation of uncertainty—that is a conse-
quence of Shannon’s (1948) proposal to operationalize information as probabilistic
entropy.
New options can be added when the codes of the communications—the horizons
of meaning—interact as control mechanisms in addition to and in interaction with
the observable interactions at the level of the data. Both vertical and horizontal
differentiations are then possible (Simon, 1973) and can operate upon one another.
However, selections cannot operate without variation.
In my opinion, the variation-generating mechanisms were insufficiently specified
byLuhmann,who posited, with reference toBateson (1972), that “all information has
meaning” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 67). Information, however, is empirical and contains
uncertainty. In Shannon’s (1948) information theory, information is yet-meaningless
uncertainty or, in other words, (potentially random) variation. The specification of
system(s) of reference is needed to provide this yet-meaningless information with
meanings. Luhmann’s specification of variation, however, is only in terms of frictions
and irritations. Consequently, “information” cannot be measured from this perspec-
tive (cf. Baecker, 2017). However, I shall argue that the relations between (Shannon-
type) information-processing and meaning-processing can further be clarified by
extending information theory with a calculus of redundancy.
When different perspectives provide different meanings to the same informa-
tion, one can expect redundancies in the overlaps among perspectives. In informa-
tion theory, redundancy is defined as the complement of the information given the
maximum information capacity—that is, the total number of options. Redundancy
provides a measure for the options that were hitherto not realized historically but
which could have been realized (Brooks & Wiley, 1986). (Adding redundancy adds
also to the maximum information content, while the latter is equal to the sum of
information and redundancy.)
Whereas Shannon-type information—H = −Σi pi log2(pi )—is (by definition)
positive, selective feedbacks can be measured as negative bits or, in other words, as
redundancy. The sharing of meanings on top of but different from the communication
of information can generate synergy under specifiable conditions. Synergy enlarges
the number of options at the above-individual level. In my opinion, this dynamic of
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adding options provides an operationalization of Luhmann’s (1990a, b, p. 27) call
for the specification of a “selection that prevents the world from shrinking.”
I shall distinguish between (i) redundancy as the not-yet-realized options at each
moment of time and (ii) the generation of redundancy as new options resulting from
the synergy in the interactions among codes in interhuman communications. The
latter redundancy operates upon the former, which is by definition at each moment
the complement of the information to the maximum entropy.
Interpersonal intentionality can be expected to encompass both information in
the first contingency of historical observables and redundancy in the second contin-
gency of expectations. The two have to be unraveled analytically. I shall argue that
historical and evolutionary processes operate as feedbacks on each other but with
opposite signs. Note that interpersonal communication can be considered as inten-
tional; however, the word “intentional” has a meaning at the supra-individual level
different from individual intentionality.
The net result of the interactions between information and meaning processing
can be measured in bits of information (Leydesdorff & Ivanova, 2014; Leydesdorff,
Johnson, & Ivanova, 2018). If this net result is positive, historical realization in orga-
nizational formats prevails; if it is negative, self-organization of the communications
is indicated changing and overwriting organizational shapes.
Self-organization means that the communication dynamics is guided by a code
in the communications which tends to take over control from agency in terms of
determining what can be communicated in specific communications. For example,
scholarly discourse is coded differently from political discourse or market trans-
actions. When the codes are not observable, they can be hypothesized and these
hypotheses can be operationalized and tested. The possible interactions among codes
are probably limited. For example, one cannot legitimately pay for the truth of a
statement.
In summary: socio-cultural evolution has a complex dynamic of organization
and self-organization that is different from biological evolution. For example, there
can be trade-offs between selection mechanisms. Biological selection is based on
genotypes that are hard-wired, historically present, and thus observable (e.g., as
DNA). The “genotypes” of cultural evolution are codes of communication which
can further be developed because they are not hard-wired. They are structures of
expectations operating at a level above the hardware. Interactions among the codes
can be positive or negative given historical constraints. Information theory enables
us to measure whether new options (redundancies) are being created, to what extent,
and in which relations.
In other words, the relations between evolutionary theory and systems theory
can further be specified using communication theory. Increasingly, it has been my
program of studies to relate these Luhmann-inspired ideas aboutmeaning-processing
with an information-theoretical operationalization (Leydesdorff, 1995; Shannon,
1948; Theil, 1972) and, thirdly, with the anticipatory mechanisms involved in the
cultural evolution of expectations and meanings in the second contingency (Dubois,
2003; Luhmann, 2002a; Leydesdorff & Franse, 2009; Rosen,1985). The essays
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underlying this bookwere collected and reorganized in order to illustrate this progres-
sion: the questions are often Luhmann’s; the answers are sometimes mine. Let me
first distance myself from Luhmann and then return to the autobiographic narrative.
1.7 “Luhmann Reconsidered”
In my opinion, Luhmann’s contributions have been obscured by attempts in his later
work—mainly in the 1990s—to develop an overarching philosophy of observation
on the basis of Spencer Brown’s (1969)Laws of Form. The focus on Spencer Brown’s
very abstract andmathematical ideas has led to theoretical discussions among someof
Luhmann’s leading followers, but hardly to empirical research and the testing of theo-
retical claims. In my opinion, Shannon’s mathematically theory of communications
provides amuchmore fruitful methodology, because this theory—based on probabil-
ities—provides instruments for the measurement (e.g., Theil, 1972). At the interface
between Luhmann’s sociological theory of communication and Shannon’s mathe-
matical theory of communication puzzles can be formulated that ask for empirical
research, modelling, and simulation (Leydesdorff, 1995).
For example, I mentioned above the puzzle (raised by Luhmann already in 1971)
of specifying social selection mechanisms other than “natural selection.” Although
Luhmann placed this and other puzzles on the agenda, he refrained from the elabo-
ration and testing of these ideas as hypotheses. The theorizing thus tends to become
a closed and highly codified artifact despite the empirical intentions. The focus on
naturalistic “observations” brings the risk of historicism; without specification of
“expectations” testing and therefore refutation become impossible. Differences are
not yet significant because they are meaningful.
In a critical reflection on Luhmann’s œuvre, Gumbrecht (2006; 2019) proposed
to distinguish among Luhmann I, II, and III as follows:
1. “Luhmann I” (mainly—but not exclusively—in the 1970s) denotes the contribu-
tions to the Habermas-Luhmann discussion about the premises and construction
of sociology as a theory of society.
2. During the 1980s, “Luhmann II” incorporated Maturana & Varela’s (1980)
theory of autopoiesis; that is, self-organization (Luhmann, 1995 [1984]). In
my opinion, this program of studies begins with the publication of Liebe als
Passion in 1982 (Luhmann, 1982b—translated as Love as Passion (Luhmann,
1986a)—includes the foundational study Soziale Systeme (Luhmann, 1984)—
Social Systems (Luhmann, 1995)—and culminates in Die Wissenschaft der
Gesellschaft—The Science of Society—published in 1990. Because of its specific
focus on science as a communication system, the last book is most relevant for
this study.
3. “Luhmann III” denotes the philosophy of observationwhich Luhmann developed
during the 1990s in order to provide his work with a fundament in an axiomatic
system to be derived from Spencer-Brown’s (1969) Laws of Form.
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“Luhmann I, II, and III” are not necessarily consecutive although there is a
pattern of development. I agree with Gumbrecht that “Luhmann III” is problematic:
following Spencer-Brown (1969) and other scholars in cybernetics (e.g., Baecker,
1999; Kauffman, 2003), Luhmann accepted in the early 1990s—on the basis of
discussions with Von Foerster and Baecker—that a distinction that is identified can
be considered as an observation. In the social sciences, however, the identification
of a distinction specifies only an observational category—an empty box—and not
yet an observation.7
In biology, a predator can observe its prey after distinguishing and identifying
it in its environment. In the social sciences, observed values to be filled into the
empty boxes thus generated have still to be determined empirically, for example,
by measurement (De Zeeuw, 1993). The status of observations thus is different:
not the observations, but observational categories are generated by distinctions and
identifications. Observations are the results of the measurement and can be tested for
their statistical significance.
“Luhmann II” provides another, and, inmyopinion,most creative and original part
of his œuvre. Crucial to the theory of that time is a sociological specification of the
autopoiesis model of Maturana & Varela (1980 and 1984) in a series of studies. The
autopoiesismodel—autopoiesis is theword for self-organization in classicalGreek—
combines structure and action and thus allowed Luhmann to bridge the gap between
Parsons’ structural functionalism and symbolic interactionism in sociology (Grathof,
1978; cf. Giddens, 1981, p. 167). The communication structures are reproduced
and changed by interactions which are carried by agents. However, the biological
model of autopoiesis cannot be applied to inter-human communications without
modifications. As Luhmann (1986b, p. 172) put it:
[…] living systems are a special type of systems. However, if we abstract from life and define
autopoiesis as a general form of system-building using self-referential closure, we would
have to admit that there are non-living autopoietic systems, different modes of autopoietic
reproduction, and general principles of autopoietic organizationwhichmaterialize as life, but
also in other modes of circularity and self-reproduction. In other words, if we find non-living
autopoietic systems in our world, then and only then will we need a truly general theory of
autopoiesis which carefully avoids references which hold true only for living systems. But
which attributes of autopoiesis will remain valid on this highest level, and which will have
to be dropped on behalf of their connection with life?
7Luhmann (II) had up until that time (that is, approximately 1990) worked with two major distinc-
tions: (i) system and environment, and (ii) (individual) “consciousness” and inter-human “com-
munication.” In his 1990 book about the Science of Society, Luhmann explicitly objected to this
reduction of sociological reasoning to observing as the basic concept of sociological analysis by
formulating as follows:
It would perhaps be possible to abandon the idea of a human subject and only use the words
“observers” and “observations.” However, such semantic changes do not lead anywhere as
long as there is only one way to identify the observer, namely as a human being. (p. 14; my
translation)
As noted, human beings (“consciousness systems”) were not Luhmann’s subject of study except
in their relation to communications. As stated above, “action” needs to be explained.
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A sociology based on the “autopoiesis” of communications can be considered
as a form of radical constructivism (Knorr-Cetina, 1989). As against other forms
of constructivism, the focus is on the constructedness of the constructs and not on
the constructing agency (Luhmann, p. 515 ff.; cf. Latour, 1983). In science and
technology studies (STS), however, the focus has been mainly on explaining macro-
structures in terms of micro-sociological agency (e.g., Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Krohn
et al., 1990; Latour&Woolgar, 1979; Latour, 1996; cf. Leydesdorff, 1993; Luhmann,
1995). From this perspective, one can consider Luhmann’s approach as a paradigm
shift from the Latourian approach prevailing in STS (Nowotny, 1990; cf. Wagner,
1996). I return to this issue in Chap. 3.
1.8 Codification
The meaning of a communication is a second-order variable attributable to the
communications. The latter are first-order attributes of communicating agents.Mean-
ings originate from communications and feedback on communications. When selec-
tions can operate upon one another, a complex and potentially non-linear dynamics
is generated. In other words: communications are provided with meanings in a layer
other than agency. Meanings are based on reflections; they are attributes of the links
and not of the actors at nodes in networks, and are therefore by their nature inter-
subjective (Fig. 1.1). The communicators—Luhmann used theword “consciousness”
for individuals—provide variation to systems of communication.
The codes coordinate the communications by discarding the noise on the basis
of selection criteria. These coordination mechanisms are not “given” or directly
observable. The theoretical task is to specify the selection mechanisms in terms
of specific codes. The codes in the communications are structural and therefore
determine the selections. For example, one can say different things in a courtroom,
Communications with 
communicators 
Communications Communications with codes of 
communication operating as 
coordination mechanisms  
Fig. 1.1 Communications can be considered as attributes of communicators, but they can also be
considered as second-order units of analysis to which codes of communication can be attributed
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in parliament, in a newspaper, or in a class, because of differences in the codifications
in the language given respective settings.
Codes developed in the communication provide criteria for the selections and thus
coordinate the system in which they emerge. Codes, however, have to be constructed
as a further refinement of language in a historical process before the logic of the
selection can take control over the logic of variation in the communication from
which the codes emerged. This emerging order builds on support structures that have
to be reproduced; for example, in terms of carrying institutions.
1.8.1 Husserl’s “Intersubjective Intentionality”
Luhmann elaborated on three disciplinary backgrounds for the specification of selec-
tion mechanisms in interhuman communications: (i) Husserl’s (1929) “intersubjec-
tive intentionality” in the philosophical background; (ii) Parsons’ (1963a, b; 1968)
“symbolically generalized media of communication” for the sociological opera-
tionalization; and (iii) Maturana’s (e.g., 1978) “autopoiesis” or self-organization
theory for the dynamic model.
First, Luhmann’s œuvre can be considered as an attempt to operationalize
Husserl’s philosophical concept of “intersubjectivity” sociologically in terms of
inter-human communications (Luhmann, 1995; cf. Knudsen, 2006). Luhmann was
fascinated by Husserl’s philosophy. For example, Paul (2001, at p. 374) described
this commitment to Husserl’s philosophy as follows:
[…] one can hardly overestimate the importance of Husserl’s phenomenology for Luhmann
(1996). I can distinguish two levels of influence. First, Luhmann extends Husserl’s project,
bequeathing legitimacy not only on reflection or conscious action but also on the experience
of the world. Second, his analyses of the constitution of the social follow directly upon the
problem posed by Husserl as to whether and, if so, how, intersubjectivity can be understood.
Meanings can be shared in a non-linear dynamic co-evolving as a feedback on
the underlying flow of information. As Luhmann (2002a, at p. 53 ff.) formulated:
A variant of operative constructivism […] is presented today under different brand names:
for instance, formal calculus; second-order cybernetics; the theory of closed, “autopoietic”
systems; or radical constructivism. Its disciplinaryprovenance is veryheterogeneous, ranging
from mathematics to biology and neurophysiology to the theory of automata and linguistics.
[…]
But how would it be if one could successfully show that Husserl already uses this theory,
except that, with concepts such as “subject,” “spirit,” or “transcendental phenomenology,”
he places it within a tradition that already in his time had little chance of a future. […] I
believe that this is possible if one […] distinguishes whether systems are constructed on the
basis of intentional acts of consciousness or on the basis of communication.
In the fifth of his so-called Cartesian Meditations, entitled “Uncovering of the
Sphere of Transcendental Being asMonadological Intersubjectivity,” Husserl (1929)
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addressed the intersubjective level. He formulated (at p. 182)8 that “the intrinsically
first being, the being that precedes and bears every worldly Objectivity, is transcen-
dental intersubjectivity […].” However, Husserl added that “we must forego a more
precise investigation of the layer of meaning which provides the human world and
culture, as such, with a specific meaning and therewith provides this world with
specifically ‘mental’ predicates” (1929, at p. 138; my translation). In contempo-
rary wording: Husserl noted that he had no instruments (methodologies) beyond his
“transcendental apperception” of intersubjectivity.
Luhmann proposed using semantic resources from the other two traditions
(Parsons’ structural-fuctionalism andMaturana’s theory of autopoiesis) for the oper-
ationalization of the interpersonal domain in terms of communications. Communica-
tions build on communications and can thus shape patterns. The recursively repeated
patterns of communications shape forms that code the communication increasingly
in specific directions as they emerge. After their emergence the codes can begin
to shape the room for further communications in feedback loops; analogously to
the mechanism of preferential attachment (Barabási & Albert, 1999) or cumulative
advantages (de Price and Solla, 1976; cf. Arthur, 1989).
For example, money can be considered as such a communication-facilitating
code. It enables us to accelerate economic transactions: one can pay the price of a
commodity instead of having to bargain on themarket. Credit further speeds upmone-
tary transactions; credit cards enable us to shop worldwide. These codes of commu-
nication operate within and on top of the communications from which they emerge
endogenously. The codes are part of the communication, but their logic of control is
different from that of the historical developments in the communications. While the
communication develops historically along trajectories, the emerging codes operate
as feedbacks from the next level of a regime. The regime exerts selection pressure
on the trajectories.
As in the case of money, the mechanisms of scientific communication, for
example, have become internally structured by using more than a single code:9 the
“context of justification” operates as a selection mechanism on outcomes of the
“context of discovery” (Popper, 1935 [1959]). The context of justification can be
considered as a “self-organized”—and therefore endogenous—control system of the
communication among scholars (Merton, 1942). The context of discovery provides
the larger environment in which knowledge can be generated. On the basis of this
production process, knowledge claims are formulated, for example, in manuscripts.
The manuscripts can be reviewed in the context of justification and then selectively
codified before possibly becoming part of the archive of science.
This evolutionary dynamic of scholarly discourse has become part of the self-
understanding of the sciences (e.g., Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). Communications
are not grounded, but anchored by codes. Using Neurath’s (1932/33, p. 206) well-
known metaphor: “The ship has to be rebuilt while a storm is raging on the open
sea.” Popper (1935) formulated, as follows:
8Husserl (1929 [1960]), at p. 156 in the English translation.
9Luhmann insists that codes are binary and unique.
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The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science does
not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp.
It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp,
but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not
because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles
are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (p. 111)
The codes can be the unintended results of repeating patterns of communication;
the logic of the codes is intersubjective, while individual intentions are subjective.
The patterns develop in terms of selections over time operating upon selections
at each moment. Some selections can be selected for stabilization along a trajec-
tory; some stabilizations can be selected for globalization and thus be incorporated.
Whereas trajectories coordinate historical practices, regimes structure expectations
or, in other words, the domain of possible practices. As a next-order emerges (after
a bi-furcation), the meanings of the communications may have to be restructured
because of unbalances in the system.
In a study entitled “The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity with Husserl,”
Alfred Schutz (1952, at p. 105) 10 objected that Husserl’s concept of “intersubjectiv-
ity” could ultimately not be grounded. As Schutz put it:
All communication, whether by so-called expressive movements, deictic gestures, or the use
of visual or acoustic signs, already presupposes an external event in that common surrounding
world which, according to Husserl, is not constituted except by communication. (Schutz,
1975, at p. 72).11
Such a “grounding,” however, was not Husserl’s intention. In his philosophy
“intersubjectivity” remains intentional, whereas Schutz argued in favor of an exis-
tential grounding of intersubjectivity in a “we,” for example, when he went on to
say: “As long as man is born from woman, intersubjectivity and the we-relationship
will be the foundation for all other categories of human existence” (ibid., at p. 82).12
Schutz wished to ground the communication in the “life-world” as a common frame
of reference for the communicating agents—for example, when “making music
together” (Schutz, 1951; cf. Johnson & Leydesdorff, early view)—he criticized
Husserl for explaining this ground as a result of intersubjective communication.
Husserl’s intentional intersubjectivity is not a layer that objectively “exists,” but it
can be considered as a logic. This logic enriches the system and our reflexive under-
standing of it. Latour (1996) and Maturana (2000) suggested independently of each
other to call thismode of pending existence “inter-objectivity.”)According toHusserl
(1929, at p. 159), however, “intersubjectivity precedes being” (italics added, L.). In
the last sectionof theCartesian Meditations (p. 181),Husserl concluded that the study
10Cf. Habermas, 1981, at p. 178f.; Luhmann, 1995, at p. 170.
11‘Alle Kommunikation, ob es sich um eine sogenannte Ausdrucksbewegung, eine Zeigegeste, oder
denGebrauchvisueller oder akustischerZeichenhandelt, setzt bereits einen äußerenVorgang in eben
jener gemeinsamen Umwelt voraus, die nach Husserl erst durch die Kommunikation konstituiert
werden soll’ (Schutz, 1952, at p. 97).
12‘Solange Menschen von Müttern geboren werden, fundiert Intersubjektivität und Wir-beziehung
alle anderen Kategorien des Menschseins’ (Schutz, 1952, at p. 105).
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of intersubjective intentionality can provide us with “a concrete ontology and theory
of science.” While Schutz’s argument of grounding asks for an origin and an expla-
nation in terms of the genesis of what is to be explained, the intentional perspective
inverts the arrow of time and considers future possibilities and constraints explaining
current states. The theory of intersubjective intentionality opens the communication
towards investigating future states as causal drivers.
In later chapters, I will address this issue in terms of recursions and incursions
in anticipatory systems. I shall argue that the sciences can be considered as gener-
ating rationalized systems of expectations. The rationalization requires specific codes
which operate as feedbacks selectively structuring and regulating the claims of
novelty.
1.8.2 Autopoiesis
By operating in terms of repeated selections, patterns are shaped. A network is first
constructed in terms of links which build upon each other over time. The resulting
structure has an architecture; one can expect main axes. Communications can be
expected to differentiate along themain axes into perspectives providing possibilities
for specific coordinations.
In formal terms, one can describe this differentiation in the communication as the
emergence of eigenvectors or principal components of the communication matrix
when this matrix is repeatedly multiplied by itself. The differentiation of coordi-
nation in terms of codes allows for more complexity, and can thus accelerate the
communication. Luhmann took these concepts from cyberneticians and mathemat-
ical biologistswritingmainly inGerman, among themHeinz von Foerster (e.g., 1960,
1993) and Ernst von Glasersfeld. Von Glasersfeld (2008, at p. 64, n. 4) translated
one of Luhmann’s (1992, p. 46) formulations into English as follows:
Even if the self-description of society springs only from a recursive network of observations
of observations and descriptions of descriptions, one might expect that eigenwerte (“eigen-
values,” L.) arise in the course of these operations, that is, positions that will no longer change
in further observations of observations but that will remain more or less stable.
Von Glasersfeld, however, qualified this “as an elegant but rather loose metaphor”
(p. 64, n. 4).13 Von Foerster’s (1960) model of self-organization and the autopoiesis
model of Varela, Maturana and Uribe (1974) build on the same intuitions. These
scholars had met one another at the Biological Computer Laboratory (BCL) in
Urbana, Illinois (Pickering, 2010). Maturana (1978) further elaborated the model
of autopoiesis into “a biology of language and knowledge” (Maturana & Varela,
1980 and 1984). However, Maturana remained cautiously a biologist in his formu-
lations: the aim was to explain linguistic behavior—Maturana (e.g., 2000) uses
“languaging”—and not human language or the cultural content of knowledge itself.
13The eigenvalue of an eigenvector is the factor by which the eigenvector is scaled when multiplied
by the matrix.
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Can the biological model be extended for capturing interhuman communciatons?
One can imagine that one understands languaging animals (whales, monkeys, etc.),
but “languaging” remains a metaphor. However, the sociological analysis requires
access to content since both commitment (Weber’s Verstehen) and value-freeness
are needed. Only human languages are sufficiently complex and flexible to carry the
richness of such an analysis.
1.8.3 Parsons’ Media Theory
Following Parsons (e.g., 1968), Luhmann proposed to analyze society as function-
ally differentiated. The functional subsystems (economics, science, policy, etc.) each
develop their own logic by entertaining a “symbolically generalized medium of
communication” with a specific code. However, the relations between the codes and
the media were formulated a bit differently in Parsons’ and Luhmann’s sociolo-
gies. These differences were analyzed, for example, by Künzler (1987, 1989), who
formulated (Künzler, 1987, at p. 323; my translation) as follows:
In contrast to Parsons,who refers to linguistic codemodels, Luhmannwanted, in his program-
matic explanations, the media-theoretical code term initially related to the model of the
genetic code. Luhmann understands a code as a duplication rule that provides two possible
expressions for occurrences and states that exist only once […] (see Luhmann, 1981: 246;
1975: 172).
Künzler argues that unlike Parsons’ linguistic codes, Luhmann’s codes can be
considered as (meta-)biological duplication rules which are turned “on” or “off” in a
binarymode, as in the case of DNA (Habermas, 1987; Künzler, 1987: p. 331; Leydes-
dorff, 2000, 2006a). However, this biological perspective pays insufficient attention
to the specificity of inter-human communications when the code is reduced to the
dichotomy true/false.14 Only mathematical and logical statements can be proven true
or false. Empirical statements can only be more or less uncertain.
Herbert Simon’s (1973) characterization of the sciences as operating in terms of
truth-finding (heuristics) and puzzle-solving, and thus with more than a single code,
seems empirically more fruitful to me. A binary scheme of “true/false” does not
inform us either theoretically or empirically.15 The specification of uncertainties—
grey shades—based on probabilities which vary between zero and one, can be made
relevant for empirical research.
Merton (1948) criticized Parsons’ sociology as not fruitful for empirical research
in the social sciences because of the a priori of a general scheme of analytically
distinguished functions. What is “functional” from one perspective, however, can be
14Luhmann uses “true/not-true”; for an assumed difference between “not-true” and “false,” see for
example Luhmann (1990a, b, at p. 416).
15Information-theoretically, both extremes of a binary distribution (p = 0 and p = 1) lead to a
message without information (sing 1 * log(1) = 0 and 0 * log(0) is also zero. In the case of a ratio
50/50, however, one bit of information can be expected.
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dysfunctional from another perspective or in a next stage, and differentiation can also
be expected to operate in opposition to integration (Mittroff, 1974). As an alternative,
Merton argued in favor of “middle-range” theories. There is not one single selection
mechanism or set of selection mechanisms operating, but a variety of processes of
codification which are both horizontally and vertically integrated and differentiated.
As Merton (1948) formulated:
I have suggested only that an explicitly formulated theory does not invariably precede empir-
ical inquiry, that as amatter of plain fact the theorist is not inevitably the lamp lighting theway
to new observations. The sequence is often reversed. Nor is it enough to say that research and
theory must be married if sociology is to bear legitimate fruit. They must not only exchange
solemn vows—they must know how to carry on from there. Their reciprocal roles must be
clearly defined. (p. 515)
I agree that empirical research develops alongside theory-development. However,
the question to be raised seems to me: what precisely is differentiated and integrated,
at which level and by which mechanisms? Action, for example, is integrative in
the performance; differentiation, however, is structural. Whether a differentiation is
functional can be investigated empirically.
In my opinion, not the functions but the codifications are differentiated. In
an invited response to my (2012) paper entitled “Radical Constructivism and
Radical Constructedness: Luhmann’s Sociology of Semantics, Organizations, and
Self-Organization,” Distin (2012, p. 95) formulated as follows:
[…] while natural languages correspond to Luhmann’s (linguistically-structured) commu-
nication media, and artefactual languages to his (linguistically-structured) dissemination
media, the term symbolically generalized communication media is amisnomer. I have argued
elsewhere (Distin 2011: 146–165) thatmoney is an artefactual language; butLuhmann’s other
examples, such as truth, love, and power, cannot meaningfully be called either languages or
media.
In her book entitled Cultural Evolution, Distin (2010) elaborated the definition
of “meta-representations,” as follows:
A metarepresentation is a representation of another representation. Its content is that other
representation, and crucially this includes information about both form and content. The
ability to metarepresent is the ability to recognise the distinction between the two: to reflect
on the connection between a representation and the information that it represents. The infor-
mation that evolves, when we metarepresent, is information about how we represent. To
put this another way, once we start comparing the representational features of different lan-
guages, the two systems effectively begin to compete with each other, under representational
pressure.
As the briefest glance at modern culture makes clear, our cognitive escape route from the
restrictions of our native language has not been restricted to other natural languages. Limited
as it is by the length of the critical period and by the human capacity for learning, natural
language has become, over time, inadequate to the representational task that it was originally
set. If language is to account for cultural evolution, then we need to look beyond natural
language to the artefactual languages that have evolved in its wake. (p. 86)
When themeta-representations operate both upon one another and upon represen-
tations in one or more cycles, redundancy and therefore new options can be expected
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(Krippendorff, 2009b). New options can be added to the communication because
of synergies in interactions among codes (Leydesdorff et al., 2017). As noted, the
generation of options is crucial, for example, for the viability of innovation systems
(Petersen et al., 2016).
In summary: flows of communication are molded by selective codes, on the one
hand, and variation, on the other. These contexts provide two analytically different
perspectives on the same events; the data can be organized using different logics.
From an historical perspective, one focuses on variation and agency, and the potential
morphogenesis of systemic relations in the data. From an evolutionary perspective,
the focus is on the samedata indicating selection environmentswhich can be specified
on the basis of a reflexive turn. Analogously, human minds not only partake in the
network dynamics as the constructive agents who generate variation, but can at the
same time be involved reflexively in the processes of providing meaning to the data.
The perceptive role is different from the constructive one.
Increases in the number of options provide evolutionary advantages in terms of,
for example, viability of systems (Petersen et al., 2016; Stafford Beer, 1989). New
options can be generated in translations among differently coded communications.
Agents mediate in the translations. Following Parsons, Weinstein and Platt (1969),
for example, considered the generation of new options for experiencing and action
as a driver of cultural evolution. New options can also be generated in synergies and
frictions between the codes of communication, on the one side, and consciousness,
on the other.
When Latour (1983), for example, quoted Pasteur saying “Give me a laboratory,
and Iwill raise theworld,” the resultingworldwas a new option attributed (by Latour)
to Pasteur’s imagination of a vaccine. Historically, Pasteur demonstrated his capacity
to vaccinate cows against cow-pox to journalists. The journalists had to formulate
“infra-reflexively” (Latour, 1988, at p. 169 ff.) the translation of scientific news to
newspaper items. Their work is both reflection and action. The relations between
scientific and journalistic coding are made specific in instances.
The codes provide the selection criteria; selection environments drive one another:
horizontally as triple-helices, and vertically because some selections are selected for
stabilization, and some stabilizations can be selected for globalization. The trade-
offs between stabilization (de-stabilization, meta-stabilization) and globalization are
empirical and therefore amenable to the measurement. I shall argue that knowl-
edge dynamics can be considered as a third coordination mechanism at the supra-
individual level interacting with wealth generation in industry and political control
by governance and regulations.
1.9 The Triple Helix Model
How and why did I relate Luhmann’s analysis to the Triple Helix (TH) model of
University-Industry-Government Relations? Whitley (1984) may have been the first
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to point to the transformation of the macro-system because of the function of “orga-
nized knowledge production and control” in reputationally controlled organizations.
The control function is no longer carried by individual agents (for example, a prin-
cipal agent; Van der Meulen, 1998). Functions are coded at the above-individual
level. Whereas political economy can be explained in terms of two coordination
mechanisms (markets and governments), a knowledge-based economy is the result
of three coordination mechanisms interacting and operating upon one another. Inter-
actions among three selection environments shape a triple helix with properties very
different from double helices.
The crucial book for relating Luhmann’s theory to these empirical questions was,
from my (autobiographical) perspective, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (The
Science of Society; Luhmann, 2000). In 1989 Peter Weingart, then Professor at the
Faculty of Sociology in Bielefeld, providedmewith a copy of the manuscript version
of this book when we met at a workshop in Amsterdam. For me, this study clarified
Luhmann’smore programmatic book Soziale Systeme (Social Systems, 1995 [1984]),
which at the time I had found difficult to read. When the book about the sciences
was published the following year (1990), however, I saw possibilities to relate this
theory to my methods and techniques.
In 1992 I wrote a review for Science, Technology, & Human Values, the journal
of the Society for the Social Studies of Science (4S; Leydesdorff, 1992). For the
purpose of enriching the discourse in STSwith these new perspectives, I furthermore
organized a nationwide colloquium in Amsterdam, where we discussed a chapter of
the book each week. Furthermore, I organized a discussion between Luhmann and
Latour in a plenary session of the combined meetings in Bielefeld (Germany) of the
Society for the Social Studies of Science (4S) and the European Association for the
Study of Science and Technology (EASST), on 12 October 1996 (Wagner, 1996).
At that occasion, Luhmann mentioned that he was ill. However, he felt relieved that
his final book in the series entitled Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (The Society of
Society) had been sent to the publisher (Luhmann, 1997a, b). OnMay 11–12, 1998, I
had the honor to replaceLuhmannat aworkshopon “Autopoiesis andSocial Systems”
held at the London School of Economics (organized by EveMittleton-Kelly, andwith
Humberto Maturana and Günter Teubner among the speakers). Luhmann passed
away on November 6, 1998.
At the time of the publication ofDie Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, I was finishing
my own (1995) book entitled The Challenge of Scientometrics: The Development,
Measurement, and Self -Organization of Scientific Communications. My idea was
first to specify a model of the self-organization of scientific communications, and
then to add incrementally to the complexity by studying the interactions among
codes at interfaces into technological innovations. Which models in science studies
can be translated into technology studies, and how are other codes recombined into
innovations in a knowledge-based economy?
Focusing on technological development and innovation, Gertrud Blauwhof took
the lead in her Ph.D. project entitled The Non-linear Dynamics of Technological
Developments: An exploration of telecommunications technology (Blauwhof, 1995;
Blauwhof & Leydesdorff, 1993). Among other things, Gertrud spent some time in
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Fig. 1.2 a Integration in the overlaps among the three helices of a Triple Helix. b Differentiation
and hypercyclic integration at the next level
Bielefeld during 1993 in order to attend Luhmann’s lectures. I began in these years
to offer my yearly course on Luhmann and self-organization.
Although Luhmann’s writings remained a source of inspiration (e.g., Leydes-
dorff, 2005, 2013), my research interests further evolved in terms of methodologies
(Leydesdorff, 2001). In collaborations with Peter van den Besselaar, we focused on
the non-linear dynamics of technology and innovation using simulations (Leydes-
dorff & van den Besselaar, 1998a, b; van den Besselaar & Leydesdorff, 1992, 1993).
In 1993 Peter and I organized a workshop entitled Evolutionary Economics and
Chaos Theory: New directions for technology studies (Leydesdorff & van den Besse-
laar, 1994). In the “Epilogue” to the book I depicted the option of a hypercycle
(Fig. 1.2b) as an integration mechanism among three cycles that is different from the
usual overlap depicted in Fig. 1.2a.
The elaboration of this hyper-cycle model into a Triple Helix (TH) of university-
industry-government relations followed in a projectwithHenryEtzkowitz (Etzkowitz
& Leydesdorff, 1995, 1997, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) in the years there-
after, and increasingly with other colleagues as well. Etzkowitz (1994) contributed
a chapter entitled “Academic-Industry Relations: A Sociological Paradigm for
Economic Development” to our 1994 book (pp. 139–151). When we met again in
1995 at a workshop in Abisko (Sweden), we agreed on “the triple helix of university-
industry-government” as a common topic (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1995; see
Chap. 5).
The extension of bilateral university-industry relations—Etzkowitz’smain topic at
the time—to trilateral university-industry-government relations was essential from
my perspective, since the model of a hypercycle is only meaningful in the case
of three (or more) subdynamics. The “hypercycle”—indicated with a dotted line in
Fig. 1.2b—provides ametaphor for the supra-individual dynamics that give intersub-
jective meaning to the meanings provided by the carrying cycles. In other words, the
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emerging next-order-level “overlay” can contain a meta-representation of the indi-
vidual representations and their interactions. This meta-representation in the hyper-
cycle feeds back as a regime on the underlying dynamics which evolve historically
along trajectories.
This historical development is recursive: the current state of a system (xt) is a
function of the previous state (xt–t) in the historical world. However, the feedback of
a hyper-cycle operates against the arrow of time: the expected state at a next moment
of time (t + t) incurs on the carrying cycles. Expectations can incur on the present
system because they are no longer only subjective; the intersubjectively carried code
is the operator. This incursion of a mechanism operating on the recursive (that is,
historical) dynamics against the arrow of time introduces the logic of anticipatory
systems.
1.10 Anticipatory Systems
The hyper-cycle (in Fig. 1.2b) does not “exist” in the sense of being observable,
but operates in terms of expectations. The next state can be anticipated by (human)
agents with the reflexive capacity to make assumptions and to entertain a model.
Using amodel, the various options can then be explored. Thus, I will propose (in later
chapters) to supplement the historical triple-helix dynamics, developing along the
arrow of time and generating probabilistic entropy, with a feedback arrow of systems
of expectations that operate against the arrowof time andgenerate redundancy instead
of (Shannon-type) information.
The theory and computation of anticipatory systems were introduced to me by
Daniel M. Dubois, at a conference on “Emergence” in Amiens (France) in 1996
(Leydesdorff, 1996). Dubois had read my Epilogue to the 1994 book and invited me
as a member of the international board of his conferences about the Computation of
Anticipatory Systems (CASYS) held bi-annually in Liège, Belgium, since 1997. In
2007, I had the honor to give the Vice-Presidential lecture entitled “The Communi-
cation of Meaning in Anticipatory Systems: A Simulation Study of the Dynamics of
Intentionality in Social Interactions,” included (albeit differently organized) in this
book as Chap. 8.
The Triple-Helix model and the modeling of anticipatory systems can be related.
Feedback and feedforward loops among the subdynamics can be expected to generate
both uncertainty—forward and historically—and redundancy—backward and evolu-
tionarily. However, the measurement theories for these two dynamics are very
different; the difference is not only an inversion along the time dimension. The
transition from a previous state (at t = t) to a next state (at t = t + t) can be very
different from the reverse transition (in discrete time).
I shall use information theory to describe the historical process with a posi-
tive sign and the evolutionary one operating as a feedback with a negative sign.
(One could also use other statistics—for example, analysis of variance (McGill &
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Quastler, 1955)—for measuring this TH dynamics, but the relation with the evolu-
tionary perspective is then lost.) Information theory allows us to study the evolution
of communication systems and thus to address the questions formulated above as the
core of Luhmann’s theoretical program: “How are these theories—communication
theory, systems theory, and evolution theory—related to one another? What unifies
them? How must a theory that integrates them be constructed?” (Luhmann, 1975, at
p. 96; Luhmann 1982b, at p. 261.)
The proposed operationalizations and methods for the measurement make
it possible to distinguish between historical organization and evolutionary self-
organization as a vertical dynamic which operates on the horizontal differentiation
among wealth generation in industry, novelty production in academia, and norma-
tive control and governance. However, the theory and computation of anticipation
were not part of Luhmann’s sociology, although he noted the intuition that “(S)elf-
referential autopoietic reproduction would not be possible without an anticipatory
recursivity” (Luhmann, 1995, at p. 446f.). He added that such an analysis should be
performed “with sufficient precision.” Luhmann ([1997a] 2012) provided at some
places (e.g., [pp. 206, 820] 2012, Vol. 1, p. 123; 2013, Vol. 2, p. 137) footnotes to
Rosen’s (1985) book entitled Anticipatory Systems: Philosophical, Mathematical
and Methodological Foundations, but these references were not further elaborated.
The mathematical biologist Robert Rosen first defined anticipatory systems as
systems that entertain models of themselves (Rosen, 1985). The model represents a
future state that is available in the present and can be used for further development.
Dubois (1998) provided an operationalization of Rosen’s model, and Dubois (2003)
added the distinction between weak and strong anticipation. As human beings we
ourselves can be considered as weakly anticipatory systems: we are able to construct
and entertain different models of ourselves, but we are also historically constrained
by our current state (“the body”). We are able to construct our present state (at t)
with reference to both our past (t – 1) and our mentally envisaged states at future
moments in time (t + 1, t + 2, …, etc.)
As against weakly anticipatory systems, strongly anticipatory ones construct their
next state exclusively from expectations representing states at t + t. However, one
cannot expect a systemother than systemsof expectations to operate in thismode. (All
other systems also take their past and/or present states into account as independent
variables.) The constraint of having to be historical vanishes at the level of supra-
individual expectations, since communications are not a living or even “existing”
system. The evolutionary dynamics of strong anticipation in terms of interacting
expectations is meta-historical; from this perspective, the history of the system is
only one among other subdynamics. The historical descriptions can specify only the
morpho-genesis of the system(s) under study (Archer 1995).
For example, one can expect the rule of law to operate as a highly codified
system of expectations at the supra-individual level. As noted, this does not preclude
that human consciousness plays a crucial role in its instantiations and translations.
The rule of law, for example, presumes that judges are able to instantiate codi-
fied expectations in each verdict. Note that these expectations are not only socially
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constructed, but also codified at the above-individual level. One can observe the foot-
prints of the evolutionary dynamics in history in specific forms of organization (e.g.,
courts) and along trajectories of discourse (e.g., jurisprudence). From an evolutionary
perspective, the observable systems can also be considered as retention mechanisms.
In other words, the observable phenotypes are historical, but the “genotypes” are
theoretical and meta-historical (Langton, 1989, p. 6). Unlike the biological code
(DNA), the codes of communication are not materially given. The codes remain res
cogitans: structures of expectations, which one can (re)construct using theories; that
is, as hypotheses. Selections in this domain are no longer “natural,” but culturally
constructed. The selection mechanisms operate in terms of criteria which are coded
into the communications.
The codes of communication can be expected to remain in flux. They can further
be developed so that they can process more complexity. As Luhmann ([1997, p. 205]
2012, p. 123) stated: “A complex research program is hence envisaged.” Luhmann’s
theory provides substantive theorizing, but the author sometimes shows an aversion
to statistics and the testing of hypotheses (cf. Stäheli, 2000). Inmy opinion, one needs
both a substantive and a measurement theory so that observations can eventually be
flagged as statistically significant or not.
1.11 The Measurement of Triple-Helix Synergy
At a workshop about Semiotics, Evolution, Energy, and Development (SEED) in
Toronto in 2002, the ecologist Robert Ulanowicz suggested usingmutual information
in three dimensions for the purpose of measuring the overlay in TH configurations
(Ulanowicz, 1986, at p. 143). There is a substantial literature about this measure
since McGill (1954) introduced it (e.g., Yeung, 2008). The cybernetician W. Ross
Ashby, for example, explained the measure as the amount of information (e.g., in
bits) due to the unique combination of a number of variables, and not reducible to any
of its subsets. Krippendorff (2009a, p. 193) mentions that Ashby was so fascinated
with this “synergy” indicator that he wore a necklace consisting of three interlinked
chains. The necklace had the property of falling apart into separate chains if any one
of them was cut.
One can consider mutual information in more than two dimensions as a quan-
titative indicator of synergy among the parts: the additional options are generated
in the interactions among the codes of communication as a level different from the
interactions among the observable communicators (Krippendorff, 1980).
Although it follows from the Shannon equations that the value of this indicator can
be negative, this generates a puzzle in information theory. Shannon-type information
can by definition only be positive—because of Shannon’s (1948) choice for the H in
the second law of thermodynamics (S = kB * H; H = −Σi pi ∗ log2(pi )). It follows
that this indicator should not be considered a Shannon entropy: it measures feedback
from a (hypothesized) future state in a loop both with and against the arrow of time
(Krippendorff, 2009a).
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A further complication is that the indicator changes sign with the dimensionality
of the system(s) under study (Krippendorff, 2009b). While synergy is indicated by
negative values in the case of three dimensions, it is positive in the case of four, etc.
From the perspective of the TH, one would like to have an indicator which could be
extended beyond the Triple helix to a Quadruple, Quintuple, or N-tuple helix in a
single framework (Carayannis & Campbell, 2009, 2010).
In October 2013, Inga Ivanova noted in an email conversation that mutual
information in three (or more) dimensions can only be negative as redundancy and
not as information. In other words, one can extend the Shannon-framework with a
theory (and a calculus) of redundancy (see Chap. 4 for the technical elaboration).
In information theory, redundancy and uncertainty are by definition each other’s
complement to the maximum information content of a distribution. Adding to
the redundancy reduces the relative information. I shall argue that the generation
of redundancy from reflexive interactions provides the selection mechanism that
Luhmann (1990a, b, at p. 27; see above) envisaged.
1.12 Concluding Remarks
The number of options available to an innovation system may be more decisive for
its survival than the historically already-realized innovations. Although uncertainty
features in all innovation processes (Freeman & Soete, 1997, p. 242 ff.), it poses
crucial challenges to the governance of innovation. An indicator of surplus options
can thus be appreciated in innovation studies from the two perspectives of (i) reducing
uncertainty and (ii) increasing the number of not-yet-realized options.
First, one would expect a configuration with less prevailing uncertainty to be
more rewarding with regard to risk-taking than configurations with high uncertainty.
Reduction of the prevailing uncertainty provides dynamic opportunities comparable
to local niches—that is, protected spaces that allow for experimentation with other
co-evolutions between selection environments (e.g., Schot & Geels, 2008, p. 537).
Second, an increase in redundancy is an effect at the systems level—that is, a result
of interacting selection mechanisms. Among the total number of possible options,
the redundancy represents the options that have not (yet) been realized. An increase
in this number does not affect the number of the realized options (Brooks & Wiley,
1986, p. 43; cf. Khalil &Boulding, 1996). Redundancy can be generated by synergy
in the interactions among the codes.
In summary: whereas university-industry-government relations are historical and
therefore amenable to forms ofmeasurement, I shall use theTripleHelixmodel below
(Chaps. 4–7) also as proxies for novelty production in academia, wealth generation
in industry, and normative regulation by governments as three interacting perspec-
tives. In Chap. 5 this TH model is generalized to a model of interactions among
demand, supply, and control as the three dynamics structurally required in innovation
processes.
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A cognitive and future-oriented input to S&T policies can thus be envisaged. In
Chap. 6, I demonstrate this empirically—using data of Statistics Italy—for the rela-
tions between local, regional, and national innovation systems in Italy; the measure-
ment instrument for synergy is further developed in Chap. 7 into a computer routine.
Using a matrix of aggregated references among journals, for example, one can map
which combinations of journals are most synergetic. The measurement of synergy
will be compared with that of interdisciplinarity.
The core of the book begins at Chap. 4. Chapters 2 and 3 are needed to position
these contributions in relation to mainstream STS (Chap. 3), philosophy of science,
and epistemology (Chap. 2). I elaborate my own philosophical position in Chap. 10.
Chapters 4–9 explore the newperspectives both theoretically and in terms ofmethods.
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Part I
The Sociocybernetics of Scientific
Knowledge
Chapter 2
The Communication Turn in Philosophy
of Science
Whereas knowledge has often been attributed to individuals or, from a sociological perspec-
tive, to communities, a communications perspective on the sciences enables us to proceed to
themeasurement of the discursive knowledge contents. Knowledge claims are organized into
texts which are entrained in evolving structures. The aggregated citation relations among
journals, for example, can be used to visualize disciplinary structures. The structures are
reproduced as “ecosystems” which differ among them in terms of using specific codes in
the communications (e.g., jargons). Unlike biological DNA, these codes are not hard-wired;
they can be changed in the communication. The sciences develop historically along trajecto-
ries embedded in regimes of expectations. Regimes exert selection pressure on the historical
manifestations. The evolutionary dynamics at the regime level induce crises, bifurcations,
etc., as historical events.
In addition to his many discoveries, Galileo changed the philosophy of science
of his time by considering the Book of Nature no longer as God’s Revelation, but as
a text open to debate and revision. In his well-known Preface to the second edition
of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), Kant reflected on this crucial step in the
development of the modern sciences, as follows:
WhenGalileo causedballs, theweights ofwhich he hadhimself previously determined, to roll
down an inclined plane; when Torricelli made the air carry a weight which he had calculated
beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of water; or in more recent times, when
Stahl changedmetal into lime, and lime back into metal, by withdrawing something and then
restoring it, a light broke upon all students of nature.[…] Reason, holding in one hand its
principles, according to which alone concordant appearances can be admitted as equivalent
to laws, and in the other hand the experiment which it has devised in conformity with these
principles, must approach nature in order to be taught by it.[…] It is thus that the study of
nature has entered on the secure path of a science, after having for so many centuries been
nothing but a process of merely random groping.
The chapter is partly based on: Leydesdorff, L. (2015). The Sciences are Discursive Constructs:
The Communication Perspective as an Empirical Philosophy of Science. In L. Cantoni & J. A.
Danowski (Eds.), Communication and technology (pp. 553–562). Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter
Mouton.
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Beyond Kant, who focused on the transcendental relation between individual
reasoning and truth,Galileowas thoroughly aware of the communicative nature of the
new sciences. For example, he entitled his booksDialogo (1632) andDiscorsi (1638),
respectively. The scholastic form of a disputatio had been used by him in earlier work
(e.g.,Disputatio de coelo, 1616) andwas still in use by his adversaries.1 However, this
monological style was increasingly abandoned in favor of dialogue as the new mode
for generating, validating, and reproducing knowledge (Biagioli, 2003). Discursive
knowledge is shaped in communications among reflexive participants with reference
to supra-individual horizons of meaning.
The cycling of discursive knowledge in communication networks makes the
criteria stable and then potentially global. In his book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, Kuhn (1962) used the “Copernican turn” of the sixteenth and early
seventeenth century—Galileo’s heliocentric worldview—as the prime example of a
paradigm change. The Scientific Revolution changed the communication and control
structures in the sciences at the above-individual level.
2.1 Discursive Knowledge
A communication-theoretical perspective on the philosophy of science can be elabo-
rated into empirical research: the dynamics of theory development can be operational-
ized in terms of communication dynamics (Krohn et al., 1990; Rorty et al., 1992).
The modern sciences are discursive and mediated. The mediation of knowledge
production by scientific literature was historically made possible after the inven-
tion of the printing press in the second half of the fifteenth century (Eisenstein,
1979, 1983; Luhmann, 1981). Free presses for printing Protestant translations of the
Bible were organized first in Geneva and Lausanne during the sixteenth century, and
then in Amsterdam and Leiden in the early seventeenth century. During most of the
seventeenth century, however, scholars still communicated by means of letters.
In 1665, the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society appeared as the
first scholarly journal, followed in 1666 by the Journal des Sçavants in French.
The increased circulation of knowledge triggered a bi-furcation between the knowl-
edge production flow and the control mechanisms during the Scientific Revolution.
The further organization of the sciences as written knowledge in scholarly journals
followed as an achievement of mainly the eighteenth century (e.g., Bazerman, 1988).
The modern citation was gradually invented in the course of the nineteenth century
(Price, 1961, p. 166). A cultural evolution of communications in layers has thus been
induced.
Themain function of a referencewas first, for example, mentioning thosewho had
attended an experiment. The argumentative function in relating texts to other texts
gradually emerged in scientific communications, leading first to the institutionaliza-
tion of the sciences; for example, at German universities in terms of Chairs during
1E.g., Orazio Crassi, (1619). De tribus cometis anni MDCXVIII disputatio astronomica, Rome.
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the 19th century (Stichweh, 1984). The institutionalization can be considered as a
retention mechanism of novelty (cf. Freeman & Perez, 1998), but the new forms of
organization changed also the nature of the communications. The modern reference,
for example, was invented as a global standard only as recently as the turn of the
twentieth century (Leydesdorff & Wouters, 1999).
The referencing networks select upon the referenced ones, thus allowing for
communications with greater specificity. In our time, hyperlinks relate documents
on the internet in terms of a hypertext; references are embedded in texts as subtexts,
etc. Subtexts and hypertexts can be considered as different contexts of the textually
embedded knowledge. The relationships between these layers of texts, sub-texts, and
super-texts have been transformed by the emergence of electronic communication
and the internet. More specifically, the real-time availability of virtual hypertexts is
changing the systems of referencing, indexing, and retrieval by adding degrees of
freedom to the evolving communications.
From an evolutionary perspective on scientific communication, the texts provide
variation (Callon et al. 1986; Law & Lodge, 1984; Hesse, 1980). By referencing,
a subset of these texts is selected. References and citations can thus be used as
indicators of selection processes. Words and co-words are relatively volatile indica-
tors, while citations may function as symbols and refer preferentially to texts that
have been codified. Indeed, citations can be more than ten times as precise as words
(Braam et al., 1991; Leydesdorff 1989 and 1997a; cf. Garfield 1955). Baumgartner
& Leydesdorff (2014) distinguished between transient and sticky knowledge claims,
operationalized as relatively recent citation at a research front versus longer-term
processes of codification.
2.2 The Modern Citation as an Example of Codification
In the pre-modern era, amanuscript had to be transcribed in amanual process thatwas
prone to error. Nowadays, a new edition of a printed book, however, can be expected
to improve on previous editions by updating the content and correcting errors.Knowl-
edge is continuously being revised in scholarly communications (Price, 1965). Thus,
one no longer proceeds from an original text (like the Bible) to an inferior copy
because of mistakes in the transcriptions. One proceeds from a previous to a next
version by rewriting. This process is social, and since the nineteenth century increas-
ingly organized for the objective of technological applications (e.g., in industrial
laboratories; cf. Bernal, 1939; Braverman, 1984; Noble, 1977; Van den Belt & Rip,
1987).
The modern citation was invented in the late nineteenth century, but first in the
form of references without dates (Bazerman, 1988). This form was replaced with the
current format around 1900. Following the invention of the new form, the older form
of referencing rapidly disappeared and the number of references began to grow expo-
nentially. For the February issue of the Journal of the American Chemical Society
42 2 The Communication Turn in Philosophy of Science
Fig. 2.1 The origins of the modern citation in the Journal of the American Chemical Society
(JACS). Source Leydesdorff and Wouters (1999)
(JACS) in 1910, the number of modern citations had increased to sometimes more
than ten on each single page (Fig. 2.1).2
The development of discursive knowledge presumes the circulation of meanings
as analytically different from the communication of information as texts. The texts are
historical instantiations of the development of the knowledge involved. New words
are sometimes needed: for example, when “oxygen” was invented in the eighteenth
century by Priestly and others to replace “phlogiston”; but at other times the same
word is provided with a new meaning (such as “force” in Newtonian versus Aris-
totelian physics). Another theoretical framework can make a difference to both the
meaning and the expected information content of the messages that are exchanged
(Hesse, 1988; Leydesdorff, 1997; Quine, 1951).
Whereas the communication of information is studied in the information sciences
and in scientometrics, the self-organization of meaning in interhuman commu-
nications has been central to Luhmann’s (1995) efforts to make the theory of
autopoiesis (Maturana &Varela, 1980) or “self-organization” relevant for sociology.
As discussed above (in Chapter One), Luhmann (e.g., 1986) argued that communi-
cations carry the self-organization of meaning. However, Luhmann focused on the
top layers of codification and its dynamics as domains. An empirically richer under-
standing of the sciences as processes of communication can be achieved when the
underlying processes are also taken into account. Can one distinguish between (a)
the communication of information and (b) the sharing of meanings? How should this
difference be modeled and can it perhaps be measured?
2The assumption of exponential growth still grossly underestimates the noted observation in 1910,
while this curve fits at r > 0.99.
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2.3 The Communication Perspective
In the philosophy of science, Popper (1935) distinguished between the context of
discovery and the context of justification. However, the communication perspective
enables us to distinguish three contexts: (i) the local interactions and exchanges
in the context of discovery operating bottom-up and submitting knowledge claims;
(ii) the validation of knowledge in globalized contexts of justification; and (iii) the
mediation between these two levels in terms of texts and discourse. The three contexts
are historically interwoven, but they can be distinguished analytically. The context
of justification can operate as a self-organizing (and largely anonymous) control
mechanism. However, knowledge needs to be instantiated in texts before it can be
reconstructed.
Whereas the context of discovery operates bottom-up, control mechanisms in the
context of justification operate top-down. Discourses—exchanges of arguments—
mediate between these two other levels (Mulkay et al., 1983). Discourses can over-
flow in exchanges between disciplines (Callon, 1998), as well as mediate between
science and society (Gibbons et al., 1994).
The sciences self-organize into disciplines and specialties using specific codes.
The codes are not manifest, but operate as selection mechanisms that coordinate the
communications. Unlike communities of people, codes in the communication can be
stabilized and globalized; communications travel more easily than people (Latour,
1987). Symbolic generalization of the codes at the global level span horizons of
meanings. Note that this is an analytical model in which the dynamics are taken apart.
Both horizontally (as different codes) and vertically (as different mechanisms), the
various subdynamics of communication operate in parallel and can be expected to
disturb one another.
Without mentioning—but, in my opinion, building on—Herbert Simon’s
(1962,1973) theory of complex systems, Luhmann (1975) proposed to distinguish
three mechanisms in the dynamics of communication: interactions, organization,
and self-organization. From this perspective, the interactions provide variation; for
example, knowledge claims. However, this variation has to be organized (e.g., in
texts) before its content can further be selected for globalization. Globalization refers
to a next systems level in which codes of communication are self-organizing; for
example, by disturbing one another.
The construction is bottom-up, but the cybernetic principle is that the selecting
next-order level is structural and can take over control as it emerges. Thismodel is also
known as reaction–diffusion dynamics (Rashevsky, 1940; Turing, 1952). If diffusion
becomesmore important than the flux in the production process (for technical reasons
divided by 2), the system becomes unstable and can go through a phase transition. A
phase transition changes the dynamics of the system irreversibly.Which subdynamic
prevails depends on the initial (and potentially random)deviations fromhomogeneity.
Without having concepts like phase-transitions and bifurcations available at his
time, Marx (1867) went to great lengths to explain why the exchange of commodi-
ties through the mediation of money (“Ware-Geld-Ware” or WGW) is qualitatively
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different from the exchange of money via the mediation of commodities (“Geld-
Ware-Geld” or GWG; see Marx, ([1867], 1995, pp. 66 ff.).3 The dynamics of money
are more abstract than those of material commodities. The price of a commodity can
be considered as an expectation of its value, and thus this symbolic generalization of
value in terms of prices enables us to handle greater complexity in the communica-
tion and at a higher speed. “Alienation” may follow when the driving forces of social
developments are self-organizing and therefore increasingly beyond the control of
individuals (Platt & Weinstein, 1971).
Analogously, in the sciences—albeit less frequently than in everyday transac-
tions on the market—the submission of a knowledge claim (usually in the form of a
manuscript) relates the context justification to the context of discovery in which new
insights have heretofore been shaped. The epistemological status of the knowledge
content under discussion is changed by entering into the differently organized layer
of communications invoked for validation and justification. However, the context
of discovery remains necessary as the source of the historical variation; the context
of justification functions as a next-order control mechanism that operates latently
alongside the context of discovery. The two dynamics—the historical one of gener-
ating specific claims versus selections from the perspective of hindsight—can be
expected to operate with different frequencies, and also to disturb each other.
Bybeing repeatedly selected, knowledge claims canbe stabilized,meta-stabilized,
and also globalized as next-order structures and dynamics in networks. However,
these constructs remain fragile and in need of reconstruction. Unlike social networks,
which find their stability in human and institutional agents as carriers of the commu-
nications on the ground, communication networks are event-based: communication
is an operation that disappears as it happens (Snijders et al., 2010). Consequently,
stability is constructed and needs to be explained (Latour, 1987). The reproduction
of communication is anchored, on the one hand, in the layer of agents carrying the
communications from below; but on the other hand, communications are selected
from above at the supra-individual level with reference to next-order structures such
as the codes of communication emerging within the communication networks as
meta-representations which span horizons of meaning (Distin, 2010). The next-order
dynamics is not resting (with a lower frequency) on the underlying ones, but tends
to differentiate with a dynamic of its own. This endogenous mechanism can drive a
phase transition to a more complex arrangement.
2.4 Operationalization and Measurement
The communication perspective on the sciences as evolving structures enables us
to proceed to empirical operationalizations. For example, the variation of scientific
communications is visible first in the form of claims in manuscripts (Myers, 1985;
3“Ware-Geld-Ware” can be translated as “Commodity-Money-Commodity;” seeMarx, 1995, pp. 66
ff.




Fig. 2.2 Aggregated journal-journal citation network among 24 journals cited in Public Under-
standing of Science in 2011 to the extent of more than 1% of all references; cosine > 0.1; Blondel
et al.’s (2008) modularity used for the clustering in Pajek; Q = 0.447.
Pinch, 1985). These knowledge claims are organized into bodies of scholarly knowl-
edge and literature. The literature can be used to visualize the coding into specialisms
and disciplines.
Figure 2.2 shows, as an example, the relevant citation environment for the 141
authors who published at least one of the 67 papers in the journal Public Under-
standingof Science (PUS) in 2011. After removing the incidental citations (< 1%),
three main groups of journals are indicated at this aggregated level: communication
studies, science communication, and science education.4
Figure 2.2 is based on a matrix of aggregated journal-journal relations among 24
journals cited in PUS in 2011. Using papers instead of journals as units of analysis,
one can, for example, analyze the references to journals in the 67 papers published in
2011 (Fig. 2.3).While Fig. 2.2. shows howPUS as a journal is related to a larger set—
providing horizons of relevance—the individual papers published in 2011 reference
4Three factors explain 43.06% of the variance.
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Science Communication 
Science Studies 
Fig. 2.3 Bibliographic coupling among ten journals cited above the 1%-level in 67 papers published
in Public Understanding of Science in 2011; cosine > 0.1; Q = 0.1373
specific literatures. These bibliographic couplings of references (mapped in Fig. 2.3)
are instantiations in a specific year (2011) of the latent and self-organizing structures
of the relevant disciplines shown in Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.4 shows the substantive variation in terms of the topics under study
in the same 67 papers. One can further enrich the map by adding the co-author
network, their institutional affiliations, national and international collaborations, etc.
The tools of social and semantic network analysis enable us to study the dynamics
in the various dimensions of the sciences in considerable detail (e.g., Leydesdorff
et al., 2008; Scharnhorst et al., 2012).
2.5 Concluding Remarks
The shaping of the context of mediation has followed the historical development of
communication technologies. For example, the printing press made the development
of the sciences possible from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. The late twen-
tieth century has witnessed the emergence of the internet as a new (global) commu-
nication technology. New media changed scientific practices both at the level of the
context of discovery and the context of justification (e.g., Heimeriks & Vasileiadou,
2008). New patterns of communication can be expected to change the codes of





Fig. 2.4 Topical network indicated by 34 words occurring more than twice in the titles of 64 docu-
ments (Three more documents (Editorials) have no title words.) published in Public Understanding
of Science during 2011; cosine > 0.2; 5 clusters indicated with Q = 0.449
communication albeit probably with a delay (Larivière et al., 2008). The various
dynamics feedback on one another.
Since the 1970s, listservs and email have become communication tools changing
laboratory life. The very process of science has become intensively embedded in liter-
ature and communication. The flows of communication and literature were increased
by orders of magnitude (Hull et al., 2008). More recently, the development of Google
Scholar (2004) has made conference proceedings, open journals, portions of books,
and personal and collections of manuscripts accessible on the internet. Other major
technological developments include real-time communication among collaborating
scientists, shared databases of references, and webinar tools. One can expect these
communication technologies to be further developed in as yet unknown directions
(Chap. 9).
The mapping of the sciences using scientometric tools makes it possible to visu-
alize the evolution of the sciences as networks (Börner, 2010). This “communication
turn” adds the social-science perspective of communication and information studies
to the “linguistic turn” in the philosophy of science (Rorty, 1962). The language usage
under study can be coded and differentiated into specific jargons. By analyzing the
sciences as communication systems in which knowledge is constructed, one obtains
both a rich conceptualization and the possibility to proceed to measurement. The
communicative mediation reflects the evolutionary dynamics. The study of these
communication dynamics thus opens the philosophy of science to empirical oper-
ationalizations other than thick descriptions. Hypotheses about scientific develop-
ments can be formulated, and confirmed or rejected on statistical grounds (e.g., Giere,
1988; Small, 2020).
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In the sociology of scientific knowledge and the sociology of translation, heterogeneous
networks have been studied in terms of practices and so-called actor-networks. However,
scientific practices are intellectually structured by codes. Cognitive structures interact and
co-construct the organization of scholars and discourses into research programs, specialties,
and disciplines. The intellectual organization of the sciences adds to and feeds back on
the configurations of authors and texts. The social, textual, and cognitive sub-dynamics
select upon each other asymmetrically. Selections can further be selected for stabilization
along trajectories and then also be globalized—symbolically generalized—into regimes of
expectations.
In his seminal study of the Sociology of ScientificKnowledge (SSK), David Bloor
(1976, at p. 2) argued that “knowledge for the sociologist is whatever men take to be
knowledge.” Consequently, the “strong program” in the sociology of science intro-
duced the so-called “principle of symmetry”: a sociological explanation should be
able to explain both true and false knowledge as human beliefs. From this perspective,
scientific knowledge can no longer be considered as “true” belief, different fromother
knowledge or beliefs (Barnes, 1974; cf. Fuller, 2018). Bloor (1982) argued that even
rules of logical inference in mathematics derive their truth from social negotiations
and human beliefs.
SSK posited that in practices the cognitive is always social, and vice versa. The
dimensions of the cognitive and the social are integrated and, from this perspective,
not to be distinguished. Sociocognitive (inter-)actions shape the social and the cogni-
tive at the same time (Collins, 1983). Therefore, analysis should not be pursued in
terms of dimensions like “cognitive” versus “social” or “internal” versus “external.”
From the perspective of SSK, one could not accept an ex ante disciplinary division of
labor among the history, philosophy, or sociology of science. The analysis is pursued
instead in terms of the subject matter.
The chapter is partly based on: Leydesdorff, L. (2007). Scientific Communication and Cognitive
Codification: Social Systems Theory and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. European Journal
of Social Theory, 10(3), 375-388.
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This strong program builds on Kuhn’s (1962) theory of paradigms as language
games (Winch, 1958; Barnes, 1969). The focus on content led to descriptions of
the world of science that were empirically richer than those provided by previous
traditions in the sociology of science (Merton, 1942; 1973; cf. Barnes & Dolby,
1970). For example, it was no longer acceptable to describe a specialty only in terms
of the organizational variables of a scientific community (Crane 1969 and 1972;
Whitley 1984). Nor could a specialty be operationalized in purely epistemological
terms, such as a set of theoretical questions linked to relations among arguments,
observations, and inferences (Hesse, 1980); nor could it be adequately described as
a body of literature or a communication structure (Price, 1961). As with all major
concepts in science studies, it was henceforth necessary to develop the definition of
“specialty” by relating the perspectives of social structure, cognitive contents, and
scientific literature. The potential tensions among these different evaluations were
“heterogeneously engineered” by both the participants and the analysts into practices
which operate as “mangles” (Pickering, 1995).
From this perspective, the analyst has no choice but to “follow the actors” like an
ethnographer (Latour, 1987). Scholars working in Actor-Network Theory (ANT)—
originally a Parisian program developed at the École des Mines—further radicalized
the symmetrical approach by including “non-humans” in their descriptions (Callon
et al., 1986; Callon and Latour, 1981). For example, in his study of the introduction of
scientific principles of breeding into fishery, Callon (1986) argued that the relevant
“actor-network” consists of the oceanologists whose aim is to transform fishing
into “aquaculture,” the science of oceanology which imposes problem-formulations,
the fishermen who defend their interests, and the scallops who breed and enter
the networks of both the fisherman and the analysts studying them. When these
different elements are aligned into an “actor world,” the system can be “translated”
at an “obligatory passage point.” A translator spokesman is needed to provide the
translation.
Note that in this “sociology of translation” the cognitive or natural constraints
on the situation are not analyzed as if they acted as constraints; this program is not
an heuristic. Instead, the actor-network is constructed as a next-order unit of perfor-
mance on the basis of what these authors call “relational strength”; heterogeneous
dimensions are homogenized in a pan-semiosis (Hagendijk, 1996). In other words,
the substantive heterogeneity in the subject of study is not addressed in terms of
analytically different dimensions, but in terms of an assumed coincidence, congruity,
and symmetry between explanandum and explanans within the subject matter. As
against the natural sciences, a sociologist in the ANT tradition cannot avoid being
part of the networks under study.
From the perspective of ANT, an analyst knows a priori that the relations in the
actor-network are mutual and symmetrical. Nothing can ultimately be explained, and
the sole purpose of the analysis is to tell a convincing story (Latour 1987; Collins and
Yearley 1992). Testing is not statistical, but in practices, and in terms of “robustness”
(Rip, 2010). Consequently, the actor-network is not only an empirical category; this
programclaims also to provide an answer to themethodological problemof analyzing
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“heterogeneity” (Akrich et al., 2010). Actor-networks cannot be explained other than
by describing them and thus becoming enrolled into them.
3.1 The Status of Cognitive Structures
In my book The Challenge of Scientometrics (1995), I argued against ANT and
SSK that authors, texts, and cognitions cannot be reduced to one another. One can
distinguish between the textual, cognitive, and social dimensions of the units of anal-
ysis under study. The variation in each dimension can be aggregated using grouping
rules in the other two dimensions. For example, authors can be grouped in terms of
substantive specialties, or in institutional terms such as departments and universities.
By considering three dimensions as orthogonal, a scheme for science studies
can be unfolded (Fig. 3.1). This model allows for interactions at each moment in
a static design, and for dynamic “feedbacks” and “mutual shapings” among the
social, textual, and cognitive (sub)dynamics over time. Over time, a “triple helix”
of cognitions, texts, and agents can thus be envisaged. Different meanings can be
expected on the basis of different grouping rules. For example, one can distinguish
between themeaning of a publication in cognitive terms at the field level and in social
terms at the level of the research group.
Note that the implied assumption of the analytical independence of the cogni-
tive dimension does not imply a return to older traditions in the philosophy and the
sociology of science. Traditionally, the context of discovery and the context of justi-
fication have been conceptualized as two separate domains, to be pictured spatially
as parallel planes and studied by distinctive scholarly traditions (that is, the history
and philosophy of science for the context of justification versus sociology for the
context of discovery). The three-dimensional scheme of Fig. 3.1, however, provides
Fig. 3.1 Three main
dimensions in the dynamics
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room for adding a third (textual) dynamics to the social and intellectual organization
of the sciences.
I have used dashes for the vertical axis in Fig. 3.1. Unlike texts and authors,
cognitions cannot be found “out there” without taking a reflexive turn. Still, the
cognitive dimension provides grouping rules for organizing texts and authors in
terms of research programs, specialties, and disciplines. These grouping rules are
not grounded in nature, but constructed. In order to address the cognitive dimension
empirically, a reflexive specification is first needed. The cognitive dimension—or, in
other words, the third helix—leads us to the question of how codifications organize
texts and people.
3.2 Codification in Communications
When a scientific paper is presented—for example, at a conference—the content has
first the status of a knowledge claim. When the paper is subsequently reviewed and
published in the literature, the knowledge claim is validated, and thus the status of
both the paper and its content is changed (Myers, 1985). Peer review is, among other
things, expected to evaluate the paper under study for its quality, and while doing so
it ascribes an expectation of quality to the paper as a construct. In other words, this
process constructs a cognitive outcome in addition to a social one.
What has been added to the article during the social process of peer reviewing?
Building on Parsons’s (1963a, 1963b) concept of “symbolically generalized media,”
on the one hand, and Husserl’s (1929) notion of “horizons of meanings,” on the other,
Luhmann suggested that the coding of the communication implies a domain-specific
selection. In other words, the paper goes through a process of recursive selections
whereby it is invested with symbolic value. The status of the paper is changed from
a knowledge claim into a contribution to be stored in the knowledge base for future
reference.
The code of communication operating specifically in the sciences was character-
ized by Luhmann as a selection on whether the claim in the paper is “true” or not. I
prefer Simon’s (1973) characterization of the code of science in terms of heuristics
(truth-finding) and puzzle-solving (see Chap. 1). The codes legitimate specific selec-
tions (cf. Zuckerman, 1999). The expectation of a selection environment drives the
competition, and this encourages participants to focus on the content of a commu-
nication rather than its social conditions. Although the codes themselves are also
constructed historically, they operate as selection mechanisms at another level and
with a different frequency than the knowledge claims that were submitted.1 Criteria
operate globally and are reproduced locally by the specification under historical
circumstances, that is, by the acceptance or rejection of the knowledge claims in the
papers under review (Fujigaki, 1998).
1From an evolutionary perspective—to which I return in a later chapter—the knowledge claims can
also be considered as phenotypical and the codes as genotypical (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2011).
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The construction of these mechanisms as a basis for a scientific culture has taken
centuries. For example, the scientific journal was an invention of the seventeenth
century (Price, 1961), while—as noted in Chap. 2—themodern citation was invented
only at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the codes should not be reified.
They remain tendencies in the communication, constructed and therefore expected
to change. In the case of a crisis in the communication, for example, the codes
may also need to be redefined. Thus, the networks of communications develop an
eigen-dynamics which is partly (that is, reflexively) accessible and partly latent for
the communicators who carry the communications (Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968; Von
Foerster, 1982).
3.3 Beliefs versis Rationalized Expectations
The strong program of SSK emphasized the symmetry of true and false statements
with reference to Durkheim’s (1912) analysis of the forms of religious life and to
MaryDouglas’s (e.g., 1970) anthropology of groups and grids. From this perspective,
the sciences are considered as belief systems attributable to agents or groups of
agents. In my opinion, the sciences are socially constructed as discursive systems of
rationalized expectations. Rationalized expectations are attributes of a discourse, i.e.,
relations among people. In other words, the units of analysis are different: beliefs are
attributes of agents at the nodes of a network, whereas expectations are discursively
rationalized communications. The rationalization is an attribute of the exchanges at
the links.
In controversy studies, the assumption that the sciences may also function as
belief systems can be empirically fruitful. In a number of other respects, however,
the sciences operate differently from religions. In contrast to a systemof expectations,
a religion tends to be organized hierarchically with reference to a single or dominant
meaning (e.g., a religious Truth) and therefore normatively integrated in terms of
what is right and what is wrong. In scholarly discourse, however, the disbelief in a
scientific “truth” no longer creates a schism as between religious communities in the
Middle Ages; nowadays the articulation of other perspectives may raise and enrich
research questions.
In other words, the mechanisms of the communications are different. Modern
sciences are no longer worldly religions organized hierarchically for celebrating
the “Truth,” but they are discursive constructions serving heuristics—that is, truth-
finding.However uncertain and variable the codingmaybe, the yardsticks for control-
ling the truth of scientific statements are different from normative integration into
individual or collective beliefs.
New forms encompass (and potentially enrich) the older ones whichmay continue
to serve as subdynamics in a more complex arrangement. Both integration into orga-
nizations and differentiation among the self-organizing codes can be expected. From
this perspective, integration is a recursive network function, namely the specific one
of providing a basis for action. Organization has to be carried historically by agency
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(Achterbergh & Vriens, 2009). The globalizing and self-organizing functions can
be expected to provide different meanings along other and potentially orthogonal
dimensions in the vector space of Fig. 3.1 (cf. Simon 1969).
A hierarchy is based on integration, as in a dendrogram; differentiation adds a
degree of freedom: more than a single hierarchy is then possible. In other words,
each function self-organizes a different hierarchy. The different hierarchies can be
expected to disturb one another, leading to a “fractional manifold” of partial hier-
archies (Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2014). Whereas a hierarchy is shaped when rela-
tions are organized into a dendogram-like structure, the resulting network contains
a structure with potentially an alphabet of dimensions.
In the longer run, the sciences can allow for normative and institutional control
over the conditions of the communication (e.g., resource allocations), but not over the
substantive and reflexive contents of these communications; the dynamics are from
this perspective self-organizing and functionally differentiated in terms of codes.
Scientists have a particular need to incorporate this cognitive differentiation enabling
them to change perspectives. One needs room to explore counter-intuitive interpre-
tations or theoretically informed hypotheses (“conjectures”; Popper, 1963) that one
may wish to change with hindsight.
This differentiation from normative integration has been a functional requirement
for the further development of natural philosophy, that is, the new sciences. The
crucial conflict between self-organization and normative control on the basis of reli-
gious or political convictions was fought in Western Europe between the appearance
ofGalileo’sDialogo in 1632 and the publication ofNewton’sPrincipia in 1687. From
that time onwards—that is, since the so-called “Scientific Revolution” (e.g., Cohen,
1994)—the further differentiation of scientific communications has been institution-
alized in the social system of science in both Europe and elsewhere (cf. Graham,
1974; Lecourt, 1976; Merton, 1938, 1942).
Why was the new “natural” philosophy able to drive this development? By recon-
structing “nature” in experimental settings—that is, on the basis of a model—an
observation is transformed into an instantiation with reference to an expectation.
Insofar as this reconstruction proves successful, the previous (“natural”) order can
be replaced with a new construct (Shapin & Shaffer, 1985). In principle, the new
paradigm can thus overwrite the older one and lead to new practices. This replace-
ment may be a sudden event (an “avalanche”) or a gradual development. Once the
old paradigm is replaced by a new one, the former tends to lose its meaning and
relevance for the further development of the communication.
The evolutionary dynamics of the sciences is both driven by and driving processes
of modernization at the level of society. Marx (1848) famously characterized this
process of modernization as “all that is solid, will melt into air” (cf. Berman, 1982).
However, “air” is not sufficiently specific; what is in the air needs to be specified in
terms of coordination and selectionmechanisms. “All that is solid” can be considered
for reconstruction; a phase space of other possibilities can be envisaged.
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3.4 “Structuration” by Expectations
In his “structuration theory,” Giddens (1979, 1984) offered another way to discuss
structures in terms of the expectations of agents. According to Giddens, structures
exist only asmemory traces that can be instantiated in action (Giddens, 1984, p. 177).
Structures can be considered as providing rules and resources which can be instan-
tiated. However, structure, according to Giddens (e.g., 1979, at p. 64), exists outside
“time and space” as “absent differences” that, in his opinion, cannot be studied empir-
ically. He argued that sociology should retain a firm focus on observable action and
empirical explanation.
How can individual memory traces be coordinated? According to Giddens, this
question is not answerable. The invocation of “magical explanatory properties of
social reproduction” could lead us back to abstract systems theory and (neo-)Marxism
(Giddens, 1979, at pp. 73–76). As he emphasized:
There can be no doubt about the sophistication and importance of the work of some authors
currently endeavouring to develop Parsons’s work in novel ways, particularly Luhmann and
Habermas. But I think it as necessary to repudiate the newer versions of Parsonianism as I do
the longer established varieties of non-Parsonian structural sociology. (1984, at p. xxxvii).
In Giddens’ “structuration theory,” the “duality of structure” is considered as
a “virtual”operation. Since this virtual operation cannot be studied empirically, a
methodology is suggested for relating institutional analysis to the analysis of strategic
conduct: the one narrative can be used as a context for informing the other; structure
is present in action and actions can be aggregated into structures. However, the two
narratives remain juxtaposed by “bracketing” the one perspective as contextual when
focusing on the other (Giddens, 1984).
Although Giddens (1976, at p. 162) acknowledged a possible interaction among
the memory traces leading to a “double hermeneutics”—the roles of observers
and participants can be combined and/or distinguished—he avoided theorizing the
“second contingency” of expectations itself as a possible structure. From his perspec-
tive, this second contingency falls outside the empirical domain studied in sociology.
As the author (1979, pp. 81f.) explained:
The communication of meaning in interaction does not take place separately from the oper-
ation of relations of power, or outside the context of normative sanctions.[…] Practices are
situated within intersecting sets of rules and resources that ultimately express features of the
totality.
However, the focus should remain, in Giddens’ opinion, on observable actions.
institutions, and instantiations of structure. Although structure is implicated in the
reproduction of social systems, it cannot and should not be studied as such because
it is absent.
In my opinion, this inference does not follow: Why would one not be allowed to
formulate hypotheses about a second contingency in social structures? The formula-
tion of expectations may be helpful in the design and then lead to the specification of
relevant observations. Might what is absent (the “zeros”) not be equally or perhaps
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more interesting than what happens to be the case (Deacon, 2012)? In social network
analysis, for example, one also studies missing links or structural holes (Burt, 1992;
cf. Breiger, 2010).
I agree with Giddens that one should avoid “abstract systems theory” without an
agenda for empirical operationalizations; but this is a different issue from denying
legitimacy to the study of structures in expectations. Structures can be expected to
operate as selection and coordination mechanisms, and observations can serve to test
hypotheses about the dynamics of expectations.
3.5 Biological and Cybernetic Metaphors
The crucial step, in my opinion, is to join theorizing with an empirical perspective
allowing for the exploration of new questions and the interpretation of empirical
results (Merton, 1948). A theory without this perspective can be considered as too
“grandiose” for sociological research and analysis. According to Giddens (1979,
p. 237), “models of biological systems, especially those tied to the notion of home-
ostasis, will not suffice to illuminate some of the key issues posed by the analysis of
social systems.”
In addition to the specter of social Darwinism, biological models indeed tend to
abstract from the individual in favor of an analysis at the level of populations.Giddens
noted that Parsons &Dupree (1976) had already signaled the potential of cybernetics
for developing a richer framework in which the relations between genotypes and
phenotypes can be studied in a context different frombiology; for example, in termsof
computer simulations and linguistics. However, Parsons did not further elaborate this
perspective. In an email conversation at the list of the American Cybernetics Society
(dated 9 June 2010), Klaus Krippendorff suggested avoiding “systems theory” given
the biological origin and epistemology of the idea of “systems.” Why should the
social be systemic? In Krippendorff’s opinion, cybernetics offers an alternative:
Gregory Bateson was one of the first to recognize the evolutionary epistemology that cyber-
netics offered him and wrote several papers about the revolutionary changes cybernetics
offered. Being less tied towhat exists gave cyberneticians an extraordinary creativity. Indeed,
cyberneticians have been amazingly unconstrained in developing and elaborating novel
concepts, starting with circularity, self-reference, information theory, all the way to several
reflexive moves that have transformed cybernetics.[…] Cybernetics’ contribution to infor-
mation theory opened the door to theories of variety, to understanding evolutionary processes
(mutation and selection of what doesn’t work), and of course digitalization and computation
which systems theories could not address, largely because their discourse directed systems
theorists to shared wholes, away from perturbations, diversity, and building computational
realities.
From the perspective of cybernetics, theoretical reification into a presumably
global system is outdated. The analysis can instead be pursued in terms of dynamics
and subdynamics, which one is able to hypothesize. The status of theorizing is then
more modest; theories serve us as heuristics for solving problems (Simon, 1969;
Newell & Simon, 1972).
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How do these considerations lead to a sociology of science that is different from the
sociology of scientific knowledge or Luhmann’s social-systems theory? The shift
from historical observations to the specification of expectations seems crucial to me.
Theories can be tested, and historicism can be avoided; cases that actually occurred
can be used as examples of what could have occurred. However, the historical narra-
tive cannot by itself inform us about the distribution of instances that one would have
expected.
Despite Luhmann’s programmatic intention to “de-ontologize” sociology (e.g.,
Luhmann, 1990, p. 67), one can find in his texts remainders of a tendency to reifica-
tion. Differentiation, for example, is labeled “functional,” whereas differentiation can
also be dysfunctional (Mitroff, 1974). As noted, Künzler (1987, p. 323) argued that
Luhmann understood code as a binary duplication rule much like DNA.2 Statements
do not have to be wholly true or false, but can be true to variable extents.
In his book entitled Social Systems, Luhmann ([1984, at p. 30] 1995, at p. 12)
went one step further in the direction of a biological model by explicitly assuming
that “systems are given.” As he put it:
The following considerations assume that there are systems. Thus, they do not begin with
epistemological doubt. They also do not advocate a “purely analytical relevance” for systems
theory. The most narrow interpretation of systems theory as a mere method of analyzing
reality is deliberately avoided.[…] In systems theory, scientific statements are not only
statements, but they also refer to the real world.
Although one can place the emphasis in the first sentence of this quotation on
“assume,” the given-ness of systems in “the real world” raises ontological questions.
At other places, however, Luhmann (e.g., 1990, p. 76) emphasized that “reality itself
remains unknown”: each self-referential system generates its own “transcenden-
tal”environment (“bubble”); a self-organizing system can “observe” in terms of the
distinctions that it has learned to make. He formulated for example:
The effect of the intervention of systems theory can be described as a de-ontologization
of reality. This does not mean that reality is denied, for then there would be nothing that
operated—nothing that observed, and nothing onwhich one would gain a purchase bymeans
of distinctions. It is only the epistemological relevance of an ontological representation of
reality that is being called into question.
It seems to me that Luhmann alternated between two repertoires: one of general
systems theory and another of socio-cybernetics as a specifically sociological branch
of systems theory. The sociological perspective is elaborated using historical studies.
The case materials are “observed” by reading and analyzing texts (e.g., Luhmann,
1982). However, the specifically human component of using language—as reflected
2Why should the codes be binary and not allow for grey shades? When discussing this issue,
Luhmann (1986, p. 2; 2004, p. 116) argued (in a discussion with Maturana) that a woman can be
either pregnant or not pregnant, but not half-pregnant. However, this is again a biological argument.
Culturally, one can also be pregnant with ideas.
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in discourse analysis and hermeneutics—is backgrounded. The purpose remained
eventually to develop a general systems theory. As Künzler (1987, p. 331) put it:
Language haunts as a foreign body in systems theory as a supertheory, and in its sub-theories,
emerging as a surprise in nebulous passages in order to vanish as surprisingly, and is obviously
perceived as a disturbing element and one which also cannot be eliminated.
Habermas (1986) identified this model in a sharp critique, as follows:
The flow of official documents among administrative authorities and the monadically encap-
sulated consciousness of a Robinson Crusoe provide the guiding images for the conceptual
uncoupling of the social and psychic systems, according to which the one is supposedly
based solely on communications and the other solely on consciousness.[…].
What a burden is assumed by a theory that divides up linguistic structures that cover both
the psychic and the social dimensions into two different systems. (p. 378f.)
In summary: Luhmann’s theory can also be read as a meta-biology. Because
of the common roots in systems theory, Luhmann tends to model language after
“languaging,” that is, a form of behavior (Maturana, 1978). The languaging agents—
human beings—can be considered as interacting “observers” (von Foerster, 1982).3
However, one cannot infer from this formal definition of an observer to the content
of an observation (see Chap. 1).4 The content itself is the cultural object.
In summary, my approach is fundamentally dualistic as opposed to the holistic
approaches nowadays prevailing in artificial intelligence and biology (e.g., Damasio,
1994; Sherman, 2017). In my opinion, the specification of expectations is not “epi-
genetic” (e.g., Ramstead et al. 2017, p. 12; see Chapter Ten), but constitutive for
inter-human communications in general, and scientific communications in particular.
The logic of an emerging system can increasingly be different (that is, “bi-furcate”)
from its genesis.5 The story about the historical genesis may serve didactic purposes,
but should not be confused with the specification of theoretical content. Genesis is
not validity; historicism were to be avoided.
3Luhmann (e.g., [1993] 1999) turned to George Spencer Brown’s (1969) book Laws of Form to
legitimate this “grounding” of his theory in “observations.” However, Laws of Form cannot be used
for this purpose: the “observer” mentioned by Spencer Brown is only one possible consequence of
the operations of distinguishing and designation.
4Spencer Brown (1969, at p. 76) concludes (on the final page of this study) that “an observer,
since he distinguishes the space he occupies, is also a mark,” and he adds: “a distinction drawn in
any space is a mark distinguishing the space. Equally and conversely, any mark in a space draws
a distinction.[…] We see now that the first distinction, the mark, and the observer are not only
interchangeable, but, in the form, identical.” Note that “in the form” means (à la Aristotle) that this
observer can be a cause of content—i.e., observations.
5See Leydesdorff (2006, pp. 169 ff.) for an explanation and derivation of bifurcation and
morphogenesis in terms of reaction–diffusion dynamics.
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I have argued in this chapter that—unlike DNA—non-biological codes in commu-
nications structure expectations in relation to horizons of meaning without being
hard-wired. The codes are theoretically constructed and reconstructed in history; for
example, in action. A cultural evolution is thus shaped on top of biological evolu-
tion. The exchange and sharing of expectations in the second contingency can be
considered as the differentia specifica of inter-human communication.
The second contingency evolves as interacting expectations. A reflexive dynamic
of meaning and intentionality is thus added to the first contingency of observable
actions. As against biological systems in which operational closure can be structural,
translations among codes remain possible across boundaries in social systems. The
differences among the codes do not “exist” physically and the codes do not need to be
organized into a hierarchy. The codes can be expected to span a space of possibilities
of which only some are realized in each instance As Latour (1988, at p. 164) argued,
there is no need to assume an ex ante hierarchy; order is established ex post.
Furthermore, I have argued in this chapter that cognition ismanifested at the social
level as discursive knowledge. The development of discursive knowledge is guided
by latent codes in the communications. The codes remain socially constructed, but
tend to develop into a control and coordination mechanism that can organize authors
and texts selectively. While the instantiations can be observed, the codes selecting
upon the observables can only be hypothesized.
In my opinion, Luhmann’s theory read as socio-cybernetics provides us with a
heuristic for exploring the dynamics of expectations. In order to proceed to empirical
research and testing, however, one needs additionally a theory of measurement. Can
this model of interacting communications and the self-organization of meaning be
made compatible with Shannon’s information theory as a measurement theory? Is it
possible to specify how the processing of information and meaning are related?
In the next chapter, I first extend the Shannon model of communication into a
complex systems model in which communications are differentiated. My long-term
objective is to bridge the gap between Luhmann’s sociological focus on meaning
processing and Shannon’s focus on information processing by decomposing the
problem using Simon’s (1973a) model of complex systems that are differentiated
both vertically and horizontally. A complex dynamic of (horizontal) differentiations
among the codes versus (vertical) integration in instantiations can be expected, which
will be further specified in Chapters Eight and Nine in terms of weakly and strongly
anticipatory systems (Dubois, 2003).
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Chapter 4
Towards a Calculus of Redundancy
In this chapter, I extend Shannon’s linear model of communication into a model in which
communication is differentiated both vertically and horizontally (Simon, 1973). Following
Weaver (1949), three layers are distinguished operating in relation to one another: (i) at
level A, the events are sequenced historically along the arrow of time, generating Shannon-
type information (that is, uncertainty); (ii) the incursion of meanings at level B is refer-
ential to (iii) horizons of meaning spanned by codes in the communication at level C. In
other words, relations at level A are first distinguished from correlations among patterns
of relations and non-relations at level B. The correlations span a vector space on top of the
network of relations. Relations are positioned in this vector space and can then be provided
with meaning. Different positions provide other perspectives and horizons of meaning.
Perspectives can overlap, for example, in Triple-Helix relations. Overlapping perspectives
can generate redundancies—that is, new options—as a result of synergies.
In the opening statements ofAMathematical Theory ofCommunications, Shannon
(1948, at p. 3) emphasized that the semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant
to the engineering problem.” Information can be defined as “uncertainty” and is not
“informative” in the sense of reducing uncertainty. Although Shannon’s coauthor
Weaver called this definition “bizarre,” he considered the change of perspective as
“potentially so penetratingly clearing the air that one is now, perhaps for the first
time, ready for a real theory of meaning” (at p. 27). Weaver (1949, p. 8) emphasized
that “information must not be confused with meaning.” Varela (1979, at p. 266),
however, argued for defining “information” in accordance with the semantic root of
the word “in-formare.” Bateson’s (1973) aphorism of information as “a difference
which makes a difference” defines information as “meaningful information” and has
been widely accepted among cyberneticians (e.g., Scott, 2004).
In my opinion, meanings can be attributed to information from the perspective of
hindsight and with reference to other possible meanings. Meaning is thus not added
The chapter is partly based on:Leydesdorff, L., Johnson,M.,& Ivanova, I. (2018). Toward aCalculus
of Redundancy: Signification, Codification, and Anticipation in Cultural Evolution. Journal of the
Association for Information Science and Technology, 69(10), 1181–1192. https://doi.org/10.1002/
asi.24052
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to the information, but events can be considered from different perspectives.Whereas
Shannon-type information is generated in relations (between a sender and a receiver),
meaning is provided from a position in a network of relations. Positions are based
on correlations among patterns of relations and non-relations. The correlations span
a vector space with dimensions (“eigenvectors”) on top of the network of relations.
The vector space and the network graph can be considered as different evaluations
of the events. First, information is generated operationally by links between senders
and receivers. Second, providing meaning to information assumes a position in the
network as an aggregate of nodes and links; and third, positions provide perspectives.
4.1 The Network Graph and the Vector Space
As a first step in the specification of a theory of meaning within the framework
provided by information theory, Weaver (1949, at p. 26) proposed two “minor
additions” to Shannon’s linear diagram of a communication channel (Fig. 4.1).
Weaver explained these extensions—the box labeled “semantic noise” and the
one labeled “semantic receiver”—as follows:
One can imagine, as an addition to the diagram, another box labeled “Semantic Receiver”
interposed between the engineering receiver (which changes signals into messages) and the
destination. This semantic receiver subjects the message to a second decoding, the demand
on this one being that it must match the statistical semantic characteristics of the message
with the statistical semantic capacities of the totality of receivers, or of that subset of receivers
which constitute the audience one wishes to affect.
Similarly, one can imagine another box in the diagram which, inserted between the informa-
tion source and the transmitter, would be labeled “semantic noise,” the box previously labeled





Fig. 4.1 Weaver’s (1949) “minor” additions penciled into Shannon’s (1948) diagram of a
communication channel. Source: Leydesdorff (2016), p. 282
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the signal the perturbations or distortions of meaning which are not intended by the source
but which inescapably affect the destination. And the problem of semantic decoding must
take this semantic noise into account.
A “semantic receiver” recodes the information in the messages received from the
engineering “receiver,” while the latter can only change signals into messages. The
semantic receiver is able to distinguish the signals from the noise. However, “the
semantic aspects” were defined by Shannon as external to the model. Therefore, the
relation between the two newly added boxes cannot be considered as communication
of Shannon-type information.
Can this semantic dimension of the communication be considered another (non-
Shannon) transfer mechanism? Meanings cannot be communicated, but they can
be shared and organized depending on positions and perspectives, even without
requiring a direct communication relation. Semantics are based not on relations, but
on patterns of relations or, in other words, correlations. For example, two firms (at
the nodes of a network) may have similar patterns of relations with their clients
without necessarily relating directly to one another (Burt, 1982). Two synonyms,
analogously, can occupy a similar position in a vector space of word co-occurrences
without any empirical co-occurrences in the domain under study.
In the case of a single relation, the relational distance is not different from the
correlational one; but in the case of three (or more) interacting nodes (Fig. 4.2),
distances in the vector space can be very different from distances in the network
(e.g., geodesics).
The graph in the left-hand panel of Fig. 4.2, for example, represents a configuration
of empirically observable nodes and links. The edges correspond to the ones in the
right-hand panel. However, the zeros in the right-hand panel are equally included
when defining the vector space. The shortest distance between A and B in the left-
hand panel is two. The positional distance between A and B is zero, since the Pearson
correlation rAB = 1.0: A and B are at precisely the same position in this network.
As against Shannon-type information which flows linearly from the sender to
the receiver, one can expect meanings to loop, and thereby to develop next-order
dimensionalities (Krippendorff, 2009a, 2009b). Horizons of meaning are spanned by
DistanceAB = 2
A B C 
A 0 0 1 
B 0 0 1 
C 1 1 0 




Fig. 4.2 Relational distance between and structurally equivalent positions of A and B. Source:
Leydesdorff et al. (2018, p. 1185)
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codes evolving in the communication.Overlapping codesmaygenerate redundancies
by describing the same events from different perspectives.
Redundancy can be measured if the maximum entropy can be defined or, in
other words, the system of reference be specified. Whereas information (Shannon’s
H) measures the number of options that have already been realized, redundancy
measures the number of options that could alternatively have been realized. In other
words, the zeros—such as the ones in the right-hand pane of Fig. 4.2—do not add to
the information, but they add to the redundancy.
4.2 Dimensions and Dynamics of Information
A communication matrix is shaped when a vertical distinction—such as the levels
distinguished by Weaver—is added to the horizontal channel (vector) of commu-
nications in the Shannon model (Fig. 4.1). A matrix can be considered as a two-
dimensional aggregate of one-dimensional vectors. Whereas each vector models
relations, a matrix can represent both relations and positions (see Fig. 4.2). The
vectors are positioned in the matrix, for example, by a sequence number. However,
a matrix contains also a structure different from and orthogonal to the sum of the
vectors of relations. Structures can operate as selection environments; for example,
providing meanings to the variation.
In Fig. 4.3a, each slice represents a communication matrix at a specific time; the
repetition over time adds the third dimension. The development of information in a
three-dimensional array can be visualized as a historical trajectory; the uncertainty
is then organized over time (depicted as a cylinder in the cube of Fig. 4.3a). A four-
dimensional array or hyper-cube of information is more difficult to imagine or repre-
sent graphically. However, a four-dimensional array can, among other things, contain
t = t 
t – tn
t – tm
Fig. 4.3 a left and b right: A three-dimensional array of information can contain a trajectory; a
four-dimensional hypercube contains one more degree of freedom and thus a variety of possible
trajectories. Adapted from Leydesdorff (1997, p. 29)
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a regime as a next-order feedback on historical developments along trajectories
(Fig. 4.3b; cf. Dosi, 1982).
In other words: a regime has one degree of freedommore than a trajectory and can
thus “select” among the possible trajectories as representations in three dimensions
of the system’s history (Fig. 4.3b). The additional degree of freedom provides room
for another selection within an emerging system: a selection of one sub-dynamic or
another. When mutual selections are repeated, a trajectory can be shaped in a co-
evolution or “mutual shaping.” Whereas a trajectory is organized in history, a next-
order regime provides meta-historical selection pressure in terms of expectations. In
this fourth (or higher) dimension, one trajectory can be “weighted” differently from
another. Each selection can refine the self-organization of a system of selections.
Refinements can be expected to add to the performativity of a system.
For the intuitive understanding, it may be helpful to consider ourselves as
psychologies with the reflexive capacity to reconstruct possible representations of
our personal histories from the perspective of hindsight. For example, one might
tell a story at work differently from what one could say at home. I suggest reading
Luhmann’s model as a proposal to consider the social system of communications as a
systemwithout psychological consciousness, butwith a similar complexity. Commu-
nications canbe expected to entertain different representations of the history andorga-
nization of communications. Communications and consciousness are substantively
different.
Whereas a psychological systemoperates in terms of individual consciousness and
tends towards integration (Haken&Portugali, 2014), a communication system can be
expected to remain distributed as a “dividuum” (Luhmann, 1984: 625; cf. Nietzsche,
[1878] 1967: 76); this additional degree of freedom allows for the processing of
more complexity at the supra-individual level than would be possible as the sum of
individual processes. As a next-order system, the communications can thus provide
a regime to the communicating individuals developing along historical trajectories
at a one-lower level. Since communication systems are not biologically alive, they
do not need to be integrated and constrained in terms of life-cycles.
In summary:whereas variation canbemodeled as a one-dimensional vector, a two-
dimensional matrix can represent selection and coordination mechanisms leading
potentially to trajectories as stabilizations of the uncertainty over time. Codes in
the communication add one more selection mechanism and make globalization at
the regime level possible. Selections can be meta-selected for stabilization along
trajectories, and some stabilizations can be selected for globalization at a regime
level. Stabilizations are historical and can be at variance. They can thus be consid-
ered as providing a second-order variation; globalization functions analogously as
a next-order selection. Because the second-order selections (regimes) select on the
second-order variation (stabilizations along trajectories) in parallel tofirst-order vari-
ations and selection, the operations loop into themselves and one another with the
resulting complexity and the possibility of self-organization, leading to unintended
consequences. (What can be considered first- and second-order may change over
time.) The loops are not hierarchically organized, but can interact and thus disturb
one another.
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Since the communication of information and the sharing of meanings operate
in terms of recursive and incursive selections, the historical origin of the variation
may no longer be visible in the present after a series of selective rewrites. Both the
historical trajectories and the evolutionary regimes can be expected to change, but
at different speeds or, in other words, without a priori synchronization. The two
momenta of historical development (at the trajectory level) and evolutionary change
(at the regime level) relate in dynamic trade-offs. The regime is instantiated as a
meta-historical selection environment pending on the historical trajectories.
For example, airplane series such as the DC3 to the DC9 are developed along
trajectories, but the introduction of the jet-engine as a replacement of the propeller
motor was a systems innovation (Frenken & Leydesdorff, 2000). While helicopters
are developed in another regime, the discontinuity between propeller airplanes and jet
aircraft can be a change at the trajectory and/or regime level. One would need empir-
ical research for answering this question. Dosi (1982, p. 152), for example, provided
operational definitions for regimes (or paradigms) and historical trajectories, as
follows:
In broad analogy with the Kuhnian definition of a “scientific paradigm,” we shall define a
“technological paradigm” as “model” and a “pattern” of solution of selected technological
problems, based on selected principles derived fromnatural sciences and on selectedmaterial
technologies.[…].
As “normal science” is the “actualization of a promise” contained in a scientific paradigm, so
is “technical progress” defined by a certain “technological paradigm”. We will define a tech-
nological trajectory as the pattern of “normal” problem solving activity (i.e. of “progress”)
on the ground of a technological paradigm.
Note that Dosi (1982) articulated a model with three selection environments oper-
ating uponone another. This predates the neo-evolutionary versionof theTriple-Helix
model by two decades. However, Dosi did not elaborate specifically the evolutionary
model (Andersen, 1994).
The metaphor of hill-climbing is also used in this context: hills are climbed along
trajectories. However, climbing is different at night or during the day, and the differ-
ence between day and night is meta-historical for the hill-climbing agents. In terms
of Dosi’s above definitions, the technological problems may be differently selected
in daylight than during the night. In his article about “objectivity” in the social and
cultural sciences, Max Weber used this same metaphor when he expressed change
in the dynamics at the supra-individual level of a regime, as follows:
[…] at one moment or another, the color will change: the meaning of the perspective which
was used without reflection, will become insecure; the road seems now to lead into zones of
twilight. The light of the important problems of the culture has advanced. At such moments,
the sciences have to provide themselves with themeans of changing position and of changing
their methodological apparatus, in order reflexively to grasp the higher grounds of reasoning
from which to look down on the stream of history. Science follows the constellations which
make it a meaningful enterprise. (Weber [1904] 31968, p. 214.)
Changes at the regime level happen beyond control; changes at the trajectory level
can be organized by agency (e.g., entrepreneurs).
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Fig. 4.4 Levels B and C added to the Shannon diagram (in red-brown and dark-blue, respectively).
Source: Leydesdorff (2016), p. 283
4.3 Levels B and C in the Shannon Diagram
In addition to proposing the two new boxes in Shannon’s diagram (Fig. 4.1), Weaver
(1949, p. 24) suggested adding to this diagram the levels B and C: meaning is
conveyed at level B, and the received meaning can affect behavior at level C (because
codes are genotypical and binding). Elaborating Figs. 4.1 and 4.4 shows a scheme
for distinguishing among these three levels.
As noted above, the relations among a semantic receiver and semantic noise at
level B are based on correlations among sets of relations at level A. In the vector space
thus constructed at levelB,meanings can be shared,while information continues to be
communicated in the links at level A. The use of language facilitates and potentially
reinforces the options for sharing (and distinguishing!) meanings at level B. Natural
languages provide opportunities to develop semantics; symbolic meanings, however,
require codes to operate in the communications.
Codes of communication are invoked from level C for regulating the use of
language. The codes enable us, among other things,1 to short-cut the communi-
cation; for example, by paying the price for something instead of negotiating using
language. The codes enable us to make the communications far more efficient than is
possible in natural languages. The communication can both vertically and horizon-
tally be differentiated: horizontally in terms of different codes operating in parallel
1Spelling rules, syntax, and pragmatics can also be considered as codes in the use of language, but
we focus on the semantics.
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and vertically between historical organization and evolutionary self-organization. In
the following sections, these two differentiations are related.
4.4 Scholarly Discourse and Codification
The tension between historical organization and evolutionary self-organization is
articulated in the sociology of science as the difference between “group” and “field”-
level dynamics. Following up on his (1976) historical analysis of “Le champ scien-
tifique,” for example, Bourdieu (2004, at p. 83) added a further reflection on the study
of the sciences in his book, entitled Science of Science and Reflexivity.He formulated
as follows:
Each field (discipline) is the site of a specific legality (a nomos), a product of history, which
is embodied in the objective regularities of the functioning of the field and, more precisely,
in the mechanisms governing the circulation of information, in the logic of the allocation of
rewards, etc., and in the scientific habitus produced by the field, which are the condition of
the functioning of the field […].
What are called epistemic criteria are the formalization of the “rules of the game” that have
to be observed in the field, that is, of the sociological rules of interactions within the field, in
particular, rules of argumentation or norms of communication. Argumentation is a collective
process performed before an audience and subject to rules.
From a very different perspective, Popper (1972) denoted the domain of supra-
individual codifications as World 3. Bourdieu (2004; at p. 78) called this transition
from“objectivity” to “intersubjectivity” a “Kantian” or transcendental turn.However,
the philosopher to be associated with this transition, is Husserl, who criticized the
empiristic self-understanding of themodern (European) sciences (Husserl, [1935/36]
1962). According to Husserl ([1929] 1960, at p. 155), the possibility to communicate
expectations intersubjectively grounds the empirical sciences “in a concrete theory
of science.” In Chap. 2, I called this the communicative turn in the philosophy of
science.
Neither Popper nor Husserl specified the evolutionary dynamics of expectations
in terms of or in relation to communications. I shall argue that the dynamics of res
cogitans can be further specified information-theoretically. The symbolically gener-
alized codes in the communication enable us to multiply meanings at the intersub-
jective level—that is, within the communication—as new options. The proliferation
of expectations can take place in a techno-cultural evolution at a speed much faster
than in biological evolution.
The intersubjective layer of expectations codes and structures the communica-
tions. The different codes can be recombined and reconstructed in translations. At
level B, meanings are instantiated in specific combinations of codes, while at level
C the codes themselves evolve in response to the integrations in the instantiations as
historical events. The superstructure of codes continues to be driven into differenti-
ations by the need to cope with the increasing complexity of the communication at
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the bottom. At this level A, the probabilistic entropy (H) increases because of the
coupling of information to entropy and the second law of thermodynamics.
4.5 Redundancy and Evolution
Shannon (1948) defined information (H) as probabilistic entropy[
H = −i pi ∗ log(pi)
]
in accordance with Gibbs’s formula for thermodynamic
entropy: S = kB ∗ H . In this equation, kB is the Boltzmann constant that provides
the dimensionality Joule/Kelvin to the thermodynamic entropy S; H provides a
dimensionless statistic. H can be measured as uncertainty in a probability distribu-
tion: H = −i pi ∗ log(pi). (When two is taken as the basis for the logarithm, the
measurement is in bits of information.)
The second law of thermodynamics states that entropy increases with each opera-
tion. Because of the linear relation between S and H, historical developments unfold
with the arrow of time; that is, from an origin to the future. However, models enable
us to anticipate future states from our position in the present, that is, to use future
states (xt+n) represented in the present (xt) against the arrow of time for the recon-
struction. In other words, the dynamics of expectations are very different from the
historical dynamics “following the actors.” In the remainder of this chapter, the focus
will be on the interactions among differently coded expectations and how they can
generate redundancy (against the second law).
Redundancy R is defined in information theory as the fraction of the capacity of
a communication channel (Hmax) that is not used. In formulic format:
R = Hmax − Hobserved
Hmax
(4.1)
H is equal to the uncertainty in a relative frequency distribution (i pi = i [f i/N])
as follows:
H = −i pi ∗ log2(pi) (4.2)
When all N probabilities are equally probable and thus equal to 1/N, one can




















= log(N ) (4.4)
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redundancy redundancy
a b
Fig. 4.5 a The development of entropy (Hobs), maximum entropy (Hmax), and redundancy (Hmax
– Hobs). b Hitherto impossible options are made possible because of cultural and technological
evolution. Adapted from: Brooks & Wiley (1986, at p. 43)
In the case of an evolving system—e.g., an eco-system inwhich new species can be
generated—not only the observed information (Hobserved) of the system increaseswith
time, but also Hmax, representing the number of possible states (N). The difference
between Hmax and the observed information Hobserved is (by definition) equal to the
redundancy R; that is, the options that are available but have not yet been realized.
From the engineering perspective of information theory, these options are redundant.
Redundancy can be used, among other things, for error-correction (Shannon, 1945).
Figure 4.5a shows Brooks &Wiley’s (1986, at p. 43) illustration of the dynamics
of a biological system. I have added green to the redundancy as part of the evolving
capacity of this system. As noted, redundancy provides a measure of the options
that were not realized, but could have been realized. The exclusion of these options
is “historical.” Kauffman (2000), for example, called these in principle possible
realizations “adjacent.” Above this (green) area, however, Brooks & Wiley (1986)
added the label of categorically “impossible” as a legend of Fig. 4.5a.
In Fig. 4.5b, I have replaced the label “impossible” with “technologically made
feasible” in order to introduce a model which includes the levels B and C. Unlike
a biological system, the techno-cultural evolution of expectations can be expected
to generate redundancy. An intentional system is able to add new options without
necessarily realizing them; one can keep options in mind. The cycling of information
on top of the linear flow generates redundancy (Maturana, 2000). Redundancy is
generated when two (or more) perspectives on the same information are operating at
an interface.
For example, in the case of introducing a new technology into a market, the
markets operate with a (supra-individual) logic different from technological criteria.
When both the economic and the technological logic can operate, innovations can be
enhanced because of the options made visible by the cross-tabling. (In Fig. 4.2b, for
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Fig. 4.6 Set-theoretical
representation of two sets of
overlapping options
example, five zeros were added to the representation in Fig. 4.2a.) The redundancy
added to the green surfaces of Fig. 4.5b is generated by the recombination of different
expectations organized in terms of the variety of perspectives that can be entertained
in the communication. Let me first specify this process in information-theoretical
terms and then return to the interpretation. The reader who is less interested in the
following derivations may wish to skip to Sect. 4.8.
4.6 The Generation of Mutual Redundancy
The total number of options available in a system is (by definition) equal to the sum of
the realized options and the not-yet-realized but possible ones. This sum of realized
and possible options determines the capacity of a system.
In information theory, one counts by using relative frequencies multiplied by
their respective logarithms.2 This transformation is monotonous. For example, the
two sets in Fig. 4.6 can be summed as follows:
H12 = H1 + H2 − T12 (4.5)
2The counting rules in information theory (Shannon, 1948; cf. Leydesdorff, 1991; Theil, 1972;
Yeung, 2008) are based on relative frequencies. Observed frequencies are divided by the grand total
in order to obtain relative frequencies or, in other words, probabilities:
pi jk... = fi jk.../ ∑
i jk...
fi jk... = fi jk.../N




pi jk... log2 pi jk...
= −
∑





= log2 N −
∑
i jk...
fi jk... log2 fi jk...
It follows that the maximum entropy Hmax = log2 N . The relative uncertainty or information
is Hobserved /Hmax. The redundancy is defined by Shannon (1948) as the relative value of the not-
realized options:
Redundancy = [Hmax − Hobserved ]/Hmax
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H1 and H2 can be used as labels for the information contents of the two sets with an
overlap in T 12. T 12 is called “mutual information” or “transmission” betweenH1 and
H2. If T 12 were not subtracted from (H1 + H2), the overlap would be counted twice.
However, the second time would be redundant. This redundancy R12 is equal to –T 12
or, in other words, negative since the mutual information (T 12) itself is Shanon-type
information and therefore necessarily positive (Theil, 1972, p. 59f.).
Weaver (1949) already noted that redundancy might be a prime candidate for the
development of a theory of meaning. Using a different definition of information (as
“a difference which makes a difference”; see Mackay, 1969), Bateson (1972, p. 420)
argued that “the concept ‘redundancy’ is at least a partial synonym of ‘meaning’: […]
if the receiver can guess at missing parts of the message, then those parts must, in
fact, carry a meaning which refers to the missing part and is information about these
parts.” Unlike information, redundancy is not observable; the maximum information
has to be specified on theoretical grounds. This specification has the status of a
hypothesis (which one may wish to update after the research process).
The same information can be appreciated differently by other agents or at different
moments and other levels. Whenever information is appreciated, a system-specific
meaning is generated. Whereas information can be communicated, meanings can be
shared. Sharing can generate an intersubjective layer with a dynamic different from
that of information processing. The redundancy in the overlaps can be measured as
reduction of uncertainty at the systems level; that is, as negative bits of information.
The relative uncertainty is reduced when the redundancy is increased. Whereas the
events are historical and generate entropy along trajectories following the arrow of
time, appreciations are analytical and can add redundancy or negative entropy from
the perspective of hindsight—that is, against the arrow of time. One can also consider
this redundancy as feedback or error correction against the arrow of time (Kline &
Rosenberg, 1986; Krippendorff, 2009b).
In Fig. 4.7, Fig. 4.6 is extended to three sets. The two possible configurations in
Fig. 4.7 indicate that T 123 (the set in the centre) can be positive, negative, or zero.
Fig. 4.7 Overlapping uncertainties in three variables x1, x2, and x3: two configurations with
opposite signs of T123
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Redundancy is a measure of these absent options which can be defined (Bateson,
1972;Deacon, 2012). Unlike the empty space outside the three circles, the gap among
the three circles in the centre can be quantified.
The formula for the entropy of the combined set H123 follows the corrected
numbers of elements using summations and subtractions as in overlaps among sets,
as follows:
H123 = H1 + H2 + H3 − T12 − T13 − T23 + T123 (4.6)
In Eq. 4.6, the central overlap T 123 is included three times in (H1 + H2 + H3)
and then three times subtracted by (– T 12 – T 13 – T 23). It follows that T 123 has
to be added once more after the subtractions. Since T 123 is added, while T 12 was
subtracted (in Eq. 4.4), the sign of the last term, representing the mutual redundancy
in three dimensions, is opposite to that representing a model with an even number of
dimensions: R12 = –T 12 and R123 = + T 123, etc.
By replacing T 12 in Eq. 4.6 with (H1+H2 −H12) as in Eq. 4.5, one can formulate
as follows:
H123 = H1 + H2 + H3 − (H1 + H2 − H12) − (H1 + H3 − H13)
− (H2 + H3 − H23) + T123 (4.7)
Or after reorganization of the order of the terms:
T123 = H123 − [H1 + H2 + H3] + (H1 + H2 − H12) + (H1 + H3 − H13)
+ (H2 + H3 − H23)T123
= [H1 + H2 + H3] − [H12 + H13 + H23] + H123 (4.8)
Using sets of relative frequency distributions—variables—the measurement of
T 123 is straightforward: all H values can be aggregated from writing the data as
relative frequencies. The values of T 123 follow from adding and subtractingH-values
using Eq. 4.8.
4.7 Generalization
The sign change of the mutual information with the number dimensions was until
recently an unsolved problem in information theory.3 However, Alexander Petersen
3Krippendorff (2009b, at p. 670; cf. Leydesdorff, 2010, at p. 68) provided a general notation for
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has proven that this sign, indeed, changes with the addition of each next dimension.4
In other words, it can be shown that mutual redundancy is a consistent measure of
negative entropy (Leydesdorff, Petersen, & Ivanova, 2017, p. 17).
Equation 4.8 can be rewritten as follows:
T123 = H1 + H2 + H3 − H12 − H13 − H23 + H123
T123 = [(H1 + H2 − H12) + (H1 + H3 − H13) + (H2 + H3 − H23)]
+ [H123 − H1 − H2 − H3]
T123 = [T12 + T13 + T23] + [H123 − H1 − H2 − H3] (4.10)
The terms in the first set of brackets in Eq. 4.10— [T 12 + T 13 + T 23]—are
Shannon-type information values and therefore strictly positive. The second brack-
eted term—[H123 − H1 − H2 − H3]—makes a negative contribution, because of
the subadditivity of the entropy: H(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ ∑n1 H(xi ), which holds for any
dimension n ≥ 2. For example, H123 ≤ (H1 + H2 + H3). The sign of the resulting
value of T 123 depends on the empirical configurations of nodes (H-values) and links
(T-values). Figure 4.7 shows the two opposites with positive and negative overlaps.
This empirical trade-off can change over time and can also be considered as “the
triple-helix dynamics” (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000; see Chap. 5).
It follows inductively that for any given dimension n, one can formulate combina-
tions of mutual information corresponding to
∑n
1 H(xi )−H(x1, . . . , xn) that are by
definition positive (or zero in the null case of complete independence). For example
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H(xi ) − H(x1, . . . , xn)
In this equation,  is the set of variables of which X is a subset, and H(X) is the uncertainty of
the distribution; || is the cardinality of , and |X| the cardinality of X.



















where the last term on the right-hand side is equal to (−1)nT1234...n .
Returning to the relation between R12 and T12, it follows (using first two
dimensions instructively) that:
R12 = −T12
= H(x1, x2) −
2∑
1
H(xi ) ≤ 0
and T12 ≥ 0 (4.13)
In other words, mutual information between two information sources is either
positive or zero (Theil, 1972, p. 59f.). The relations for R123 and R1234 follow anal-




























The left-bracketed term of Eq. 4.14—
[
H(x1, . . . , xn) − ∑n1 H(xi
)]—is neces-
sarily negative (because of the subadditivity of the entropy; see above), while the
configuration of mutual information relations contributes a second term on the right
which can be positive. This latter term represents the entropy generated by the
realization of the network in terms of links. The links are historical and thus add
information.
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In summary, Eq. 4.14 models the generation of redundancy (with a negative sign)
on the one side versus the historical process of uncertainty generation in the relations
(with a positive sign) on the other. A system with more than two codes (e.g., three
alphabets; cf. Abramson, 1963, p. 127 ff.) can operate as an empirical (im)balance.
When the resulting Rn is negative, self-organization prevails over organization in the
configuration under study,whereas a positiveRn indicates conversely a predominance
of historical organization over evolutionary self-organization.
4.8 Clockwise and Anti-clockwise Rotations
When the relation between two subdynamics is extended with a third, the third may
feed back or feed forward on the communication relation between the other two, and
thus a system is shaped (Sun & Negishi, 2010). This principle is known in social
network analysis as “triadic closure.” Triadic closure can be considered as the basic
mechanism of systems formation (Bianconi et al., 2014; de Nooy & Leydesdorff,
2015). The cycling may take control as in a self-organizing vortex (Fig. 4.8). A
cycle with the reverse order of the operations (counter-clockwise) is equally possible
stabilizing the dynamic in organizational formats.
The two cycles can be modeled as two vectors PABC and QABC with three (or
more) dimensions (A, B, and C), and this system can then be simulated in terms of
the rotations of the two vectors (Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2014b). One rotation can be
understood as corresponding to the tendencyof historical realization, and the evolving
self-organization of horizons of meaning. Using simulations, Ivanova & Leydesdorff
(2014a) showed that the operation of these two (three-dimensional) vectors upon each
other can be expected to generate an R. The value of R is determined by the network
configuration as were the values of T123…n in (Eq. 4.14). A negative sign of R can be
associated with clockwise and the positive sign with counter-clockwise rotations of
the vectors in the simulation, while the values of the two terms in Eq. 4.14 measure
the relative weights of the two rotations in empirical data. The theorizing, simulation,
and measurement can thus be brought into the single and comprehensive framework
of a calculus of redundancy as a complement to Shannon’s calculus of information
(Bar-Hillel, 1955). The resulting value of R can be positive or negative reflecting the
possibility of an inversion along the time axis.




Ulanowicz (2009, at p. 1888,
Fig. 3)
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4.9 Summary and Conclusions
I first extended Shannon’s model of communication (at level A) withWeaver’s levels
B and C. This changes Shannon’s linear model into a non-linear and potentially
evolutionary one, since feedback and feed-forward loops among the levels become
possible. The three levels distinguished in Fig. 4.3 correspond with Luhmann’s
distinction among (i) interactions, (ii) organization on the basis of decisions, and
(iii) self-organization among the fluxes of communications. At level A, information
is communicated in interactions among senders and receivers; at level B, meanings
can be shared to variable extents and thus meaningful information is organized into a
vector-space. However, this vector space is constructed and therefore remains subject
to reflexive reconstructions. The reconstructions, in terms of different weights of the
codes of communication, open self-organizing horizons of meaning at level C.
The question central to the next chapters can now be formulated as follows: under
what conditions can the different codes be expected to interact and co-evolve, and thus
lead to new options? In this chapter, I have first focused on the coherence and tensions
among the communication-, evolution-, and systems-theoretical perspectives with
reference to Luhmann’s formulation of the program of theory construction (cited in
Chap. 1). I have argued that redundancies can be generated at interfaces among sets
of relations which are structured by codes.
In Luhmann’s theory, however, interactions among codes were a priori held to be
impossible; the (sub)systems are defined as “operationally closed” (Luhmann, 1986a
and b; cf. Maturana, 1978). In my opinion, this assumption leads to a meta-biology,
since the analyst remains external to the closed systems under study which can
only be “observed.” Whereas biological systems can gain in complexity by closing
themselves operationally—for example, by shaping a membrane—expectations can
disturb and penetrate one another “infra-reflexively” (Latour, 1988, at p. 169 ff.) and
across domains in the second contingency. Neither the communication “systems”
nor the codes “exist” as hardware (res extensa).
The reflexive layers (res cogitans)—at the individual and the above-individual
levels—can be expected to operate with specific selection criteria upon one another
and over time. Because of these reflexive couplings in terms of expectations, cultural
evolution can be much faster than biological evolution, which operates in terms
of realizations (over generations). Writing and rewriting in the hardware requires
more energy and time than the exploration and codification of new combinations of
expectations.
In other words, I draw a sharper line than Luhmann did between biology and
sociology. Different from Luhmann, I do not make the assumption that systems
“exist.” On the contrary, I assume that “systems” are analytical constructs. These
constructs can eventually be tested as sets of expectations. Cognitive constructs are
thus different from living systems. The philosophy in the background is fundamen-
tally opposed to the holistic and biologically oriented ones nowadays prevailing in
artificial intelligence (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Sherman, 2017). Theories of information
and redundancy span different domains (Deacon, 2012). In the reflexive domain of
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the social sciences, we study our methods of studying, since these methods are the
constraints of our respective perspectives.
Furthermore, Luhmann (e.g., 2013, p. 98) stated “avoidance of redundancy” as an
objective. But it remained unclear why. From my perspective, this a priori makes it
impossible to contribute to his original objective to specify “a form of selection that
prevents the world from shrinking down to just one particular content of conscious-
ness with each act of determining experience” ([1971] 1990, p. 27). The new options
are redundant. The generation of redundancy proceeds in a domain of expectations
about options that do not (yet) exist, but that one can imagine reflexively, refine, and
(re)construct.
By turning away from an objectivistic self-understanding of the sciences as
“observers” and “observations” room thus can be found for a theory of meaning and
knowledge-generation as an extension of Shannon’s information theory (Fig. 4.3).
Whereas Shannon felt the need to distance himself explicitly from this potential
extension, his co-author Weaver understood this possible consequence as the proper
intension of information theory (Bar-Hillel, 1955).
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Part II
Synergy in Triple-Helix Relations
Chapter 5
Evolutionary and Institutional Triple
Helix Models
The institutional TH model focuses on relations of universities, industries, and govern-
ments in networks. Institutional arrangements develop over time along trajectories. The
Triple-Helix metaphor of university-industry-government relations can also be elaborated
into a neo-evolutionary model combining the vertical differentiation among the levels (in
terms of relations, correlations, perspectives, and horizons of meaning) with the options for
horizontal differentiation among the codes (e.g., markets, technologies, politics, etc., oper-
ating in parallel). The neo-evolutionary model focuses on the interactions among selection
mechanisms (markets, technologies, endowments) at the regime level. The historical and
evolutionary dynamics feedback on each other. The relative weights of the historical versus
evolutionary dynamics can be measured as a trade-off. Among three or more selection envi-
ronments, synergy can be generated as redundancy on top of the aggregates of bilateral and
unilateral contributions to the information flows. The number of new options available to an
innovation system for realization may be as decisive for its survival more than the historical
record of past performance.
The “Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations” originated as
a research agenda from a confluence of Henry Etzkowitz’s longer-term interests
in the entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz, 1983, 2002; cf. Clark, 1998) with
my interest in the evolutionary dynamics of science, technology, and innovations
as a result of three (or more) different sub-dynamics. Etzkowitz (1994, pp. 139–
151) contributed a chapter entitled “Academic-Industry Relations: A Sociological
Paradigm for Economic Development” to our—that is, Leydesdorff and van den
Besselaar’s (1994)—edited volume entitled Evolutionary Economics and Chaos
Theory: New directions in technology studies. In this chapter, Etzkowitz described
the development of MIT into an entrepreneurial university since the 1930s. In the
editorial Epilogue to this volume, I argued that more than two interacting dynamics
are needed for studying technology and innovation.
The chapter is partly based on: Leydesdorff, Ivanova, & Meyer (2019). The Measurement of
Synergy in Innovation Systems: Redundancy Generation in a Triple Helix of University-Industry-
Government Relations. In W. Glänzel, H. Moed, U. Schmoch & M. Thelwall (Eds.), Springer
Handbook of Science and Technology Indicators. Heidelberg, etc.: Springer.
© The Author(s) 2021
L. Leydesdorff, The Evolutionary Dynamics of Discursive Knowledge,
Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Scientific and Scholarly Communication,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59951-5_5
89
90 5 Evolutionary and Institutional Triple Helix Models
In the summer of 1994, Etzkowitz and I met again at a workshop in Abisko
(Sweden) and discussed a follow-up project combining his interest in university-
industry relations with my interest in the dynamics of science, technology, and
innovation. In the email conversations that followed, we developed the Triple-
Helix (TH) model of university-industry-government relations as a common denom-
inator (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1995).1 We agreed about using this title in email
exchanges during the month of November 1994.
Etzkowitz and I could find a common ground while the THmetaphor can be elab-
orated from two different (yet related) perspectives: the (neo)institutional one of rela-
tions among universities, industries, and governments, and a neo-evolutionary one
of interactions among three coordination mechanisms: wealth generation, novelty
production, and governance. The (neo)institutional approach can be combined with
social network analysis as amethodology. For example, one can look for the centrality
of agents or institutions in the network. In this chapter, I shall elaborate the differences
and also discuss the role of transitive and cyclic triads in systems formation.
5.1 Historical Trajectories and Evolutionary Regimes
A knowledge-based economy is different from a political economy by being the
result of three instead of two coordination mechanisms operating upon one another.
The third coordination mechanism of knowledge production and control (Whitley,
1984)—hitherto considered as external to the economy—is to be “endogenized”
into the model of a knowledge-based economy, whereas only the two coordination
mechanisms of markets and policies were needed for explaining phenomena in a
political economy. Among three coordination mechanisms, however, synergy can be
generated as a surplus of options on top of the aggregates of bilateral and unilat-
eral contributions to the information flows. The institutional dynamics in networks
generate variations (bottom-up). From a neo-evolutionary (top-down) perspective,
the networks can alternatively be considered as retention mechanisms (Freeman &
Perez, 1988).
Synergy is a second-order effect among the eigenvectors of a network based
on and added to the first-order effects of networks among agents. Relations in a
network are the (first-order) attributes of agents at the nodes. However, one can
attribute second-order variables to the links (as first-order variables). The attribution
of second-order variables to first-order variables implies an orthogonal (90°) change
of perspective. In otherwords, relations in the first layer add up to a configuration. The
1Precursors for the Triple-Helix metaphor can be found in Lowe (1982) and Sabato (1975). Peter
Healey informed me in March 2004 that he had used this metaphor at a meeting in Mexico in
January 1993, but never published it. Note that a Triple-Helix model was the (erroneous) alternative
of Linus Pauling for explaining the structure of DNA, as against the Double Helix proposed by
James D. Watson and Francis Crick in 1953; Watson and Crick were awarded the Nobel Prize in
1962 (Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz, 2003; cf. Lewontin, 2000). Lewontin (2000) also used the TH
metaphor in a biological context.
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resulting network has an architecture with main axes. These main axes—principal
components—are based on correlations among the distributions of relations and
non-relations. However, correlations between each two distributions can be spurious
on a third as a common factor in the background. For example, the relation between
two parents will be changed when something happens to their child. Analogously,
when universities file patents in addition to publishing, this may affect the weights
of all the collaborative and competitive relations in Triple Helices.
As against the (neo)institutional approach, the (neo)evolutionary model does
not focus on relations, but appreciates distributions of relations—including non-
relations—evolving in a vector space constructed on the basis of correlations. Using
the TH indicator, one is able to measure and compare the synergies generated in
ranges of possible configurations. The quality of specific Triple Helices can then
be measured in terms of the opportunities which are generated. In the next chapter
(Chap. 6), I elaborate this measurement instrument as the TH indicator using the
empirical example of regional and national innovation systems in Italy. Chapter 7
finalizes the empirical part of this study by developing the Triple-Helix synergy indi-
cator to a methodology. A general-purpose computer program for the computation
and comparison of synergies among subsets—available at https://www.leydesdorff.
net/software/synergy.triads—enables the user to study whether synergy is generated
in a complex dynamic in terms of which dimensions and/or at which scale?
5.2 From Dialectics to Triads
Evolutionary economics and technology studies emerged during the 1960s and 70s
(Martin, 2012; Rakas & Hain, 2019). Until then, the economy had been analyzed
mainly in terms of the dynamics of production factors such as labor, capital, and
land. The contribution of technological innovation to economic growth was long
held to be a residual factor—that is, the economic growth which remained otherwise
unexplained (e.g., Abramowitz, 1956; OECD, 1964; Solow, 1957). In the 1970s,
the “black box” of technology, innovation, and the economy (Rosenberg, 1982)
was gradually opened by a school of scholars in evolutionary economics who have
also been characterized as “neo-Schumpeterians” (e.g., Andersen, 1994; Freeman &
Soete, 1997; Lee, 2013).
The reference to Schumpeter points, among other things, to his ([1939], 1964)
distinction between technology-driven changes in the form of the production func-
tion reflecting the possibility to generate more output from the same economic input
because of new technologies, versus factor substitutions along a production func-
tion based on relative changes in the prices of input factors (Sahal, 1981). Using
the Cobbs-Douglas production function, the two mechanisms can be modeled as
orthogonal to each other (Fig. 5.1).
Nelson andWinter (1977, 1982) provided a dynamic elaboration of Schumpeter’s
model in terms of natural trajectories, technological regimes, and selection environ-
ments. They added that selection environments can be both market and non-market.























Fig. 5.1 Schumpeter’s model of technological change as a shift of the (Cobb-Douglas) production
function towards the origin versus factor substitution as a shift along the production function
In their evolutionarymodels, however, firms are the carriers of innovations and trajec-
tories are endogenous to firms as routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Regimes (e.g.,
miniaturization) are assumed to be “natural,” and thus not in need of being explained.
A broader perspective on the dynamics of innovation at the level of society was
first formulated in Nelson & Winter’s earlier (1977) study entitled “In Search of a
Useful Theory of Innovation.” The authors formulated (at p. 49) as follows:
We are attempting to build conformable sub-theories of the processes that lead up to a new
technology ready for trial use, and of what we call the selection environment that takes the
flow of innovations as given. (Of course, there are important feedbacks.)
The feedbacks—provisionally bracketed—are part of a control system which can be
managerial or political (Stafford Beer, 1984, 1989). Nelson &Winter chose to focus
on behavior of firms and not in terms of expectations and opportunities. However,
firms are phenotypical and cannot evolve; they can develop a life-cycle in history.
Andersen (1992) suggested that the question “what is evolving?” could have been
made more focal to the analysis in evolutionary economics (cf. Boulding, 1981). I
shall come back to this problem in a later chapter.
Focusing on governmental control and national innovation policies, Freeman and
Perez (1988) formulated a dialectical model of long waves in the development of
techno-economic paradigms (on the basis of key-factors in the economy) versus the
need of structural adjustments at the institutional level. Nations (or regions) can, for
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example, compete in terms of these institutional adjustments. In this model, however,
the “key factors” remain external drivers of the innovation dynamics; as “manna from
heaven.”However, Nelson andWinter (1977, 1982) had called for models that would
endogenize—i.e., explain—technological innovations and not assume technological
developments as a consequence of external factors.
The various models in this neo-Schumpeterian tradition have in common that two
dynamics are almost always postulated as an evolutionarymodel: (i) adjustmentswith
reference to an equilibrium—Marx’s “exchange value” and Schumpeter’s changes in
factor prices—and (ii) the generation of innovations upsetting the tendency towards
equilibrium—Marx’s “use value” and Schumpeter’s shift of the production function
toward the origin. In the TH model organized knowledge production is considered a
third dynamic in addition to and in interaction with market coordination and polit-
ical control. In general, a third dynamic makes a system “complex” and thus poten-
tially non-linear, so that trajectories and regimes, emergence, lock-in, etc., can be
specified.2
5.3 The Knowledge-Based Economy
Whereas wealth generation and governance are inherent constituents of polit-
ical economy, the study of the knowledge-based economy includes the additional
dynamics of novelty production and innovations. The three selection environments
operate with different selection criteria. For example, patents provide legal protec-
tion of intellectual property along the governance axis of regulation and legislation,
while patents can also be considered as input to the economy or output (like publica-
tions) for academia. In sum, the same events—in this case, portfolios of patents—can
have different meanings with reference to each of these three selection environments
(Fig. 5.2). Furthermore, the trilateral interactions among the bilateral ones can be
expected to provide an emerging feedback on the constituent helices and their mutual
interactions.
How can interactions among three bilateral trajectories shape a phase transition to
a trilateral regime? In his book entitled Investigations, Stuart Kauffman (2000, at p.
258) suggested that “by mere constructive interference” the various trajectories may
resonate into a phase transition about which “one can hope” that it will provide evolu-
tionary advantages. However, such an interference remains a coincidence happening
in history. Chance processes generate variations; selections are structural—based on
criteria—and deterministic.
In the neo-evolutionary version of the TH model proposed here, the next-order
regime develops on top of the historical trajectories with another logic that is not
historical but evolutionary. The regime first emerges as a feedback harmonizing the
2In Leydesdorff & Van den Besselaar (1998), for example, we simulated the emergence of trajec-
tories and regimes within the framework of Schumpeter’s production function (cf. Dolfsma &
Leydesdorff, 2009; Leydesdorff, 2006).












Fig. 5.2 The first-order interactions generate a knowledge-based economy as a next-order system.
Source Leydesdorff (2010, at p. 379)
trajectories into an innovation system—as different from a sum total of sub-systems
and with the capacity to process more complexity than the sum of its constituent
trajectories. A three-way interaction term is added. However, unlike a “natural”
regime—e.g., the cycles of the seasons—a technological regime can continue to
interact (in feedback loops) with the trajectories on which it rests. Being not alive, a
technological regime can only be reproduced by being reconstructed.
In other words, the regime of a knowledge-based economy does not “exist,” but
such a regime can be considered as a structure of expectations. The regime adds
to the selection pressure by providing the option of globalization at a next-order
(that is, relatively global) level. The global dynamics selects on historical stabi-
lizations; stabilizations provide second-order variation and globalization provides
second-order selection. In other words, the dynamics of triads are dually layered:
both the variations and selection mechanisms can interact.
5.4 Triads and Simmelian Ties in Triple-Helix
Configurations
Triads can be either cyclic or transitive (Batagelj et al., 2014, pp. 53f.). Transitive
triads—“the friends of my friends are my friends”—are open, while cyclic triads
can be closed as a system of relations. In general, triads are the building blocks of
systems (Bianconi et al., 2014); all next-order forms of organization (quadruplets,
etc.) can be decomposed into triads (Freeman, 1996).
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Transitive triads can shape 
hierarchies
Closure of a transitive triad can 
lead to a cyclic triad
Cycling of the triad generates 
redundancy and closes the system
Fig. 5.3 Transitive and cyclic triads
Transitive triads are based on relations and can be aggregated into hierarchies
(as in a dendogram; see the left-hand panel of Fig. 5.3). Cyclic triads can shape the
axes of helices by incorporating potential disturbances generated by relations (the
right-hand panel of Fig. 5.3). The cyclic rewrites generate redundancies. The panel
in the middle of Fig. 5.3 is intended to illustrate the stochastic possibility of closure
in a triad, when more links become available.
University-industry-government relations shape networks in which both dyads
(e.g., university-industry relations) and triads can be expected. The sociologist
Simmel argued already in 1902 that the transition from a group of two to three is a
qualitative one: another awareness of space becomes available. In a triplet, the real-
ization of one or the other relationmaymake a difference for the further development
of the triad as a system.
According toSimmel (1902), a dyad remains a private relation; the triad introduces
“sociality”: each third person canwatch the other two and thereby have the advantage
of the tertius gaudens (“the third who benefits”); that is, the third person may see
options in the relations between the other two which s/he can use to her advantage. If
the third person actively participates in breaking the tie between the other two, one
can consider this as an instance of divide et impera (“divide and rule”).
The operationalization of these dynamics in terms of social networks was first
pursued by Burt’s (1992) theory of structural holes. Structural holes in network
configurations enable agents to harvest advantages in specific configurations. For
example, agents positioned between cliques may provide the only way to move from
one cluster to another. Thus, the concept of structural holes is related to betweenness
centrality (Freeman, 1978/1979). In the case of a structural hole, an agent between
two other agents can induce competition between the latter two and thus reap the
benefits; for example, by providing a “weak link” (Granovetter, 1973, 1982).
Krackhardt (1999) argued that Burt’s theory of structural holes is about the
dynamics of interacting dyads, whereas Simmel had meant to focus on how triads
contain more capacity than the sum of the interactions among dyads. As Krackhardt
formulated:
In his [Simmel’s] view, the differences between triads and larger cliques were minimal. The
difference between a dyad and a triad, however, was fundamental. Adding a third party to
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a dyad completely changes them, but […] the further expansion to four or more persons by
no means correspondingly modifies the group any further (Simmel, 1950, p. 138).
Krackhardt (1999, p. 186) then defined a “Simmelian tie” as follows:
Two people are ‘Simmelian tied’ to one another if they are reciprocally and strongly tied to
each other and if they are each reciprocally and strongly tied to at least one third party in
common.
A triad of Simmelian ties is cyclic. As transitive triads can shape hierarchies by
relating relations into orders, cycles can operate in parallel and thus be hierarchical
(Kontoupolos, 2006). In a social system, these processes can occur concurrently
and may disturb one another. The self-organizing selection environments tend to
differentiate horizontally under the selection pressure of the regime, while institu-
tional organization and agency are based on integrations among the dimensions at
specific moments of time. The loops may bring a system into fruition by adding
redundancy—that is, by providing structural room for new options—or lead in the
opposite direction to lock-in and historical stagnation (Ulanowicz, 2009).
The constructed “genotypes” are not to be reified into ameta-biology; they remain
knowledge-based constructs in a process of being rewritten. This model is “neo-
evolutionary” because the status of the selection(s) in these environments is different
from Darwin’s “natural” selection. The selection environments (in the plural!) are
knowledge-based; the criteria are socially constructed. The more the “genotypes”
can differ in terms of their functionalities, the more complexity can be processed.
The analytically expected tendency is towards an orthogonal spanning of horizons of
meaningbydifferent codes in the communication.However, this evolutionaryprocess
is constrained because one of its subdynamics has to remain on the ground in order
to host also the historical variations and stabilizations as among its subdynamics
(Bathelt, 2003).
In this TH model, the helices are no longer pictured as wrapped along a common
axis, but they are opened up as three dimensions of a vector space (see Fig. 5.2)
containingmanymore options than can be realized.Whereas relations operate histor-
ically at specific moments (or during periods) of time, the hypothesized structures
operate in a vector space generating redundancies (against the arrow of time).
5.5 The Generalized TH Model of Innovations
In the TH model, the dynamic of innovations is first carried by the institutional
dynamics among the agents (universities, industries, and governments) whose rela-
tions are institutional and observable. However, the dynamics of innovation are based
on options provided by interactions among the communications of these agents. In
network terms, not the nodes but the links operate. This second-order dynamic of
interacting communications (links) builds on the first-order dynamic of relations
among agents (nodes). It is not the agents who are interacting in the innovative
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process at this next-order level, but the distributions of their relations and non-
relations (e.g., the distribution of competencies or geographical addresses). These
distributions cannot be attributed to individual agents! A second-order dynamics
among the links is thus overlaid on the first-order one of links among the carriers.
The non-linear model contains the linear one on which it builds as one of its
subdynamics (Goguen & Varela, 1979; Maturana, 2000). The loops generate feed-
backs on the linear flows or, under specifiable conditions, also feedforwards. What is
variable and what is structural (and thus selective) is not prescribed and may change
over time. However, a second-order model (of interactions among the attributes of
links on top of the interactions among the nodes) can no longer be micro-founded on
agency (the homo economicus), as is required in economic models.
Lundvall (1988) noted this complication for the micro-foundation of his model of
national systems of innovation and proposed to “micro-found” the model on “inter-
actions” (that is, links) instead of agency such as entrepreneurship at the nodes.
However, Lundvall did not elaborate the second-order interactions among first-order
interactions into an evolutionary model of trajectories and regimes. Instead, he advo-
cated a focus on the nation as a common (institutional!) environment allowing for
learning. Others advocated for using regions or sectors as “innovation systems”
(Carlsson, 2006).
In my opinion, a priori delineations of “innovation systems” are begging the ques-
tion. Whether a system is innovative or not is an empirical question. The delineation
of an innovative system may be very different from administrative delineations, and
optimal delineations may change over time. The micro-level dynamics is always
participating in the systems dynamics, but not necessarily in a foundational role.
Even if entrepreneurs were foundational in generating the system historically, the
system’s dynamics can be expected to change during its further development. After
the initial phase, one is no longer able to control non-linear dynamics at the level of
individual agency (Callon, 1986; Luhmann, 1997).
Whether an innovation system is national, regional, entrepreneurial, sectorial, or
technological cannot be decided ex ante. As noted, these remain empirical questions.
What is crucial in the THmodel is the extension of economic and policy analysis with
attention to the cognitive dynamics between discursive and individual knowledge.
The objective is to endogenize the cognitive dynamics. However, the delineation
of the cognitive, economic, or political system can be different. From the systems
perspective of an evolving knowledge base, the observable networks show only the
retention at specific moments of time; one can observe the de-selected cases and
follow their history. But “history-friendly” simulations (Malerba et al., 1999) and
“stylized facts” are not sufficient for the specification of selectionmechanisms. Single
case studies or comparative studies cannot carry an inference about the dynamics at
the systems level. As noted, selections operate on distributions of cases, and not on
individual cases.
Howcan an evolutionarymodel of innovationwith three dynamics be constructed?
In non-linear models of innovation, feedback arrows can first be added to the linear
models of technology push (from supply to demand) and of demand pull in the
reverse direction (from demand to supply). As noted, Nelson and Winter (1977)
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mentioned the importance of feedback terms. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) proposed
a “chainingmodel” with such feedbacks. Unlike a linear channel between supply and
demand, however, relations based on feedbacks are no longer fixed and given; they
become adaptable. When the feedbacks become increasingly important, they may
drive the system over a threshold of generating more redundancy than information
and induce the need for reconstruction. The control mechanism of feedbacks then
becomes another (third) dimension (Stafford Beer, 1984, 1989). The driving force
in one phase (e.g., a new technology or a specific market) can become a dependent
variable after a bifurcation (Phillips, 2016).3
Figure 5.4 illustrates how feedback and feed-forward arrows can interact and
thus shape a mechanism of control operating alongside supply and demand. The
emergence of a control system follows when the feedback and feed-forward arrows
increasingly interact among themselves.When a forward arrow in Fig. 5.4 represents
variation, the corresponding arrow in the opposite direction indicates selective feed-
back. Different sources of variation are interacting, along with the different selection
mechanisms. The cycles remain fragile and can be interrupted, broken, reversed in
their order, and recombined.
Combining a technological opportunity with a market perspective, for example,
may generate an invention. However, the market has to operate as a selection envi-
ronment before an invention can be turned into an innovation. In general, knowl-
edge-based innovations can emerge from horizontal, vertical, or even diagonal
(re-)combinations of technological advances, market perspectives, and geographic
endowments and constraints (e.g., Arthur, 2009; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979). Once
sufficient triads are closed, a technology can enter the regime phase on the basis of
the dynamics among triads.
3The mere fact that variables are both dependent and independent over time does not imply that
the system is non-linear. The two variables can have linear effects on one another with a perfectly
predictable outcome over time (Wouter de Nooy, personal communication, 2 December 2019).
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A triangle can be tipped clockwise or counter-clockwise. The two rotations
(depicted as cyclic arrows in the center of Fig. 5.4) precondition each other as
local organization and global self-organization; networks instantiated at the organiza-
tional level provide stepping-stones and retentionmechanisms for the self-organizing
dynamics of the selection environments; and vice versa, the selection environments
can be expected to adapt evolutionarily to opportunities provided in the historical
layer.
In Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), we considered this emerging network of
communications among the three subdynamics (the dashed circle in Fig. 5.5) for
the first time as a “communication overlay.” However, this additional dynamic was
not further specified at the time. The overlay provides an emerging (and therefore
fourth) selection environment on top of the three institutionally carried functionalities
of wealth generation (by industry), novelty production (in academia), and political
control (by governments). In summary: the overlay operates on top of and in inter-
action with the carrying dynamics as another (trilateral) feedback. The possibility of
a Quadruple Helix is thus endogenous to a Triple Helix (Fig. 5.6); inductively, all
next-order helix-models follow as another recursion of this transition.
If one imagines the dashed circle (in Fig. 5.5) as hovering above the plane, one
can envisage the four subdynamics as organized in a tetrahedron (Fig. 5.6). The
“hovering circle” of Fig. 5.5 is represented as a fourth circle that in time comes
to enjoy a similar status as the other three circles. The arrow of genesis is thus
incorporated as a sub-dynamic during the morphogenesis of the system. However,
the evolutionary dynamic can be expected to overwrite the historical one.
A tetrahedron (Fig. 5.6) can be tumbled in all directions so that all four (that is,
three plus one) perspectives can equally become dominant; for example, during the
different periods of a cycle. The four resulting communication overlays can operate
upon one another and shape a “fractal manifold” (Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2014).
All the hierarchies among them are historical and transient. Co-evolutions in the
Fig. 5.5 “Communication
overlay”
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Fig. 5.6 Tetrahedron of
three communication
systems with an overlay
bilateral arrangements along trajectories can be broken open (at all times and scales)
by a third perspective along each side of a triangle. The resulting manifold is a
scale-free fractal because it develops at a next scale in terms of new, but potentially
disruptive opportunities. Since fractals build on fractals, this order of expectations
remains fragile, while drifting towards the edge of chaos.Disruptions can be expected
to generate avalanches of all sizes (Bak & Chen, 1991; cf. Leydesdorff et al., 2018).
5.6 Institutional and Evolutionary TH-Models
The institutional and neo-evolutionary TH models are related in terms of the
topics under study that they seek to explain; for example, the emergence of new
options (Padgett & Powell, 2012). The institutional TH model focuses on relations
(Storper, 1997; cf. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). From the neo-evolutionary perspec-
tive, however, the relations are first-order attributes to the nodes, whereas interactions
among the relations in a triadic (or more-dimensional) configuration can lead to a
second-order dynamics among the attributes. Table 5.1 summarizes the differences
between the institutional and the neo-evolutionary TH models.
The institutional TH model shares with models in the neo-institutional literature
(e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) a focus on the networked relations between and
among the institutions. From this institutional perspective, the evolutionary perspec-
tive can also be considered as focusing on “institutional logics” (Cai, 2014; Thornton,
Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) or as a “categorical imperative” (Zuckerman, 1999).
However, these other terms designate similar mechanisms. Let me emphasize that
“genotypes” cannot be specified on the basis of historical instantiations of these
“genotypes” as phenotypes. Such a confusion might lead to historicism (Popper,
1967).
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The institutional and evolutionary models are different in terms of the theoretical
perspectives. Most importantly: the units of analysis are agents in an institutional
model, and innovations as recombinations in a neo-evolutionary one. As Casson
(1997) noted, an institutional model of innovation leads eventually to a focus on
entrepreneurship. Indeed, the focus in the literature based on the institutional TH
model has shifted gradually from innovations to the study of “academic entrepreneur-
ship” and the “entrepreneurial university” (e.g., Etzkowitz, 2002 and 2016). Typical
research questions from this perspective include descriptions of graduates who begin
startups; university professors who change their perspective from academic to indus-
trial; or transfer agencies and incubators analyzed in terms of their efficiency. Policy
advice about improving institutional conditions can then also be provided. Improving
the conditions at one place, however, may have unintended consequences at another
since a non-linear dynamic is operating at the next-order (regime) level.
The neo-evolutionary TH model assumes that innovation can be considered as
a second-order outcome of interactions among communications. The next-order
dynamics are based on interactions among selection mechanisms at the system level.
From such a neo-evolutionary perspective, one can expect both intended and unin-
tended consequences of any policy specified in terms of the means-ends logic of the
linear model. The unintended consequences are likely to outweigh the intended ones.
In my opinion, evaluation should focus on these unintended effects because one can
learn from them about the non-linear dynamics of innovations operating on top of
the linear flows.
The two models differ most importantly in terms of their methodological orienta-
tions.While in the institutional model the focus is on networks of relations which can
be studied as observable graphs. The neo-evolutionary model is factor-analytic—as
opposed to graph-analytic—and based on studying matrices including cases which
could have been expected but did not happen. The structural properties of networks
develop along axes that provide specific meanings to the information. Since selec-
tion is deterministic, selection mechanisms determine what in the variation can be
considered as a signal and what as noise. In my opinion, the specification of these
selection mechanisms (as hypotheses) has theoretical priority.
5.7 The Measurement of Triple-Helix Configurations
The TH indicator (derived in Chap. 4) provides a quantification of the balance
between bi- and trilateral relations among universities, industries, and governments
(Leydesdorff, 2003; Park & Leydesdorff, 2010; Ulanowicz, 1986). Mutual infor-
mation among three or more dimensions—follows from the Shannon formulas (see
Eq. 4.8; Abramson, 1963; McGill, 1954; Yeung, 2008). The measure T 123 can be
formulated as follows:
T123 = H1 + H2 + H3 − H12 − H13 − H23 + H123 (5.1)
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It was shown in Chap. 4 that mutual redundancy is equal to mutual information in
the three-dimensional case: R123 = T 123. In the two-dimensional case, however, R12
= –T 12. The change in the signs may seem confusing—Weaver (1949) considered
the Shannon definitions as “bizarre” and counter-intuitive—but in order to main-
tain consistency with Shannon’s information theory, redundancy generated in TH
configurations has a negative sign (see Chap. 4 for the relevant derivations).
In the next chapter, I use the TH indicator for testing assumptions about the
Italian innovation system; but let me first introduce the indicator here by providing
two empirical examples using the tool straightforwardly for descriptive statistics:
1. Taking publications as units of analysis, one can count the institutional addresses
of authors provided in the by-lines as “university” {u}, “industry” {i}, or “gov-
ernment’{g} and any of the possible combinations {ui, ug, ig, uig} (Leydesdorff,
2003). When for example, an academic and an industrial address co-occur in the
by-lines of a single document, this can be counted as a university-industry rela-
tion. Thus, one obtains seven categories {u,i,g,ui,ug,ig, and uig}; an eighth empty
category {0, 0, 0} can also be included. Figure 5.7 shows the results of such an
analysis for all the publications in the Social Scioences Citation Index (SSCI) and
theArts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI)with at least oneKorean address
during the period 1968–2006 (N = 190,196; Park and Leydesdorff, 2010).
2. Using Storper’s (1997) metaphor of a “holy trinity of technology, territory, and
organization,” three variables can be specified as attributes of firms: technological
classes, geographical addresses, and organizational formats. One can study the
interactions among these three dimensions as indicators of the knowledge base of
Fig. 5.7 The development of mutual redundancy in South Korean university-industry-government
relations during the dictatorship and the periods of democratization, liberalization, andglobalization,
respectively. Source Elaborated from Park and Leydesdorff (2010, at p. 645)
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regions and nations. This is introduced here for the case of Sweden and elaborated
in the next chapter for Italy.
5.7.1 Synergy in Co-authorship Relations in South Korea
Figure 5.7 shows the long-term development of new options in the social sciences
and humanities literature with an institutional address in South Korea, using mutual
redundancy as the TH synergy indicator. Publications were first evaluated manually
in terms of university-industry-government co-authorship relations. The units of
analysis are documents to which different institutional addresses are attributed as
academic, industrial, or governmental. Mutual information and redundancy is based
on co-occurrences among these three TH categories.4
Figure 5.7 shows the results. Whereas the South-Korean system was originally
hierarchical and state-controlled, the dictatorial regime relaxed gradually in the
1970s. This tendency was strengthened during the period of democratization during
the 1980s. When the status of a more advanced economy was reached, the pendulum
in the balance between uncertainty and redundancy generation swung back. Korea
entered the world market increasingly, leading to full OECD membership in 1996.
In this later period, internationalization of the research system tended to uncouple
the self-organizing publication system operating internationally from the national
level (Wagner, 2008, 2018). Whereas the discourse in these social-science publica-
tions was strongly integrated nationally during the dictatorship, new options became
available with democratization. In the more recent period of globalization and inter-
nationalization, mutual redundancy consequently decreased in absolute value (or,
in other words, became less negative). Communication became more efficient with
globalization, or, in other words, less redundant.
The indicator measures a trade-off between institutional retention and self-
organized expansion. The example shows that what retention and expansion mean is
system-specific. In an innovation system one aims to retain wealth from knowledge,
while in a publication system uncoupling from national integration can show the
very different dynamic of internationalization.
5.7.2 Synergy in Innovation Systems across Sweden
Retention of wealth from knowledge assumes the development of synergy in TH
relations. Which regions or sectors contribute most to the generation of options?
I introduce this design here using Swedish firm data as an example, but elaborate
further on this methodology in the next chapter for the case of Italy.
4A routine is available at https://www.leydesdorff.net/th/th.exe where one can feed in the values for
each of the seven categories and obtain as a result the value of Tuig.
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The complete set of firm data for Sweden was obtained from Statistics Sweden in
November 2011; N = 1,187,421. This micro-data contained address information in
terms of 290 units at the lowest (NUTS5)5 level of municipalities, a technology clas-
sification into 21 classes,6 and nine classes of numbers of employees which allowed
us to distinguish between small, medium-sized, and large companies (Leydesdorff &
Strand, 2013, p. 1894, Table 5.2).7 One thus obtains a data array in three dimensions in
which each cell value indicates the number of co-occurrences between technological
classes, geographical addresses, and size categories. Using the margin totals, one can
derive bilateral relations; Eq. 5.1 can be used for the computation of synergy values
at different geographical scales (using the NUTS hierarchy of the OECD/Eurostat).
Figure 5.8 shows the results for the 21 counties in Sweden at the NUTS-3 level
of so-called counties. I chose Sweden as an example for didactic reasons: the results
accord in this case with the literature and with common intuition. Mutual redun-
dancy is largest for Stockholm (–3.49 mbits), Västre Gotalands län (–2.91 mbits),
and Skåne (–2.31 mbits). These three counties host the major universities and domi-
nate the picture within the nation; together they account for 48.5% of the summed
redundancies of the regions at this geographical scale (NUTS-3).
The between-group redundancy (R0) among the 21 counties can be used as a
measure of the synergy among regions.8 Anegative value ofR0 indicates an additional
synergy at the next level of national agglomeration among the lower-level units.
Although the values in bits of information are sample-specific, one is allowed to
compare the indicators as percentages of contribution to the synergy at different
levels (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 (bottom line) shows that the surplus of the national system in Sweden
is −4.61 mbit (on top of the aggregation of the results at individual counties). This
is 25.7% of the −22.56 mbit measured for Sweden as a national system. In other
5NUTS is an abbreviation for Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, a system developed
and maintained by EuroStat.
6A concordance table between the Swedish sector classification and the NACE codes
(Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes) can
be found at https://www.scb.se/Grupp/Hitta_statistik/Forsta_Statistik/Klassifikationer/_Dokument/
070129kortversionSnisorterad2007.pdf. Unfortunately, the technological classification is less
specific than the NACE codes of the OECD.
7One can organize the data as a three-dimensional array using, for example, consecutive sheets in an
Excel workbook, or one can write three attributes for each firm and use the TH calculator available
at https://www.leydesdorff.net/software/th4. This software computes the TH indicator Rijk and all
the two-dimensional and one-dimensional components.
8Analogously to the decomposition of probabilistic entropy (Theil, 1972: 20f.), mutual redundancy
in three (or more) dimensions can be decomposed into groups as follows:






When one decomposes in the geographical dimension, R0 represents redundancy generated
between regions; RG is the synergy generated at a geographical scale G; nG is the number of firms
at this geographical scale; and N the total number of firms in the aggregate (N = 1,187,421 in the
Swedish case).
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Fig. 5.8 Percentages of contributions to redundancy at the level of 21 Swedish counties (NUTS-3)
Table 5.2 Between-group
synergy at different


















Source Leydesdorff and Strand (2013)
words, one-quarter of the reduction of uncertainty in the national system is realized
at a level higher than within the regions. At the next level of aggregation (NUTS2),
an additional synergy of (22.56–19.84)= 2.72 mbits, or 13.7%, is indicated. Among
the three Landsdelar (NUTS1), however, only 0.5 mbit, or 2.2% of the national
sum total, is reduced by this further aggregation. In summary, the Swedish national




In a series of studies—usually co-authored with colleagues from these nations—a
number of national systems of innovation were thus analyzed and the results were
decomposed in terms of both regions and technological sectors: Germany (Leydes-
dorff & Fritsch, 2006; Ruhrmann et al., under review), the Netherlands (Leydesdorff,
Dolfsma, & van der Panne, 2006), Sweden (Strand & Leydesdorff, 2013), Norway
(Strand&Leydesdorff, 2013), Italy (Leydesdorff&Cucco, 2019), Hungary (Lengyel
& Leydesdorff, 2011), Spain (Leydesdorff & Porto-Gomez, 2019), the Russian
Federation (Leydesdorff, Perevodchikov, & Uvarov, 2015), the USA (Leydesdorff,
Wagner, Porto-Gomez, Comins, & Phillips, 2019),and China (Leydesdorff & Zhou,
2014).
In the cases of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and China, for example, the
national level adds to the sum of the regions. In the Netherlands, the (inter-regional)
highways to Amsterdam Airport (Schiphol) are probably the most important axes
of the knowledge-based economy. In Sweden, the synergy is concentrated in three
regions (Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö/Lund); in China, four municipalities
which are administered at the national level participate in the knowledge-based
economy more than comparable regions. In Germany, however, most of the synergy
was found decentralized at the level of the federal states (Länder).
InNorway, foreign-driven investments in themarine andmaritime industries along
thewest coast drive the transition fromapolitical to a knowledge-based economy.The
synergy in terms of the development of new options is larger in these coastal regions
than in the regionswith the traditional universities inOslo and Trondheim. Hungary’s
western part has been transformed by integration into the European Union, whereas
the eastern part has remained a state-led innovation system. The capital Budapest
occupies a separate position as a metropolitan system of innovations. The national
level no longer adds synergy to the sum of the synergies in these three regional
systems.
One of the conclusions to be drawn throughout this series of studies of regional
and national innovation systems is that knowledge-intensive services (KIS) tend not
to contribute to the local synergy in regions, since KIS is not necessarily coupled
geographically to a region or city. For example, if one offers a knowledge-intensive
service in Munich and receives a phone call from Hamburg, the next step is to
take a plane to Hamburg or to catch a high-speed train. In other words, it does not
matter whether one is located in Munich or Hamburg since knowledge-intensive
services tend to uncouple from the local economy. The main competitive advantage
is proximity to an airport or train station. In the study of the Russian Federation, the
national level could be shown to disorganize synergy development at lower levels.
Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) cannot sufficiently circulate in Russia because
of their integration into the (firmly localized) state apparatus.
Analogous to this relative “foot-looseness” (Vernon, 1979) in the case of KIS,
one can also expect uncoupling in the case of high-tech knowledge-based manufac-
turing. However, the expectation is very different for medium-tech manufacturing,
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because in these sectors the dynamics are often more embedded in other parts of
the economy (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). A number of policy implications follow
from these conclusions and considerations. Footloose companies cannot be expected
to contribute to the strengthening of integration within a given region. High-tech
knowledge-intensive services, however, may require a laboratory. One would expect
medium-tech manufacturing to be embedded and thus to generate more employment
than high-tech.
In summary, the various country studies show that patterns can be very different
among nations as well as among regions within nations (e.g., Yoon & Park, 2016).
Furthermore, one can expect the dynamics to be different at the system’s level
between the sciences and markets: in publication systems, uncoupling and inter-
national (that is, non-localized) orientations can be considered as improvements to
the system, while in the case of regional developments the focus is on retaining
“wealth from knowledge” and thus on developing local synergies.
This discussion of the potential uncoupling from geographical locations by
knowledge-intensive services illustrates how the different dynamics can also be inter-
woven. High-tech and knowledge-intensively tend to induce globalization, including
volatility. The trade-off between the knowledge-based economy self-organizing at
the global level and the lower-level organization in networked instantiations can
be measured in considerable detail using the TH indicator. Since the dynamics are
complex, the results can be counter-intuitive, and raise further questions. The a priori
categories attributed to innovation systems—such as national, regional, etc.—can be
considered as hypotheses to be tested and refined.
In a recent study of synergy in the Spanish system, for example, Andalucia as a
region (at the NUTS2 level) did poorly in generating mutual redundancy, whereas
Seville as the capital of this region (NUTS3) showed a different pattern (Leydesdorff
& Porto Gomez, 2019). Indeed, one of the objectives of these studies is to test, revise,
and inform the categories used for making assessments. Are regions the appropriate
unit of analysis? In the next chapter, I focus on the Italian innovation system using
this instrument.
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and the North–South Divide in Italy
Using firm-level data collected by Statistics Italy for 2008, 2011, and 2015, the Triple-
Helix synergy among geographical and size distributions of firms and technology classes
is analyzed both regionally and nationally. The Italian system is both knowledge-based and
knowledge-intensive, and therefore an interesting case. The contributions to national synergy
of the twenty regions in Italy have increased between 2008 and 2015, but synergy generation
at levels above the regions has remained relatively stable at approximately 45%. As against
the statistical classification into twenty regions, or into Northern, Central, and Southern
Italy, the greatest synergy is retrieved by defining the country in terms of Northern and
Southern Italy as two sub-systems, with Tuscany included as part of Northern Italy. Different
innovation strategies could be developed for these two parts of the country. However, the
current focus on twenty regions for innovation policies may to some extent be an artefact of
the statistics and EUpolicies. In terms of sectors, bothmedium- and high-techmanufacturing
(MHTM) and knowledge-intensive services (KIS) are integrated proportionally in the various
regions.
Italy was shaped as a nation state in the period 1848–1870. During the Second
War of Independence (1859–1861), the northern part of Italy was unified under the
leadership of the Kingdom of Piemonte (Turin), and the southern part—the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies (with Naples as capital)—was conquered by Garibaldi in 1860.
Central Italy, which until then had been the Papal State, was invaded by Italy in 1870
and thereafter Rome became the capital of the nation. The division into three parts—
Northern, Central, and Southern Italy—has remained important; it is commonly
used for policy purposes. However, the North/South divide is also a common termi-
nology in political discourse. In short, the North and the South have different cultural
traditions and marked differences in GDP per capita, the composition of economic
activities, and employment indicators.
At a lower level of aggregation, the country is administrated in terms of twenty
regions, of which five have a special status. Among these, Valle d’Aosta is an
This is a shortened and rewritten version of Leydesdorff, L., &Cucco, I. (2019). Regions, Innovation
Systems, and the North-South Divide in Italy. El profesional de la información, 28(2), e280214.
https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2019.mar.14.
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autonomous region inwhich French functions as a second language. AltoAdige (also
knownas Süd-Tirol) is an autonomous province ofTrentino-AltoAdige, bordering on
Austria, withGerman as a second language. Below the level of regions, 107 provinces
are defined in the statistics.1 Furthermore, Italy is known for its “industrial districts”
which often cover a small territory within one or more provinces, with specialized
manufacturing or services (Becattini et al., 2003; Bertamino et al., 2017). These
districts are highly innovative and mainly located in the northern part of the country
(Biggiero, 1998). Using 2011 census data, Statistics Italy (IStat) distinguished 141
industrial districts and furthermore 611 so-called local labour systems based on
commuting patterns (“sistemi locali del lavoro,” SLL). Insofar as SLLs overlap with
industrial districts, the data allows for economic analyses at the district level(e.g., Paci
& Usai, 2000; Mameli, Faggian, &McCann, 2008). Industrial districts, however, are
not a separate level of administration and hence not included in the national statistics.
National statistics for Italy are aligned with the hierarchical classification of the
EuropeanUnion in the “Nomenclature desUnités Territoriales Statistiques” (Nomen-
clature of Territorial Units for Statistics, or NUTS). In this classification, NUTS1 is
defined as lands (e.g., the German Länder), NUTS2 as regions (e.g., Lombardia), and
NUTS3 as provinces or metropolitan areas (e.g., the metropolitan region of Milano
or the province of Lecce).
Grilliches (1994) noted that the use of administrative units in statistics can be a data
constraint for innovation studies and also for innovation policies. For example, inno-
vation is not constrained geographically (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991). Innovation
systems may depend on interactions and infrastructures that do not match regional
and national boundaries. Sectorial innovation systems (e.g., oil refinement, biotech-
nology) are in important respects organized internationally (Carlsson, 2006 and
2013). Furthermore, firms can interact with non-regional universities if the knowl-
edge and skills required are not available within the region (Asheim&Coenen, 2006;
Fritsch & Schwirten, 1999), or when they are seeking higher-quality collaboration
partners at the international level (d’Este& Iammarino, 2010; Laursen, Reichstein, &
Salter, 2011). For the purpose of implementing innovation policies at the appropriate
level, however, it is important to understand the boundaries of innovation systems.
This is a complex undertaking which could be addressed at different levels (e.g.,
municipal, provincial, regional, national, supra-national; by sector or comprehen-
sively) and using different instruments, such as various combinations of qualitative
analyses and quantitative indicators.
Italy is a challenging and exemplary case: to what extent and at which levels
is innovation-systemness indicated? Can the regions carry the function of regional
innovation organizers (Etzkowitz & Klofsten, 2005)? If we test regional innova-
tion systems using the generation of redundancy as an indicator of synergy, the
results show that the understanding of Italy in terms of regional innovation systems
is not optimal when synergy is measured in terms of the interactions among (i)
the geographical distributions of firms, (ii) the economic structure in terms of firm
sizes, and (iii) the technological knowledge bases of these firms as indicated by the
1These numbers change over time. The current count of provinces is 110.
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NACE-codes. (NACE is the acronym for the “Nomenclature générale des Activités
économiques dans les Communautés Européennes” used by the OECD and Euro-
Stat.) Most synergy is found by considering Italy in terms of a northern and southern
part, with Tuscany as part of Northern Italy.
6.1 Innovation Policies and Innovation Systems in Italy
Both the OECD and the EU provide incentives for organizing regional innovation
policies. Among other things, the OECD reviews regional innovation policies with
the objective of providing policy recommendations (e.g., OECD, 2009). In innova-
tion studies (economic geography and evolutionary economics), it is increasingly
assumed that regions (including metropolitan regions) are the appropriate units of
analysis for studying the transition to a knowledge-based economy (e.g., Braczyk,
Cooke, &Heidenreich, 1998; Cooke, 2002; Feldman& Storper, 2016; Florida, 2002;
Storper, Kemeny, Makarem, Makarem, & Osman, 2015).
In Italy, regions have gained importance as innovation-policy units since 2001,
when the Italian constitution was changed (Riforma del Titolo Quinto). A range of
devolution measures gave regional governments greater control over policy areas
such as health, education, and economic and industrial development, including inno-
vation policy (Rolfo & Calabrese, 2006). This devolution led to a sharp reduction of
the national budget for the support of industrial andR&Dactivities, particularly in the
South. Brancati (2015) estimates that between 2002 and 2013, state aid decreased by
72%; the remaining state interventions privileged Central and Northern Italy, while
industrial policies in favor of the Southern regions were virtually abandoned after
2000 (Prota & Viesti, 2013).
Furthermore, the 2007–2009 economic and financial crisis has severely impacted
the Italian industrial system. Compared with the trends calculated for the 1992–
2008 period, about 300 bn Euro of gross investment were lost in Italy between 2008
and 2013 (Cappellin et al., 2014). Southern regions were disproportionally affected:
between 2007 and 2012, industrial investment in the South decreased by 47% (Prota
& Viesti, 2013). This retreat of national policy has only partly been compensated
by regional policies, supported to varying degrees by EU Cohesion and Structural
funds. In the EU programs during the period 2007–2013, about 21.6 bn Euro of
EU funds (FESR/ERDF and FSE/EFS) were allocated to regions in Southern Italy
for Convergence objectives (Calabria, Campania, Puglia, and Sicilia) and 6.3 bn to
regions in Central and Northern Italy for so-called Competitiveness objectives.
Despite the increasing role played by regional governments in innovation policy,
it has remained a subject of debate whether the regional level is most appropriate for
the design and implementation of such policies. On the basis of an analysis of the
performance of the Italian national innovation system during the 1980s and 1990s,
Malerba (1993, at p. 230), for example, argued that “not one, but two innovation
systems are present in Italy.” The first is a “core R&D system” that operates at
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the national level through systematic cooperation between large firms with indus-
trial laboratories, small high-tech firms, universities, public research institutes, and
the national government. The second innovation system would be a “small-firms
network” composed of a plurality of small- and medium-sized firms that cooperate
intensively at the local level, oftenwithin industrial districts, andgenerate incremental
innovation through learning-by-doing.
Malerba mentions the lack of overall coordination in public policy and R&D
support services and aweak tradition of successful university-industry cooperation in
research asmajor problems in the Italian innovation system. Nuvolari &Vasta (2015)
added that Italy canbe characterized as a structurallyweaknational innovation system
in comparison to its main competitors. The diverging performance between scientific
and technological activities can lead to major difficulties in the technology transfer
of scientific results from universities to firms due to a lack of bridging institutions
(e.g., Balconi et al., 2004).
A number of studies in various sectors of the economy (e.g., Antonioli et al.,
2014; Belusssi et al., 2010; De Marchi & Grandinetti, 2017; Lew et al., 2018) have
argued that the international orientation of research collaborations means that Italian
regions cannot be considered as innovation systems. These innovative regions are
better characterized as “glocal” systems. They pair a relatively low connectedness
at the local level with strong knowledge-intensive relationships at the international
level. On the industrial side, this international orientation carries a threat of de-
industrialization of innovative districts and regions because new options can easily be
bought bymultinational corporations and relocated elsewhere (Cooke&Leydesdorff,
2006; Dei Ottati, 2003).
In sum, the gradual emergence of knowledge production as an additional coor-
dination mechanism in an industrial system that is otherwise coordinated in terms
of institutions and markets introduces the risk of “footloose-ness” (Vernon, 1979).
Knowledge-intensive services and high-tech manufacturing tend to uncouple an
innovation system from a specific geographical address and can thus be counter-
productive from the perspective of regional innovation policies (Leydesdorff &
Fritsch, 2006).
6.2 Methods
Elaborating on the reasoning in Chaps. 4 and 5, I note that mutual information among
three (or more) dimensions does not measure action (e.g., academic entrepreneur-
ship) as relations between input and output, but the investment climate as a struc-
tural consequence of correlations among distributions of relations. However, the
distinction between these structural dynamics in terms of changing selection envi-
ronments and the historical dynamics of relations is analytical; the historical and
the evolutionary dynamics are coupled in the events. Mutual information indicates
a trade-off between variation and selection as positive and negative contributions to
the prevailing uncertainty. The question of systemness can thus be made empirical
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and amenable to measurement: when the generation of redundancy prevails over the
generation of uncertainty, “innovation systemness” is indicated.
Furthermore, in the case of groups (e.g., subsamples at a lower geographical
scale), one can decompose the information as follows: H = H0+∑G nGN HG (Theil,
1972, pp. 20f.). Since T values are decomposable in terms of H values, one can
analogously derive (see Chap. 5; Leydesdorff & Strand, 2013, at p. 1895):






In this formula, TG provides a measure of synergy at the geographical scale G;
nG is the number of firms at this scale, and N is the total number of firms under
study. One can also decompose across regions, in terms of firm sizes, or in terms of
combinations of these dimensions.
The three relevant dimensions are the (g)eographical, (t)echnological, and
(o)rganizational; synergy will be denoted as TGTO and measured in millibits with
a minus sign. Because the scales are sample-dependent, values are normalized for
comparisons across samples as percentages. After normalization, the contributions of
regions or groups of regions can be compared. The between-group term T 0 (Eq. 6.1)
provides us with a measure of what the next-order system (e.g., the nation) adds in
terms of synergy to the sum of the regional systems.2
6.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Statistics Italy (IStat) collects firm census data every ten years. Complete data sets for
the years 2008, 2011, and 2015 were harvested from the so-called ASIA (“Archivo
Statistico delle Imprese Attive”) database of Statistics Italy. This database includes
all enterprises that performed productive activities for at least six months during the
reference year.However, this data does not cover the sectors agriculture, fisheries, and
forestry. Public administration and non-profit private organizations are also excluded.
The data contain 4,514,022 firms in 2008, 4,450,937 firms in 2011, and 4,338,085
in 2015.
For a Triple-Helix analysis of synergy, we need three key variables: (1) the admin-
istrative location of the firm in the form of its postal address indicating the geograph-
ical dimension (government); (2) the NACE code indicating the main technology in
the knowledge base of the firm; and (3) the character of the firm in terms of its size
indicated as the numbers of employees. These three dimensions have been used in a
number of previous studies about the TH in various nations (see Chap. 5).
2A routine with further instructions is available at https://www.leydesdorff.net/software/th4 which
generates the synergy values from data which for this purpose have to be organized as comma-
separated variables with for each case (that is, firm) a unique identifier, a postal code, a size class,
and a NACE code. The results are organized into a file which can be read into programs like SPSS
or Excel for further processing.
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6.3.1 The Geographical Distribution of Firms in Italy
The administrative division of Italy into Northern, Central, and Southern Italy and,
alternatively, into twenty regions is visualized in Fig. 6.1 and further specified in
Fig. 6.1 Organization of Italy into Northern, Southern, and Central Italy, and regions; Northern
Italy is indicated in dark green, Central Italy is in very light green, and Southern Italy is in light
green. Source Figure produced by the authors using SPSS v.22
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Table 6.1 Regional Division of Italy at the NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 levels
Codes of
ISTAT
NUTS1 NUTS2 Name of the
region
Macro-regions North–South
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 North-west
Italy (ITC)
ITC1 Piemonte Northern Italy Northern Italy














ITI1 Toscana Central Italy















Table 6.1. Among other things, I shall test the three conventional partitions of Italy
provided in columns c, d, and e of Table 6.1.
Table 6.2 provides the numbers of firms in the years under study. With the excep-
tions of Trentino-Alto Adige and Lazio, the numbers of firms have been declining
during this past decade. This confirms the impression of stagnation since the crisis
of 2007–2009. Italy has only partly recovered from this crisis.
6.3.2 Small, Medium-Sized, and Large Enterprises
In addition to the assignment of geographical addresses and NACE codes, firms
can be scaled in terms of the number of their employees. SMEs, for example, are
commonly defined in terms of this proxy. Financial turn-over is also available in the
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Table 6.2 N of firms in 20 Italian regions
Region 2008 2011 2015 % change 2008–2015
Piemonte 344,334 339,261 323,184 −6.1
Valle d’Aosta 11,959 11,933 11,257 −5.9
Lombardia 822,579 818,998 805,755 −2.0
Trentino-Alto Adige 83,121 83,656 84,398 1.5
Veneto 406,800 402,976 391,474 −3.8
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 88,683 86,797 82,720 −6.7
Liguria 132,288 129,708 122,874 −7.1
Emilia-Romagna 389,123 370,778 366,475 −5.8
Toscana 338,943 332,563 320,167 −5.5
Umbria 70,892 69,411 66,455 −6.3
Marche 133,261 131,567 126,213 −5.3
Lazio 423,059 428,715 426,322 0.8
Abruzzo 100,120 101,115 97,184 −2.9
Molise 21,705 21,445 20,631 −4.9
Campania 351,688 340,601 336,819 −4.2
Apulia 254,431 254,277 249,196 −2.1
Basilicata 36,169 35,234 34,586 −4.4
Calabria 114,858 110,391 105,878 −7.8
Sicily 278,451 273,155 264,480 −5.0
Sardegna 111,558 108,356 102,017 −8.6
Sum 4,514,022 4,450,937 4,338,085 −3.9
data as an alternative indicator of economic structure. However, we chose to use the
number of employees since one can expect this number to exhibit less volatility than
turn-over, which may vary with stock value and economic conjecture more readily
than numbers of employees. However, the numbers of employees are sensitive to
other activities, such as outsourcing.
The definitions of small and medium-sized businesses, large enterprises, etc.,
vary among world regions. Most classifications use six or so categories for summary
statistics. I use the nine classes provided in Table 6.3 because this finer-grained
schemeproduces richer results (Blau&Schoenherr, 1971; Pugh,Hickson,&Hinings,
1969a, b; Rocha, 1999).
6.3.3 The Technological Dimension (NACE Codes)
The third dimension of the data to be used is the attribution of NACE codes.
The classification of firms in terms of the Nomenclature générale des Activités
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Table 6.3 Classification of firms (2015) in terms of the number of employees. Source Statistics
Italy
CLASS Number of employees Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative percent
1 0–1 3,473,928 80.1 80.1 80.1
2 2–4 493,365 11.4 11.4 91.5
3 5–9 201,497 4.6 4.6 96.1
4 10–19 99,554 2.3 2.3 98.4
5 20–49 45,476 1.0 1.0 99.4
6 50–99 13,275 0.3 0.3 99.7
7 100–199 6223 0.1 0.1 99.9
8 200–499 3225 0.1 0.1 100.0
9 500 or more 1542 0.0 0.0 100.0
4,338,085 100.0 100.0
Note that micro-enterprises (with fewer than five employees) constitute 91.5% of the firms under
study
économiques dans les Communautés Européennes (NACE, Rev. 2) is used for indi-
cating the technological dimension.3 The NACE code can be translated into the
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) that is used in the USA (e.g.,
Leydesdorff, Wagner, Porto-Gomez, Comins, & Phillips, 2019). The disaggregation
in terms ofmedium- and high-techmanufacturing, and knowledge-intensive services,
is provided in Table 6.4.4
We will additionally analyze the subsets of high- and medium-tech companies,
and (high-tech) knowledge-intensive services, because one can expect very different




Figure 6.2 provides a visualization of the percentage contribution of the twenty
regions to the national synergy of Italy in 2015. The visualizations for 2008 and
2011 are not essentially different.5
3Firms are classified in the ASIA database using ATECO 2007 codes, the Italian version of NACE
Rev. 2.
4A complete index of NACE codes can be found, for example, at https://www.cso.ie/px/u/NACECo
der/Index.asp.
5The rank-order correlations among the regions in these three years are significantly the same
(Spearman’s ρ > .99; p < 0.001).
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Table 6.4 NACEclassifications (Rev. 2) of high- andmedium-techmanufacturing, and knowledge-
intensive services. Sources: Eurostat/OECD (2011); cf. Laafia (2002, p. 7) and Leydesdorff et al.
(2006, p. 186)
High-tech Manufacturing
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical
products and pharmaceutical preparations
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and
optical products
30.3 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and
related machinery
Medium–high-tech Manufacturing
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical
products
25.4 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment
n.e.c
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and
semi-trailers,
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
• Excluding 30.1 Building of ships and boats,
and
• Excluding 30.3 Manufacture of air and
spacecraft and related machinery






59 Motion picture, video and television
programme production, sound recording and
music publishing activities
60 Programming and broadcasting activities
61 Telecommunications
62 Computer programming, consultancy and
related activities
63 Information service activities
64–66 Financial and insurance activities
69 Legal and accounting activities
70 Activities of head offices; management
consultancy activities
71 Architectural and engineering activities;
technical testing and analysis
72 Scientific research and development
73 Advertising and market research




80 Security and investigation activities
84 Public administration and defence,
compulsory social security
85 Education
86 to 88 Human health and social work
activities
90 to 93 Arts, entertainment and recreation
Of these sectors, 59 to 63, and 72 are
considered high-tech services
Figure 6.2 shows that Tuscany belongs to the northern part of Italy as a knowledge-
based economy; the distinction of Central Italy including Tuscany is not supported
by this data.
Mountainous regions both along the Alps and in the Apennines are weakest in
generating synergy. However, one should keep in mind that Italy has a system of
excellent highways and trains that cross these regions. Their relative marginality
is thus not likely to be due to the mountainous character of these regions, but
perhaps more a consequence of their structural positions such as their distance from
metropolitan centers, harbors, and airports.
Figure 6.3 shows that triple-helix synergy has increased over time in virtually all
regions (but not in Sardegna). The strongest regions became even stronger in terms
of their contributions to the national synergy. For example, Lombardia increased its
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Fig. 6.2 Percentages of contributions of the regions to the national synergy of Italy in 2015
leading contribution to the national synergy by a further 1.8%. The percentage of
synergy generated above the regional level—that is, the complement to 100% of
the sum of the regional contributions—declined from 48.9% in 2008 to 44.4% in
2015 (–4.5%). This reduction of above-regional synergy contribution over time as a
percentage is consistentwith the progressivewithdrawal of innovation policy-making
at the national level, and the growing importance of the regions (Table 6.5).
In summary: regions have become more important, but only 55% of the synergy
is realized at the regional level. The other 45% is realized at the above-regional level
(such as across the North/South divide or in Italy as a national system).
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Fig. 6.3 Percentages of contributions of the regions to the national synergy of Italy in 2008, 2011,
and 2015
6.4.2 Northern, Central, and Southern Italy
Using the classification of regions into Northern, Southern, and Central Italy as
provided in Table 6.1 , Fig. 6.4 shows the above-regional synergy development using
three (northern, southern, central) or two (northern and southern) groups of regions,
respectively, on the right side, and the values of T 0 on the basis of twenty regions on
the left side. As noted, the latter declined from 48.9 in 2008 to 44.4% in 2015.
The above-regional synergy development among the three groups of regions
(north–south-center) is of the order of 22.5%, but is not increasing consistently as the
supplement of the synergy among the twenty regions. Among two groups of regions
(north–south), however, T 0 was further reduced to 18.2% in 2015.
Both the northern and southern parts are more synergetic when compared with
the division into three parts. If Tuscany is analyzed as part of northern Italy, however,
the northern part of Italy accounts for 47.0% of the synergy and the southern part for
34.9%;with an additional 18.2% synergy at the national level. Values around 20% for
the national surplus synergy were also found for other countries in previous studies.
Adding Tuscany, which itself contributes only 5.8% to the synergy at the national
level, to the northern part (instead of the central one) increases the contribution of the
north by more than 9% (=46.95 − 37.90; in Table 6.6). Thus, an additional synergy
is indicated by using this model of Italy.
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Table 6.5 Percentages of contributions of the regions to the national synergy of Italy in 2015
Region 2008 2011 2015 % change 2008–2015
Piemonte 3.82 3.95 4.17 9.2
Valle d’Aosta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
Lombardia 8.67 9.18 10.43 20.3
Trentino-Alto Adige 1.09 1.08 1.13 3.6
Veneto 4.19 4.15 4.31 3.0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1.37 1.51 1.49 8.4
Liguria 1.47 1.56 1.58 7.5
Emilia-Romagna 4.71 4.73 5.08 7.7
Toscana 5.55 5.75 5.81 4.7
Umbria 0.45 0.46 0.48 6.0
Marche 2.14 2.10 2.26 5.6
Lazio 3.09 3.27 3.38 9.5
Abruzzo 1.15 1.37 1.33 15.5
Molise 0.27 0.35 0.26 −4.6
Campania 2.67 2.82 2.99 12.2
Apulia 2.79 2.94 3.01 8.1
Basilicata 0.32 0.33 0.38 21.4
Calabria 1.43 1.50 1.54 7.5
Sicily 3.36 3.79 3.89 16.0
Sardegna 2.54 2.66 2.07 −18.7
T0 48.91 46.48 lePara> 44.40 −9.2
Sources Eurostat/OECD (2011); cf. Laafia (2002, p. 7) and Leydesdorff et al. (2006, p. 186)
The conclusion is that considering Italy as twenty regions leaves 45% of the
synergy in the Italian innovation system unexplained. This is extremely high when
compared with other nations. In the USA, we found that the additional synergy at
the national (above-state) level is only 2.8%. This is much less than we found in
previous studies of national innovation systems: Norway (11.7%), China (18.0%),
the Netherlands (27.1%), Sweden (20.4%), and Russia (37.9%). Italy would score
above the Russian Federation when considered in these terms, but for very different
reasons (Leydesdorff, Perevodchikov, & Uvarov, 2015). The high surplus in Russia
is caused by the centralized nature of this system, while in Italy, the high surplus is
unexplained when the wrong data model is used. When Italy is conceptualized as a
country with two or three innovation systems, the results accord with those for other
EU nations.
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Using the NACE codes (provided in Table 6.4), we can repeat the analysis for subsets
of firms which are classified as high- or medium–high-tech, and for knowledge-
intensive services.Of the approximately 4.3millionfirms, 1,294,874 (29.8%)provide
knowledge-intensive services, while only 40,083 (0.9%) are classified as MHTM in
2015. However, the differences between the distribution of the set and the subsets
are marginal. Table 6.7 shows the rank-order correlations which are all above 0.95 (p
< 0.001). In other words: both medium-high-tech and knowledge-intensive services
are distributed proportionally over the country in terms of numbers of firms. Table
6.8 provides a summary of the results, including the values for these subsets as
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Table 6.7 Rank-order correlations between the samples of firms classified as high- and medium–
high-tech manufacturing (MHTM) and knowledge-intensive services (KIS) over the twenty regions
of Italy
Full set MHTM
MHTM Correlation Coefficient 0.955**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 20
KIS Correlation Coefficient 0.982** 0.950**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000
N 20 20
** Spearman’s rho; correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Table 6.8 Summary table of percentages of contributions to the synergy in the Italian innovation
system (2015)
Region 2015 north_south_center north_south MHTM KIS
Piemonte 4.17 37.90 46.95 7.14 3.58
Valle d’Aosta 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lombardia 10.43 11.68 9.19
Trentino-Alto Adige 1.13 0.94 0.80
Veneto 4.31 7.66 3.54
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1.49 2.72 1.38
Liguria 1.58 1.93 1.59
Emilia-Romagna 5.08 7.40 5.20
Toscana 5.81 17.50 8.15 4.81
Umbria 0.48 34.85 0.67 0.50
Marche 2.26 4.06 2.12
Lazio 3.38 3.07 2.07
Abruzzo 1.33 21.62 2.32 1.30
Molise 0.26 0.30 0.21
Campania 2.99 3.70 2.45
Apulia 3.01 3.76 2.36
Basilicata 0.38 0.70 0.42
Calabria 1.54 1.96 1.47
Sicily 3.89 4.44 4.09
Sardegna 2.07 1.34 1.85
Sum 55.60 77.01 81.80 73.94 48.93
T0 44.40 22.99 18.20 26.06 51.07
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percentages of synergy in the two right-most columns.
In Table 6.8, values with outliers forMHTMand/or KIS are boldfaced in the right-
most columns: when we focus on MHTM, Piemonte, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, and
Toscana provide contributions to the synergy more than two percent higher than
without this focus. Lombardia, Marche, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia follow with more
than one percent higher values.
Unlike manufacturing, services can be offered nation-wide or even beyond the
nation, and thus tend to uncouple from a specific location, leading to a negative effect
on the local synergy. In Italy, this is the case mainly for services in Lombardia and
Lazio, since these two regions contain the two metropoles of Milano and Rome with
airports, etc. Toscana (Florence) and Veneto (Venice) follow with smaller effects.
In Southern Italy, there are no effects from either MHTM or KIS. A negative
effect of MHTM is indicated for Lazio, probably meaning that some manufac-
turing may have administrative offices located in Rome without contributing to the
knowledge-based synergy in this region (Lazio). Sardegna also has a negative effect
when focusing on MHTM because the medium- and high-tech sectors are marginal
in this local economy.
6.5 Conclusions and Discussion
In analogy to “national innovation systems” (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988, 1992;
Nelson, 1993), many studies have argued for studying “regional innovation systems”
such as Wales or Catalonia (Braczyk, Cooke, & Heidenreich, 1998; Cooke, 1998,
2002). However, innovation systems are not bound by administrative and political
borders. In my opinion, one should not make the choice between studying regions
or nations on a priori grounds and across the board. The function of regions in an
otherwise relatively homogeneous country (e.g., Denmark) is different from that in
a country with a federal structure, such as Belgium.
From this perspective, Italy is an interesting case because there is a traditional
divide between the North and the South, but there are also common denominators
such as a single language (with small exceptions), and national institutions such as a
network of state universities, a national research council (CNR) with a similar struc-
ture in all regions, and a national government without a federal structure. During the
last two decades, the regions have become more important because of the devolution
policies of the central government and the emphasis on regions in EU policies.
One would expect the coherence of an innovation system to be a mixture of
both national and regional aspects. The research question then becomes: how
much innovation-systemness is generated at the various levels? Is this innovation-
systemness distributed across regions or specialized in specific regions? The synergy
measure enables us to address these questions empirically and in considerable detail.
In summary, Italy as a nation is integrated, albeit not at the level of the twenty
regions. Eight regions in Northern Italy (including Tuscany) are well developed as
innovation systems. These eight regions contribute 34.0% to the national synergy.
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However, as a separate subsystem Northern Italy contributes 47.0% of the synergy
(Table 6.6). This is 13% more than the sum of the individual regions. The regions
on the Northern borders with different cultural orientations (Alto Adige and Valle
d’Aosta) contribute marginally to the synergy in the Northern-Italian system.
If we apply the same reasoning to Southern Italy (the ItalianMezzogiorno), twelve
regions contribute 21.6% to the national synergy. Considered as a subsystem (Table
6), the South contributes 34.9%; that is, another 13.3%more synergy. On top of these
two sub-systems, Italy as a nation contributes 18.2% to the national synergy. This can
be interpreted as a synergy generated as a result of interactions among sub-systems.
Most synergy is found by considering Italy in terms of a northern and southern part,
with Tuscany as part of Northern Italy.
As one would expect, synergy is enhanced by focusing on high- and medium-tech
manufacturing. Rome and Milano function as metropolitan centers of innovation
systems, followed by Florence and the region of Venice (including the harbour).
Unlike Spain, where Barcelona and Madrid function as metropolitan innovation
systems without much further integration into the remainder of the country (Leydes-
dorff & Porto-Gómez, 2018), the Italian system is nationally integrated in terms of
MHTM and KIS.
6.6 Policy Implications
Innovation policies focusing on the regional level in Italy may miss important oppor-
tunities in inter-regional interactions. In other words, the coordination of innova-
tion policies among regions, particularly within each of the two major innovation
(sub)systems of Northern and Southern Italy, could be considered as potentiallymore
effective. More generally, our results provide support for the argument that admin-
istrative borders which originated for historical and administrative reasons should
be examined critically in terms of their functionality for innovation, particularly in
a knowledge-based economy that is far more networked than a political economy.
The knowledge dynamics added to the economic and political dynamics generates
a complex system with a volatile dynamics that tends to self-organize its boundaries
(Bathelt, 2003). A complex system is resilient and thus adapts to signals that do not
accord with its internal dynamics. A political administration that is not reflexively
aware of and informed about how the relevant innovation systems are shapedmay lack
the flexibility required to steer these systems and feel in the longer term constrained
by the unintended consequences of its own actions (Ashby, 1958; Luhmann, 1997).
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Chapter 7
The Measurement of Synergy
When policy-makers call for “interdisciplinarity,” they often mean “synergy.” Problem-
solving requires crossing boundaries, such as those between disciplines. However, synergy
can also be generated in inter-sectorial or geographical collaborations. Synergy is indicated
when thewhole offers more possibilities than the sum of its parts; “interdisciplinarity” can be
an instrument for creating “synergy.” Synergy can bemeasured as an increase of redundancy;
that is, the number of options which are available, but not-yet used. Instead of asking for
the synergy among pre-defined categories, such as regions, sectors, size-classes, or nations,
etc., I propose to let the most synergetic combinations among (potentially heterogenous)
variables emerge from the data matrix. A synergy map can be drawn showing (cluster of)
available but not-yet-realized options. A computer routine is made available at https://www.
leydesdorff.net/software/synergy.triads which compares all possible triads in a data matrix
in terms of their contributions to the synergy in a configuration.
In this chapter, I generalize the Triple-Helix indicator for measuring synergy in
interactions among three or more helices to an indicator for any data set (e.g., an
Excel sheet). As noted, a routine is made available for automating the analysis. I
first discuss a toy model that one can follow using pen and paper and then upscale
to empirical cases.
In the TH model, synergy is assumed to be generated in interactions among
the three TH partners—universities, industries, and governments. Carayannis and
Campbell (2009 and 2010), however, proposed to extend the analysis to four and
five helices. However, the helices remained defined ex ante. In this chapter, I turn the
question around and ask for the measurement of synergy among any three variables
in a data set. The variables can be permutated so that one can compare among all
possible triads. Which combinations of variables (nodes) and relations (links) are
most synergetic? Are triplets that generate redundancy sparse and isolated? Or are
they connected to a large component?
This chapter is partly based on: Leydesdorff, L., & Ivanova, I. A. The Measurement of “Interdisci-
plinarity” and “Synergy” inScientific andExtra-ScientificCollaborations. Journal of theAssociation
for Information Science & Technology (2020, Early view); https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.24416.
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“Synergy” is an objective different from “interdisciplinarity.” The third mission
of the university does not necessarily challenge the internal—disciplinary or interdis-
ciplinary—organization of research. In my opinion, the crucial question is whether
and how social and scientific relevance can be synergetic so that surplus value for
the various stakeholders can be generated (Bunders & Leydesdorff, 1987).
7.1 “Synergy”
The term synergy originates from the word συνεργ ία in classical Greek which
means “working together.” By working together, a whole can be created that is
greater than the sum of its parts. In science, for example, synergy may mean that
new options have become available because of collaborations across disciplinary,
sectorial, or geographic boundaries.
Newly emerging options are vital to innovative systems, more than past perfor-
mance. A system may run out of steam and be deadlocked if new options are not
sufficiently generated. A larger number of options adds to the maximum capacity of
a system. Unlike biological systems, this maximum capacity of a cultural system—
the Hmax in information theory—is not a given, but a construct that can further be
informed and thus enlarged (see Fig. 4.2). For example, new means of transport can
be invented. This adds capacity to (in this case) the transportation system.
The generation of redundancy is based on interactions among selection environ-
ments. Whereas interactions among variations generate uncertainty, selections can
be expected to reduce uncertainty. The same information can be selected differently
by various stakeholders using different criteria. The appreciations from different
perspectives (“the meanings of the information”) can be shared and thus generate
redundancy. Thus, the same or overlapping informations can be involved more
than once. Whereas information can be communicated in relations (and measured
using Shannon’s formulas), meanings are provided and can be shared from different
perspectives with reference to horizons of meaning. Sharing can generate an “over-
lay” among perspectives with a dynamic of redundancy different from that of
information processing (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000).
For example, when a child asks permission fromone of its parents, the other parent
is latently present in the response albeit with a potentially different interpretation of
the uncertainty in the configuration. Uncertainty can be reduced or increased when a
third perspective operates in the background, like in this case of the relation between
the parents (Abramson, 1963, pp. 130f.). In a triad, the correlation between each two
variables can spuriously be co-determined by a third with a plus or a minus sign.
As discussed in Chapter Five, triads are the building blocks of systems (Bianconi
et al., 2014; cf. Krackhart, 1999). All higher-order configurations in networks can be
decomposed into triads (Freeman, 1996). The values for uncertainty and redundancy
in triads can be aggregated and disaggregated since the Shannon-formulas are based
on sigma’s (Leydesdorff & Strand, 2013, p. 1895, n. 5). I exploit these possibilities
for the development of the indicator of synergy here below.
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Table 7.1 Four column vectors and their margin totals in a toy model
v1 v2 v3 v4 Sum
0 0 3 0 3
0 6 0 4 10
9 0 0 3 12
4 4 0 5 13
0 3 4 0 7
13 13 7 12 45
The number of possible triads among n sets or variables is n * (n – 1) * (n – 2)/(2
* 3). This number grows rapidly with an increasing number of n. For n = 10, for
example, this number of triads is (10 * 9 * 8)/6) = 120. (The denominator [2 * 3]
corrects for double counting.) Each node can partake in n – 1 links of which some
are parts of triads which generate redundancy and others are not.
Triads contain three nodes and three edges: both links and nodes can be part of
more than a single triad.1 In each of these triads, the nodes and links partake in
both the redundancy and uncertainty generated in a triad. How much redundancy is
generated at the level of nodes, links, and triads? Let me specify this step-by-step
using a toy model; thereafter, I shall upscale to empirical examples.
7.2 A Toy Model
In the “toy” model in Table 7.1, for example, four variables are attributed to five
cases like column vectors of a matrix.
One can compute the joint entropy (H12) and mutual information or transmission
between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of this matrix (T 12) by following the
steps explicated in Table 7.2.
Column e in Table 7.2 contains themargin totals of the five rows of the data matrix
(columns a to d). Using the grand total of thematrix (N = 45) as denominator, relative
frequencies are provided in columns f to i. In column k to n, the values in this two-
dimensional probability distribution (pij) are transformed into the contributions to
the Shannon-type information (by using H ij = –
 pij * log2 pij) in bits. It follows
from the summation of the cell values that H ij = 3.23 bits (at the bottom of column
o). This is the two-dimensional information content of this matrix.
1For example, if the number of nodes n = 4, each of the four nodes can participate in n – 1 = 3
direct relations [e.g., in the case of node 1 (n1): (1) n1 – n2; (2) n1 – n3; (3) n1 – n4]. The number
of unique relations possible in this network is 4 * 3 / 2 = 6, namely: (1) n1 – n2; (2) n1 – n3; (3)
n1 – n4; (4) n2 – n3; (5) n2 – n4; (6) n3 – n4. The number of possible triads in this case is (4 * 3 *
2)/(3 * 2) = 4; in this case: (i) n1 – n2 – n3; (ii) n1 – n2 – n4; (iii) n1 – n3 – n 4; and (iv) n2 – n3
– n4.
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Table 7.2 Computation of the one- and two-dimensional information in the toy model
Toy model Probabilities; relative frequencies
(n/N)
Two-dimensional H(12) in bits =
–
 pij log2(pij)
v1 v2 v3 v4 p1 p2 p3 p4 i1 i2 i3 i4
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o
0 0 3 0 3 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.26
0 6 0 4 10 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.22 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.31 0.70
9 0 0 3 12 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.27 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.72
4 4 0 5 13 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.35 0.97
0 3 4 0 7 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.26 0.31 0.00 0.57
13 13 7 12 45 0.29 0.29 0.16 0.27 1.00 0.77 0.96 0.57 0.92 3.23
The margin totals in the vertical and horizontal direction provide us with the one-
dimensional probabilities: the information values in column e add up to H1 = 2.19
bits. Analogously on the basis of the values in the bottom row of columns a to d, H2
= 1.96 bits. Using Eq. 4.5 (above):
T12 = H1 + H2 − H12 = 2.19+ 1.96− 3.23 = 0.92bits (7.1)
A matrix contains by definition a two-dimensional distribution
(∑
i j pi j = 1
)
;
mutual information in two dimensions is necessarily positive (Theil, 1972). For the
representation of a three-dimensional distribution, however, one would need three
independent dimensions.
7.3 Vector Coordinates
One can also consider the values in each three columns as vector representations in
the x, y, and z dimensions of a three-dimensional array [x, y, z]. The four vectors in
Table 7.1 contain four such triplets: {v1,v2,v3}, {v1, v2,v4}, {v1,v3,v4}, {v2,v3,v4}.
One can compute for each triplet a three-dimensional H123, the three bidimensional
information contentsH12,H13,H23, and three one-dimensional information contents
H1, H3, H3. I elaborated the computation in the case of the first triplet {v1,v2,v3} in
Table 7.3.
Using the bottom line of Table 7.3 and Eq. 4.8, it follows that
T123 = [H1 + H2 + H3]− [H12 + H13 + H23]+ H123
= (0.89+ 1.53+ 0.99) − (2.21+ 1.86+ 2.27) + 2.69
= 3.40− 6.34+ 2.69 = −0.24 bits (7.2)
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Table 7.3 Exemplary elaboration of the computation of redundancy in the first triplet {v1, v2,v3}
The first triplet {v1, v2, v3}
v1 v2 v3 Sum
0 0 3 3
0 6 0 6
9 0 0 9
4 4 0 8
0 3 4 7
13 13 7 33
Probabilites One dimension Two dimensions Three dimensions
p1 p2 p3 p12 p13 p23 p123
0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.09
0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00
0.69 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00
0.31 0.31 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.00
0.00 0.23 0.57 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.09 0.12
Sum: 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.65 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.21
Informa on 
in bits H1 H2 H3 H12 H13 H23 H123
0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.31
0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00
0.37 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00
0.52 0.52 0.00 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.00
0.00 0.49 0.46 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.46 0.41 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.37
Sum: 0.89 1.53 0.99 2.21 1.86 2.27 2.69
Analogously, the other three possible triplets provide: T 124 = –0.08; T 134 = –
0.23, and T 234 = –0.08 bits. The values for the four triplets can be aggregated for the
set (because of the sigma’s in the Shannon formulas). The sum of the redundancies
in the relevant triads can be attributed as a synergy value to the nodes and links
participating in the respective triads (Leydesdorff & Strand, 2013, p. 1895, n. 5). As
noted, the routine (available at https://www.leydesdorff.net/software/synergy.triads)
permutes all column vectors of a data matrix so that all possible combinations of
variables are evaluated in terms of their contributions to the synergy.
For example, v2 participates in the triads {v1, v2, v3}, {v1, v2, v4}, and {v2, v3,
v4}, but not in {v1, v3, v4}. Among the triads in which a vector participates somewill
generate information (T 123 > 0) and others redundancy (T 123 < 0). One can define the
synergy value of v2 in this matrix as the sum of the negative values of the triplets in
which v2 participates. For v2, this is [–0.24 – 0.08 – 0.08]= –0.40 bit of information.
Both v1 and v2 participate in the triads {v1, v2, v3} and {v1, v2, v4} which
generate –0.24 and –0.08 bits of redundancy, respectively. The link between v1 and
v2 can analogously be attributed with this redundancy shared between v1 and v2.
This is – 0.24 for {v1, v2, v3} plus – 0.08 for {v1, v2, v4}, and thus –0.32 bits. One
can visualize the resulting retentions of synergy in this toy network as in Fig. 7.1. It
happens that all links and nodes participate in the generation of redundancy in this
specific “toy” model.
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Fig. 7.1 Synergy retention network of the toy model (in bits of information)
7.4 Empirical Applications
7.4.1 Synergy in International Co-Authorship Relations
In addition to interactions among the disciplines, synergy can also be generated in
extra-scientific contexts, such as university-industry relations or in geographical co-
locations. Using data collected from the Web-of-Science on 28 June 2020 (Leydes-
dorff et al., 2013),2 Table 7.4 shows the numbers of internationally co-authored
papers among six western-Mediterranean countries in 2009: France, Italy, Spain,
Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.
Figure 7.2a shows the affiliations network of internationally co-authored papers
among these six nations. France has relations with Italy and Spain (within the EU),
Table 7.4 International co-authorship relations among six western-Mediterranean countries in
2009
France Italy Spain Morocco Algeria Tunisia
France 0 3970 3065 383 681 765
Italy 3970 0 2834 68 35 85
Spain 3065 2834 0 118 45 70
Morocco 383 68 118 0 33 53
Algeria 681 35 45 33 0 29
Tunisia 765 85 70 53 29 0
2I repeated the data analysis on June 26, 2008.
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Fig. 7.2 a Affiliations network among six western-Mediterranean countries, b synergy network
among six western-Mediterranean countries
but one can expect co-authorship relations with scholars in the former colonies of
France in northern Africa. Scholars in these countries are often francophone.
Figure 7.2b shows the synergy network among these six nations: the three Euro-
pean nations generate synergy from their collaborations as do the three northern-
African nations among them. However, the values for the European countries are
twice those for the African ones. However, there is no synergy indicated between
France and the northern-African countries in 2009, although there was synergy in
previous years. One thus can conclude that scholars in France have more options in
relations to EU partners than with the northern-African nations.
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Fig. 7.3 Map based on cosine-normalized citing patterns among 26 journals cited in Scientometrics
during 2017. Clustering based on the Louvain algorithm (Blondel et al., 2008); VOSviewer was
used for the layout and visualization
7.4.2 Synergy in Aggregated Citation Relations Among
Journals
As a second example, I use the aggregated journal-journal citation matrix of 26
journals cited in reference lists of publications in Scientometrics during 2017 more
than a threshold value of 43 times.3 I chose this example because the disciplinary
and interdisciplinary classification of journals is often intuitive.
Figure 7.3 provides a map of this network of journal-journal relations on the
basis of the cosine-normalized (“citing”) vectors in the citation matrix. The structure
induced by Blondel et al.’s (2008) algorithm for decomposition shows three groups
of journals: information-science journals in the direct environment of Scientometrics,
multidisciplinary ones (e.g., PNAS, PLOS One, and Nature) on the right side, and
policy and management journals on the left side of the map (e.g., Research Policy
and Technovation).
For n = 26 (as in this case), the number of possible triads among the vectors
is (26 * 25 * 24)/(2 * 3) = 2,600. Of these triads, 38 (1.4%) contribute to the
redundancy. Consequently, the vast majority of triplets (98.6%) does not generate
redundancy. However, 18 of the 26 (69.2%) journals participate in triplets which
generate redundancy.
3This threshold is based on using 1% of the total number of references summed over the papers in
this journal (6464) after subtraction of the 2161 within-journal self-citations; one percent of (6464
– 2161 = ) 4303 references. One-percent of this is 43, the threshold value in this study.
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Table 7.5 Rank-ordering of synergy contributions of 26 journals and journal-journal relations
Journal (Nodes)
Synergy 
in bits Journal-journal relation (Links)
Synergy 
in bits
Am Econ Rev -4.27 Expert Syst Appl Am Econ Rev -3.08
Expert Syst Appl -3.08 Manage Sci Am Econ Rev -0.79
Manage Sci -0.79 Strategic Manage J Am Econ Rev -0.75
Strategic Manage J -0.75 Acad Manage J Am Econ Rev -0.65
Acad Manage J -0.65 Science Am Econ Rev -0.56
Science -0.56 Soc Networks Am Econ Rev -0.50
Soc Networks -0.50 Nature Am Econ Rev -0.48
Nature -0.48 Expert Syst Appl Strategic Manage J -0.33
Technol Forecast Soc -0.32 Technol Forecast Soc Am Econ Rev -0.32
Phys Rev E -0.26 Expert Syst Appl Science -0.31
Res Policy -0.23 Nature Expert Syst Appl -0.29
P Natl Acad Sci USA -0.22 Manage Sci Expert Syst Appl -0.28
Scientometrics -0.22 Expert Syst Appl Acad Manage J -0.28
Plos One -0.21 Phys Rev E Am Econ Rev -0.26
Organ Sci -0.15 Expert Syst Appl Technol Forecast Soc -0.25
High Educ -0.08 Expert Syst Appl Phys Rev E -0.25
J Technol Transfer -0.03 Res Policy Am Econ Rev -0.23
Am Sociol Rev 0.00 P Natl Acad Sci USA Expert Syst Appl -0.22
J Inf Sci 0.00 P Natl Acad Sci USA Am Econ Rev -0.22
Inform Process Manag 0.00 Scientometrics Am Econ Rev -0.22
Technovation 0.00 Scientometrics Expert Syst Appl -0.22
J Informetr 0.00 Expert Syst Appl Plos One -0.21
J Assoc Inf Sci Tech 0.00 Plos One Am Econ Rev -0.21
Soc Stud Sci 0.00 Expert Syst Appl Res Policy -0.19
J Doc 0.00 Organ Sci Am Econ Rev -0.15
Res Evaluat 0.00 Expert Syst Appl Soc Networks -0.13
… (55 – 25 = ) 30 other link …
Furthermore, each link can be part of n * (n – 1)/2 triads. For n= 26, this amounts
to 325 possible values; 55 of them (16.9%) have a negative value. In Table 7.5 the
links are listed in terms of most synergy. Combining the redundancy values for nodes
and links, one can generate a network; VOSviewer was used to visualize this network
in Fig. 7.3.4 Table 7.5 lists the 26 journals in terms of synergy values in the left-most
column, and in terms of decreasing redundancy in links between these journals in
the next two columns.
Science ranks on the synergy indicator on the 6th position, and Nature follows on
the 8th rank. However, large journals with a pronouncedly disciplinary identity such
as the Am Econ Rev and a number of journals in the management sciences generate
more synergy than Science and Nature. Among the library and information-science
journals, the journal Scientometrics scores highest on synergy (with rank number 13
and −0.22 bits of redundancy). However, the journal Social Networks occupies the
4The noted computer routine provides among other things the files “minus.net” and “minus.vec”
in the Pajek format so that one can proceed to the visualization and further analysis of the synergy
network.
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Fig. 7.4 Synergy network among the citing patterns of 26 journals in the citation environment of
Scientometrics in 2017
7th position on the ranking of synergy values with−0.50 bits of redundancy. This is
more than twice as high as the value of −0.22 for Scientometrics.
The synergy map in Fig. 7.4 is very different from the affiliations map in Fig. 7.3.
The interpretation of this figure raises all kinds of questions. For example, Sciento-
metrics is not central to its synergy map. However, one should keep in mind that this
is a single case; the purpose of this exercise was a proof of concept. More cases and
further refinement of parameter choices are needed before one can draw empirical
conclusions; for example, about the significance of differences. Note that the synergy
indicator allows to combine, for example, authorship and disciplinary-specific vari-
ables (e.g., title-words). The indicator can be used for the evaluation of any set of
three or more variables, including disciplinary affiliations, geographical address, or
demographic characteristics.
7.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Unlike most performance indicators, the synergy indictor was not generated in a
research evaluation practice, but is theory-based (McGill, 1954; Ulanowicz, 1997;
Yeung, 2008; cf. Krippendorff, 2009a and b). Bridging the gap from theory to practice
will require more empirical work and examples. For example, in a next project, it
may be interesting to study synergy in translation research because the generation
of synergy is a stated objective of this research program. In translation research,
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the objective is to accelerate the application of new knowledge from basic (e.g.,
molecular) biology in the clinic (“from bench to bed”) or vice versa to articulate
demand at the bedside in terms which can be made relevant for research agendas in
pre-clinical specialisms.
In my opinion, “synergy” is more important for the evaluation of the social func-
tions of science than performance indicators which usually are intended to serve the
management of research. However, university-industry relations can be conceptual-
ized as non-linear processes of transfer, application, and incubation. The mediation
between supply and demand may require managerial or governmental interventions.
In university-industry-government (“Triple Helix”) relations, feedbacks can be more
important than linear transfer.
Wu et al. (2019) developed an indicator of disruptiveness using the differences
between citing and cited patterns over generations of papers as an indicator of change.
The comparison of disruptiveness with synergy can be a subject for further research.
Using Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) of MEDLINE/PubMed, Petersen et al.
(2016) showed a relation between synergy-development and innovativeness during
technology-specific periods of time.
In sum: by appreciating redundancies, one shifts the focus from the measurement
of past performance to the question of the number of options. The measurement
of synergy can also be relevant for the coupling to other areas of policy making
(cf. Rotolo et al., 2017). Synergy refers to options which are possible, but not
yet fulfilled, whereas most bibliometric indicators hitherto evaluate past perfor-
mance; that is, options that have already been realized. More generally, the measure-
ment of redundancy may provide methodologies opening a range of future-oriented
indicators.
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Part III
The Dynamics of Expectations
and Knowledge
Chapter 8
Anticipation and the Dynamics
of Expectations
The operationalization of socio-cognitive structures in terms of observables such as texts
(e.g., in discourse analysis and scientometrics) or the behavior of agents (e.g., in the sociology
of scientific knowledge) may inadvertedly lead to reification. The dynamics of knowledge
are not directly observable, but knowledge contents can be reconstructed. The reconstruc-
tions have the status of hypotheses; hypotheses can be tested against observations. Whereas
agent-based modelling (ABM) focuses on observable behavior, simulations based on algo-
rithms developed in the theory and computation of anticipatory systems (CASYS) enable
us to visualize the incursive and recursive dynamics of knowledge at the individual level
as different from the potentially hyper-incursive dynamics at the intersubjective level. The
sciences can be considered as “strongly anticipatory” at this supra-individual level: expec-
tations are discursively reconstructed in terms of next generations of expectations. This
reflexive restructuring is embedded in historical dynamics on which it feeds back as a selec-
tion environment. The agents and texts entertain discursive models and thus be considered
“weakly anticipatory” participants in the communication.
In a lecture entitled “Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject,” the philosopher
Karl Popper (1967, 1972) elaborated his argument about “objective knowledge” in
“World 3” as follows:
[…] it is important to distinguish between different senses of the word knowledge:
(1) Subjective knowledge which consists of certain inborn dispositions to act, and of their
acquired modifications.
(2) Objective knowledge, for example, scientific knowledge which consists of conjectural
theories, open problems, problem situations, and arguments.
All work in science is work directed towards the growth of objective knowledge. We are
workers who are adding to the growth of objective knowledge asmasons work on a cathedral.
(pp. 131f.)
As is probablywell-known, Popper distinguished threeworlds:World 1 consisting
of physical objects and events, including biological phenomena;World 2 as theworld
This chapter is based on: Leydesdorff (2015).
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of mental processes; and World 3 as containing “objective knowledge.” The three
worlds are substantively different and operate in parallel.
Objective knowledge in World 3 is possible because human language has also a
descriptive function. A description can be objectified; for example, by writing it on
paper. As Popper formulated:
Without the development of an exosomatic descriptive language—a language which, like a
tool, develops outside the body—there can be no object for our critical discussion. But with
the development of a descriptive language (and further, of a written language), a linguistic
third world can emerge. (p. 120)
In my opinion, language not only provides the option of exosomatic descriptions,
but enables us to shape discursive knowledge as a result of interactions among the
descriptions. In this context, “discursive” is different from Popper’s use of the word
“linguistic.”
From an evolutionary perspective, discursive knowledge can be considered as
“speciation” of another medium in the communication. In Chap. 2, I argued for
“a communicative turn in the philosophy of science”—beyond Rorty’s 1992 [1967]
“linguistic turn.” Synergies based on interactions among codes in the communication
can induce a knowledge base which operates in terms of expectations. This neo-
evolutionary model was elaborated in Chaps. 4 and 5 for the case of the Triple Helix
of university-industry-government relations.
With the coding of the communications, the medium has changed into discursive
knowledge. A symbolic layer is added to the language. One needs a specific compe-
tence to participate in the discourse beyond linguistic competence. Concepts can
be symbolically generalized and function in the next-order communication dynamic
of interacting codes. The functionally different codes span horizons of meaning that
operate as selection environments at arm’s length from the intentions of the language
users. The relations between language users and cognitive structures are mediated
by language.
Adding a second dimension to language changes the medium into a performative
medium. For example, one can use this second dimension first for rank-ordering the
communications on a speakers list in a debate; for example, in parliament. However,
the second dimension can also be used as a grouping variable. Specific languages
usages (e.g., jargons) invoke other symbols. The communication can become richer
and more performative because of an additional selection in the second dimension
(Broszewski, 2018; Distin, 2010). A restricted discourse can always be elaborated
into natural language (Bernstein, 1971; Coser, 1975).
The newly added dynamics (of discourse) feeds back as a modifier on the carrying
one of common language. Luhmann (1997a, b, pp. 393f; 2012, pp. 238f.) formulated
the dual-layered communication dynamics, as follows:
[…] the medium therefore has to be both condensed and confirmed in a paradoxical because
contrary operation of generalization through specification. Media symbols thus generate, we
could say, the eigenvalues of their own recursivity. When they are reused, such medium-
specific eigenvalues develop—for example, as the value of otherwise valueless money
symbols. […]
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In Chap. 1, I discussed Marx’ (1867) argument that the mediation of money
(“Ware-Geld-Ware” orWGW) is qualitatively different from the exchange of money
via the mediation of commodities (“Geld-Ware-Geld” or GWG).1 The dynamics
of money are more abstract than those of commodities; more transactions can be
processed. Further codification of money into credit enables us to shop worldwide.
Luhmann (1997a, b, pp. 393f.; 2012, pp. 238f.) added that “the issue of generalized
acceptance has been discussed particularly with regard to the medium of money. But
it concerns all other media as well.” The more fine-tuned the medium is, the richer
the communication can be. The capacity of the medium to select from the variation
is limited by the quality of the reflection in the medium (cf. Ashby, 1958).
When the processing grows more complex than the content of the commu-
nications, a change in the relative weights of couplings among subdynamics
may restructure the system. In abstract terms, one can consider this as reaction-
diffusion dynamics and its bifurcations. Avoiding this abstract vocabulary, Luhmann
formulated as follows:
All communication is an operation that takes place concretely under the direction of specific
meaning intentions. It is concerned with the truth of certain statements, compliance with
certain instructions, the purchase of certain objects, certain signs of love—or indifference.
Individual com-munications of this type are, however, never self-motivating, they draw on
a recursive network of reusability of the same medium. In each and every case, the medium
therefore has to be both condensed and confirmed in a paradoxical because contrary operation
of generalization through specifi-cation. Media symbols thus generate, we could say, the
eigenvalues (grouping variables, l.) of their own recursivity.
The selective cycling may lead to stabilization of patterns of communication over
time and globalization as a pending selection mechanism in the representation of
the future. When stability is lost, the communication still has the option of this
external hold of globalization:
[…] a medium can use the future of its own operations as a focus for externalizations.
Future is and remains external in that it can never be-come reality but is always only held
in abeyance. In so far as real-ity is actual, every system always finds itself at the end of its
history. However, one can test at every moment, in every present, whether the future still
holds what was promised. Whether others are still willing to accept money can, however, be
tried out only in the present, but in every present. Lovers swear to be eternally faithful—at a
moment for the mo-ment. But here, too, one situation follows another, and we can (however
self-destructive this might be) check over and again whether the oath is still valid. Truths
can already be revised tomorrow; but if new truths are to be convincing, they must be able
to offer an explanation for what, as one now knows, the old truths had wrongly explained,
for otherwise there would be not competition for substitutes.
We can accordingly very well assume that media validate themselves with reference to
previous states and even derive certain form requirements from this self-validation. We need
only a sufficiently subtle theory of time that determines the present as the boundary between
past and future.
I shall argue in this and the next chapter that the theory and computation of
anticipatory systems as developed by Rosen (1985) and Dubois (e.g., 1998, 2003;
1“Ware-Geld-Ware” can be translated as “Commodity-Money-Commodity” (Marx, 1995, pp. 66
ff.).
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Dubois & Resconi, 1992) can serve us as this “sufficiently subtle theory of time.” In
addition to the recursive shaping of the codes along the arrow of time (morphogenesis
in texts and practices), one can define incursions at the border between past and
future, and hyper-incursion in restructuring the order of expectations. Different from
recursion on a previous state, incursion operates with reference to the current state
and hyper-incursion inverts the arrow of time so that anticipated states can drive the
operation. However, the various dynamics cannot sufficiently be distinguished using
common (“natural”) languages, since one would have to add time-subscripts to all
language usage as in the case of algorithms. Language operates with geometrical
metaphors and on the assumption that meanings are relatively stable within a single
text or context. Algorithmically, the descriptions, the described, and the meanings
can change in strange loops with irregular transitions.2
As we shall see below, the incursive, recursive, and hyper-incursive equations
can have very different solutions despite their common background. The equations
provide access to different realities because of the involvement of other selection
mechanisms (Casti, 1989). What is “true” from one perspective, may be “false”
from another. When a routine is evaluated as “false,” the prevailing regime of a “do
while true” loop is interrupted and another routine is invoked.
8.1 Popper’s Perspective on the Growth of Knowledge
Can the dynamics of Popper’s “objective knowledge” in World 3 be specified as
a selection mechanism? Are incursive and hyper-incursive selection mechanisms
different from recursive ones so that we can envisage to answer Luhmann’s (1971,
p. 34; 1990a, b, at p. 27) quest for a selection mechanism that does not shrink,
but enriches the data? “[W]hat is special about the meaningful or meaning-based
processing of experience is that it makes possible both the reduction and the preser-
vation of complexity; i.e., it provides a form of selection that prevents the world
from shrinking down to just one particular content of consciousness with each act of
determining experience.”
In the noted lecture, Popper (1967; 1972, at p. 121) explicated the evolutionary
mechanism operating within World 3 as follows:
The autonomous world of the higher functions of language becomes the world of science.
And the schema, originally valid for the animal world as well as for primitive man,
P1 → T T → E E → P2
becomes the schema of the growth of knowledge through error-elimination byway of system-
atic rational criticism. It becomes the schema of the search for truth and content by means
of rational discussion. It describes the way in which we lift ourselves by our bootstraps.
(p. 121)
2The loops can be strange because a stochastic element can be involved.
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The schemeP1 → TT → EE → P2 begins with a problem P1 which is “tentatively
theorized” (TT ) and then via “error elimination” (EE) leads to a next problem P2
which can enter a next cycle in a loop. The cycles can build upon each other, co-
evolving into a trajectory.3 According to Popper, this scheme is “originally valid for
the animal world as well as for primitive man.” However, the mechanism of how this
scheme “becomes the world of science” was not further specified. The text suggests
that this evolutionary step can be achieved by cumulative and gradual changes.
On the basis of Maturana and Varela’s (1984) model of autopoiesis (“self-
organization”) and Luhmann’s elaboration of this model for the sciences as systems
of expectations, I argued above that as a consequence of cycling, codes can be devel-
oped that function as shortcuts in the communication. The codes can be expected to
develop further along the eigenvectors of the communicationmatrix when thismatrix
is repeatedly multiplied by itself (von Foerster, 1960). Each code adds a dimen-
sion and therefore increases the redundancy. Most cells will initially be empty: the
information content is then not affected, but the redundancy is.4 Interactions among
differently coded communications (e.g., economic, technological, and political) can
bootstrap a knowledge-based order into virtual existence. Using the word “virtual”
is here intended to signal that the codes and this order (in a vector space) are not
“given” but remain a reconstruction, for example, in language (cf. Giddens, 1981,
p. 64).
Whereas the cycles continue to loop along trajectories at {t1, t2, … tn} with the
arrow of time—stepwise as in Popper’s above scheme [P1 → TT → EE → P2]—
each solution to a problem incurs as a feedback on historical developments and can
then trigger discontinuity. When this feedback term prevails, historical trajectories
can bifurcate into branches (cf. Sahal, 1985; Waddington, 1957). This mechanism of
bifurcation is known as reaction-diffusion dynamics (Turing, 1952; cf. Leydesdorff
2006, pp. 169 ff. for an extensive explanation): the reaction process generates a
diffusion dynamic with a different logic. After a bifurcation the diffusion dynamic
becomes a selection environment for the reaction process which continues to provide
variation. Selection is deterministic and thus this feedback can take control.
In a related lecture entitled “Evolution and the Tree of Knowledge,” Popper
([1961] 1972, pp. 262f.) elaborated the analogy with and the difference from biolog-
ical growth. Like a tree, knowledge “grows,” but “almost in the opposite direc-
tion.” The time axis is inverted by the dynamics of knowledge when compared with
biological growth:
When we spoke of the tree of evolution we assumed, of course, that the direction of time
points upwards—the way the tree grows. Assuming the same upward direction of time, we
should have to represent the tree of knowledge as springing from countless roots which grow
up into the air rather than down, andwhich ultimately, high up, tend to unite into one common
stem. In other words, the evolutionary structure of the growth of pure knowledge is almost
the opposite of that of the evolutionary tree of living organisms, or of human implements,
or of applied knowledge.
3One can also consider such a longitudinal series of cycles as a helix.
4The maximum entropy Hmax is extended from Hmax = log(n * m) to Hmax = log(n * (m + 1)). If
n is large, this change can have large consequences.
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In summary, three elements relevant to my argument were articulated in Popper’s
philosophy of science: (i) scholarly discourse is constitutive for the development
of knowledge at the supra-individual level; (ii) the growth of knowledge operates
with another time direction than biological evolution; and (iii) the emerging World
3 exhibits a (quasi-)autonomous dynamic.5
I added the possibility of an incursive dynamics at 90° to the plus and minus
directions of “with” or “against” the arrow of time. Incursions operate orthogonally
(as interventions) on trajectories; regimes operate with one more turn of 90 degrees
as feedbacks in the opposite direction; that is, as selections from the perspective of
hindsight—against the arrow of time. The codes anchor meanings in the domain
of expectations, but some meanings are anchored more than others; the strength of
incursive couplings between variation and selection can be expected to vary. The less
anchored meanings may be discarded as noise or be forgotten. Whereas the feedback
is first shaped against the arrow of time (at 180°), a bifurcation can lead to a second
eigenvector at ninety degrees which codifies the dynamics of incursion. However,
the relative priorities of the eigenvectors can be expected to change over time, so that
the main perspective for the reflection becomes one among two (or more) orthogonal
dimensions.
8.2 The Hyper-incursive Order of Expectations
In addition to sequences of events (along trajectories), an event at time t can be
provided with meaning at a later moment t + t. In other words, meaning can be
provided from the perspective of hindsight to events that have already happened
or are happening. Whereas meanings incur on the events, codification operates
hyper-incursively on meanings, that is, by grounding the subjective—historically
contingent—perspectives on intersubjective layers of control.
In their “sociology of expectations,” Brown and Michael (2003) noted a tension
between the forward movement along the arrow of time and backward interpretation
and control as a balance between “retrospecting prospects and prospecting retro-
spects.” In a similar vein, Latour (1987, at p. 97) argued that “the two versions […]
are not uttered by the same face of Janus.”6 However, a reflection in the time domain
stands orthogonally—i.e., is independent of—substantive reflections at eachmoment
of time. The word “reflexive” can have different meanings in these various contexts.
In a static design, one focuses on latent structures, whereas the development over
time can be reconstructed as shaping a trajectory. When the spatial and the temporal
reconstructions can operate upon each other, an inter-objective reality of expec-
tations—horizon of meanings—can be generated in a newly emerging dimension.
5Maturana and Varela (1984) used the same metaphor of “a tree of knowledge,” but two decades
later and without a reference to Popper’s World 3.
6One is reminded of Walter Benjamin’s ([1940] 1974) “Angel of History”.
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However, this construct “exists” only as a structure of expectations; it remains a cogi-
tatum or, in other words, a matter about which we remain uncertain. (Popper (1963)
preferred to use the word “conjectures.”) Discursive knowledge develops in interac-
tive processes which are “self-organizing” as an evolutionary dynamic including, for
example, refutations (at the trajectory level) and crises or paradigm changes (at the
regime level). As Popper formulated in The Logic of Scientific Discovery ([1935]
1959, at p. 111):
The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science does
not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp.
It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp,
but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not
because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles
are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.
Although an evolutionary mechanism was envisaged, the evolutionary model was
not yet specified by Popper. When he formulated in this quotation that “we simply
stop when we are satisfied,” one can raise the question “who are the ‘we’?” Was not
“objective knowledge” knowledge without a subject? Are the “we” an aggregate of
the “I”s or an interaction term among us? By focusing on “meanings,” the unit of
analysis shifts from the constructing agency to the dynamics of “reconstructions and
revolutions” in the constructs (Hesse, 1980). It is no longer the agents or the texts
that are updated, but the expectations. The updates can be reflected by agents and in
texts.
8.3 The Differentia Specifica of Inter-human
Communications
Even if dolphins and monkeys were able to use a kind of language for their commu-
nication, human analysts would not have direct access to this (quasi-)language. A
biologist can reconstruct and interpret “monkey speech”; for example,whenmonkeys
signal danger to one another.However, the biologist herself usingbiological discourse
(for example, about “monkey speech”) remains a super-observer, to be distinguished
from the “languaging” agents under study.
The biologistMaturana (1978, pp. 56 ff.) formulated the specificity of inter-human
communications as follows:
Human beings can talk about things because they generate the things they talk about by
talking about them. That is, human beings can talk about things because they generate them
bymaking distinctions that specify them in a consensual domain, and because, operationally,
talking takes place in the same phenomenic domain in which things are defined as relations
of relative neuronal activities in a closed neuronal network.
What is specifically (re)constructed by the languaging among human beings?
What is evolving? Unlike biological code (DNA), the codes of expectations are
communication-based. The codes enable us to communicate about what is not the
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case. Redundancy is a measure in the present of these absent possibilities. The future
states are analytical specified (in the second contingency), but absent in the first.
The cybernetic hypothesis is that a next-order system is constructed bottom-up
(by constructing agents), but the construct tends to take control top-down. In the
case of language and languaging, the language that is emerging can be expected to
structure the use of language by languaging agents. This cultural domain of evolving
expectations is specifically human. Giddens (1976, at p. 144) succinctly formulated
his critique of using a meta-biological metaphor for studying society, as follows:
The process of learning a paradigm or language-game as the expression of a form of life is
also a process of learning what that paradigm is not: that is to say, learning to mediate it with
other, rejected, alternatives, by contrast to which the claims of the paradigm in question are
clarified.
Given this specific capacity to change the reflexive system under study on the fly,
there remains little hope of arriving at the illusion of stable pillars of codified knowl-
edge as, for example, seemingly in physics. The dynamics of communication cannot
be stabilized in an experimental setting, since both the analysts and the subjects
under study communicate and learn. Within the loops, the cogitantes (agency) and
cogitata (constructs) can “learn” from each other. But one can expect an asymmet-
rical dynamic in the two directions. Furthermore, the different cycles can reflexively
interrupt one another.
In summary, from different perspectives both Popper and Husserl argued against
logical positivism that insisted on observations and that non-verifiable statements
should be discarded as “metaphysical.” Pieces of the puzzle of a model of cultural
evolution were specified by these authors. However, empirical operationalization
and problems of the measurement were beyond the scopes of these philosophers. As
Popper (1972, pp. 259f.) put it:
I cannot, of course, hope to convince you of the truth of my thesis that observation comes
after expectation or hypothesis. But I do hope that I have been able to show you that there
may exist an alternative to the venerable doctrine that knowledge, and especially scientific
knowledge, always starts from observation.
In my opinion, the subjective “consciousness” of individual actors and the inter-
objective “communication” were not sufficiently distinguished by these authors
as different units of analysis. The dynamics of communication are different from
individual learning.
8.4 The Theory and Computation of Anticipations
The theory and computation of anticipatory systems enable us to simulate cultural
(that is, non-biological) evolutions, and thus to take next steps using simulation
as a possible mechanism of methodological control. The anticipatory perspective
radicalizes the inversion of time into a newparadigm: present states can be considered
from the perspective of future states.
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Anticipatory systems were first defined by Rosen (1985) as systems that entertain
models of themselves. The model provides an anticipatory system with a degree
of freedom for entertaining internal representations of other possible states. Dubois
(1998; cf. Dubois & Resconi, 1992) proposed to model the representations enter-
tained by the anticipatory systems using incursive and hyper-incursive equations.
Using these equations, possible future states can be considered as independent
variables counter-intuitively driving the present against the arrow of time.
The possibility of incursion as different from recursion follows analytically from
the possibility of evaluating a difference equation forward or backward in discrete
time. The differential equation in continuous time—e.g., speed as a function of
distance over time; v(t)= dx/dt)—can be formulated in general (for any x) as follows:
dx/dt = f (xt ) (8.1)
The additional option of a backward and a forward mode finds its origin in the
possibility to approach the infinitesimal as a limit transition positively from the
previous state or negatively from the perspective of the next state, as follows:
x(t + t) = x(t) + t f (x(t)) (8.2)
f (x(t) = (x(t + t) − x(t))/t (8.3)
Or equivalently backward:
x(t − t) = x(t) − t f (x(t)) (8.4)
f (x(t) = (x(t) − x(t − t))/t (8.5)
In continuous time, the two tangents canbe the same (sincet →0); but in discrete
time, the one equation is recursive and the other incursive. Drawing the respective
tangents, Fig. 8.1 shows that the two approximations may lead to very different
results. In other words, there are two pathways for obtaining xt : one following the
arrow of time from the past (t – t) to the present (t), and one developing against
the arrow of time from a future state (t + t) to the present.
The recursive equation operates in historical time and the incursive one against
the arrow of time, or, in other words, as an intervention. A next state incurs on the
present one as the expectation of a further selection. This possibility to operate against
the arrow of time is akin to the model of information versus redundancy generation
discussed above (in Chaps. 4–7). Both redundancy generation and (hyper-)incursive
models operate against the arrow of time and therefore with a minus sign, given
that the development of entropy in history is by definition positive. The minus sign
is needed in order to keep a calculus of redundancy consistent with the Shannon
equations: redundancy is generated against the arrow of time (reflexively), whereas
entropy is generatedwith the arrowof time (historically). The algorithmic approachof
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Fig. 8.1 Backward and forward evaluation of the infinitesimal transition. Source Linge and
Langtangen (2020) Fig. 8.4, at p. 214, and 8.22, at p. 245
anticipatory systems elaborates and adds an algorithmic approach to the geometrical
model of redundancy generation and synergy measurement at specific moments or
during specific periods of time.
8.5 Incursive and Hyper-incursive Equations
The logistic equation—also known as the Pearl-Verhulst equation—can be used,
among other things, for modeling growth in a biological system. The model is based
on recursion: each next state is a function of the previous one. Following Dubois
(1998), this recursive version of the equation serves me here as a baseline for models
using incursive and hyper-incursive variants.
In the biological case, the logistic equation is formulated as:
xt = axt−1(1 − xt−1) (8.6)
This model is recursive, since each next stage (xt) builds on its previous state
(xt−1). In Eq. 8.6, the time relation is in accordance with the arrow of time in both
arguments of the equation. For example, a population first grows with each time
step (xt → xt+1), but then increasingly selection pressure—written as (1 − xt−1)
in Eq. 8.6—is generated, bending the system’s growth curve into the well-known
S-shape.
An incursive version of this same equation can be formulated, for example, as
follows7:
xt = axt−1(1 − xt ) (8.7)
7Another incursive equation is xt = xt (1 − xt−1). This quadratic equation has two roots [x =
(1 − a)/a and x = 0], which correspond to the steady states of Eq. 8.7 to be discussed below
(Leydesdorff & Franse, 2009, at pp. 110f.).
8.5 Incursive and Hyper-incursive Equations 159
For example, the market as a system of expectations does not select commodities,
technologies, etc., from among the options provided at a previous moment (that is,
using [1 – xt−1]); the market selects among options in the present. However, at the
same moment the update from xt−1 to xt in the first factor provides the historical
(that is, recursive) perspective in Eq. 8.7. In other words: a technology develops
historically—that is, with reference to its previous state—but the new technology is
selected on the market in the present. We shall see that Eq. 8.7 has solutions that are
different from those of Eq. 8.6.
The corresponding hyper-incursive model is:
xt = axt+1(1 − xt+1) (8.8)
I shall argue that (i) the logistic equation (Eq. 8.6) can be used to model a growth
process against increasing selection pressure; (ii) the incursive equation (Eq. 8.7)
models an instantiation at the present moment t; (iii) this process is hyper-incursively
embedded in the structuring of expectations as modeled in Eq. 8.8.
It may seem that one can reformulate recursive equations into incursive and hyper-
incursive ones by changing the temporal subscripts: instead of xt as a function of
xt−1, one can also write xt as a function of xt+1. However, the consequent solutions
of the equations can be very different, and so are their interpretations. In the case of
the incursive equation (Eq. 8.7), for example, an anticipatory system xt builds on its
previous state (xt -1), but the selection factor (1 – xt) operates in the present and not
in the past, as does (1 – xt−1) in the biological model (Eq. 8.6).
In Eq. 8.8, history (xt-1) no longer plays a role. This hyper-incursive equation
mirrors Eq. 8.6 in terms of the time subscripts. This hyper-incursive system is
(re)constructed at t = t in terms of its future states (t + 1, t + 2, etc.). Such a
model without a reference to previous states can be considered strongly anticipatory
because the expectations are generated internally; the expectations are not in the
environment. Weakly anticipatory systems entertain a model to predict future states;
a strongly anticipatory one uses future states to reconstruct itself (Dubois, 2002,
pp. 112 ff.).
Whereas individuals can be considered as weakly anticipatory systems enter-
taining a model of themselves reflexively but operating historically (given a life-
cycle), systems of rationalized expectations communicate inter-subjectively with
reference to horizons of meaning. The communication is continuously restructured
in terms of refinements of the expectations, and can be considered as strongly antici-
patorywhile operating at the regime level. Expectations of future states are circulating
hyper-incursively in this subdynamic; not the behavior of agents but their expecta-
tions are coordinated by these selectionmechanismswhich are different from“natural
selection.” Luhmann (1971; 1990a, b, p. 27) conjectured the possibility of “a form of
selection that prevents the world from shrinking down.” Unlike “natural selection,”
one can consider this selection mechanism “cultural,” since oriented to generating
hitherto unrealized alternatives.
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8.6 Solving the Equations
Incursive and hyper-incursive equations can be expected to have solutions that are
different from recursive equations. As is well known about the logistic equation (e.g.,
May, 1976), the bifurcation diagram of x plotted against the so-called bifurcation
parameter a is increasingly chaotic when a → 4, and cannot exist for a ≥ 4. In
Fig. 8.2, this development is depicted as the left half of the figure. In the case of
the incursive Eq. 8.7, however, this limit value (for a → 4) loses its relevance. The
equation has solutions for a > 4.
One can derive on the basis of Eq. 8.7. as follows:
xt+1 = axt (1 − xt+1) (8.7)
xt+1 = axt − axt xt+1 (8.8)
xt+1(1 + axt ) = axt (8.9)
xt+1 = axt/(1 + axt ) (8.10)
By replacing xt+1 with xt in Eq. 8.11, two steady states can be found for x = 0
and x = (1 − a)/a, respectively, as follows:
Fig. 8.2 The steady state of
the weakly anticipatory
system x added. Source
Leydesdorff and Franse
(2009), p. 111
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x = ax/(1 + ax) (8.11)
1 = a/(1 + ax) (8.11a)
1 + ax = a (8.11b)
x = (a − 1)/a (8.11c)
These steady states correspond to (i) the non-existence of the system (x = 0) and
(ii) the brown line penciled into the bifurcation diagram in Fig. 8.2. Note that this
incursive system has values in the domain of a ≥ 4, which is biologically not possible.
An expectation itself cannot be a biological given. However, biologically embodied
agents—body-mind systems—are needed to entertain these expectations. The body-
mind system, for example, has a presence in both the biological and psychological
domains.
The line penciled into Fig. 8.2 represents an incursive system which can provide
meaning(s) to events by integrating them into both the biological domain (a < 4; e.g.,
bodily perceptions) and the domain of meaning-sharing and processing (a ≥ 4). The
instantiation of the two arguments in a single receiver integrates the information and
meaning processing historically (e.g., in action), and thus can function as a linchpin
between weakly anticipatory minds and strongly anticipatory communications in the
cultural (i.e., non-natural) domain of meaning-processing (a ≥ 4). As we shall see
below, hyper-incursive uncertainty drives a need to take incursive decisions.
The hyper-incursive equation (Eq. 8.8) is quadratic in xt+1 and therefore has two
possible roots:
xt = axt+1(1 − xt+1) (8.8)
xt = axt+1 − ax2t+1 (8.12)
ax2t+1 − axt+1 + xt = 0 (8.13)
x2t+1 − xt+1 + xt/a = 0 (8.14)
xt+1 = 1/2 ± 1/2
√
[1 − (4/a)xt ] (8.15)
This system has no real roots for a < 4, but it has two solutions for values of a >
4. (For a = 4, the two roots are equal: x1 = x2 = ½; see Fig. 8.3.)
For a > 4, two expectations are generated at each time step: one on the basis of
the plus and one on the basis of the minus sign in Eq. 8.15. After N time steps, 2N
future states are possible if this systemwere to operate without historical retention by
making decisions. Thus, the system of expectations needs a mechanism for making
choices between options, because otherwise the system would rapidly become over-
burdened with options. In other words, in short order the communication cannot be
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Fig. 8.3 The system of expectations (x) as a result of hyper-incursion. Source Leydesdorff and
Franse (2009, at p. 113)
further developed without agent(s) able to make choices between options, because
of the continuous proliferation of uncertainty by the hyper-incursive mechanism.
Decisions by agents anchor the hyper-incursive anticipations historically in instan-
tiations. Reasoning in another (sociological) context, Luhmann (2000) also suggested
considering decisions as the structuring mechanism of organizations. Beyond single
decisions, the organization of meaning can also be achieved by institutional agency,
using decision rules as a codification of decision-making (cf. Achterbergh & Vriens,
2009). From this perspective, the individual can perhaps be considered as theminimal
unit of reflection for making choices (Habermas, 1981; Leydesdorff, 2000). Both
agency and organizations—institutional agents—are able to integrate perspectives
by reflexively making choices (and taking action on that basis).
If decisions are socially organized—for example, by using decision rules instead
of individual preferences—an institutional layer can increasingly be shaped. The
institutional layer provides a retention mechanism for a next round of developing
expectations (Aoki, 2001). Thus, the system can be considered as dually layered: (i)
as a forward-moving retention mechanism, and (ii) as sets of possible expectations
which flow through the networks in the opposite direction, that is, against the arrow
of time.
Note that expectations can proliferate much faster than their retention in res
extensa. Unlike action-based instantiations, “horizons of meaning” are not material
or given, but continuously in flux and undergoing reconstructions. While the agents
and the texts can both be part of the recursive retention mechanism, the agents as
minds can also partake incursively as cogitantes in res cogitans.8
8In the semiotic tradition—actor-network theory and the sociology of translation—a distinction is
made between agents in sociology and “actants” in the narrative (e.g., Latour, 1996).
8.7 Simulations of Incursive and Hyper-incursive Equations 163
8.7 Simulations of Incursive and Hyper-incursive
Equations
Hitherto, x was not yet specified. The advantage of this abstractness is that x can
be anything about which one is able to specify and entertain an expectation (xt+1).
How can one move from these very abstract bifurcation diagrams (in Figs. 8.1, 8.2
and 8.3) to modeling the sciences operating as strongly anticipatory systems? The
technique of cellular automata for simulations enables me to develop and illustrate
my argument (see Leydesdorff & Van den Besselaar, 1998a, 1998b). The simulation
results will be used to refine the theoretical reasoning (in the next chapter.)
8.7.1 Cellular Automata
A cellular automaton is a grid of cells with rules for the interactions among the cells
resulting in updates for each cell. For example, one can assume that each cell at the
coordinates {x, y} on a screen can be influenced by the four cells (above, below, to
the right, and to the left) in its so-called Von Neumann environment. The coordinates
of these four neighbors are: {x, y + 1}, {x, y − 1},{x + 1, y}, and {x − 1, y}. In
Table 8.1, a routine is provided simulating an environment in which the presence
of at least three of the four neighbors in this Von Neumann environment induces
adaptation in terms of the color of the pixel. I use a simple form of Basic (QBasic)
in this example for the introduction of the technique.
In the routine of Table 8.1 an array “scrn(321, 201)” is first declared (in line 40)
with the same size as a window opened on the screen: 320 cells horizontally and
200 cells vertically. The array is filled randomly with the values +1 and −1 (in lines
120–140). The correspondence between the values in the array and the colors on the
Table 8.1 Simulation of Von Neumann Neighborhoods in QBasic
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screen enables us to study both the micro operations and macro effects in the same
passes.
In each run, a pixel is randomly drawn (in lines 60 and 70) from the set of pixels
horizontally (0 < x < 320) and vertically (0 < y < 200). The corresponding cell value
in the array is evaluated in line 90 as the sum of the positive and negative values of
its four neighbors {x, y + 1}, {x, y − 1},{x + 1, y}, and {x − 1, y}. If the value
of z resulting from this summation is positive, the pixel is set to “+1” in line 130;
and otherwise to “–1” in line 140. If z = 0, the attribution is random (in lines 100
and 120). The system loops, for example, one million times from line 50 to line
150. The routine changes a randomly distributed screen in two colors on the left side
of Fig. 8.4 into a pattern as on the right side of this same figure. In other words, a
structure is always generated.
Thus, one can both numerically (in the array declared at line 40) and visually
(on the screen) follow how the rules affect each element at both the individual pixel
level and the aggregate level. The rules can also be made dynamic; for example, by
specifying thresholds for the introduction of new routines. In Table 8.1, the drawing
of pixels is random (lines 60–70) and structure is emerging. However, this can be
defined differently in non-biological models. One can change the perspective without
consequences for this methodology.
A cellular automaton allows for intersections among loops, including “strange
loops” based on incursionswithin recursive loops. Such an intersection is not allowed
in a formal calculus because loops can be created. Action at one place, for example,
may cause an avalanche of changes at other places. In principle, cellular automata
enable us thus to simulate the “fractional manifolds” discussed in previous chapters.
Different mechanisms and time horizons can be combined into these simulations.
Random attribution of two colors Von Neumann neighbourhoods 
after one million recursions
Fig. 8.4 Simulation of Von Neumann Neighborhoods in QBasic on the Basis of Table 8.1
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8.7.2 Modelling of Expectations Using Cellular Automata
Cellular automata have been used in the social sciences for modelling bottom-up
processes in so-called agent-basedmodelling (ABM), but themethod ismore encom-
passing and abstract, allowing also for units of analysis other than individual agents
(VonNeumann&Burks, 1966).ABMhas becomepopular in the social sciences since
the publication of Epstein & Axtell’s Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science
from the Bottom Up (1996).9 On the basis of his work with ABMs, Epstein (2006)
formulated what he called a “generative” research program for the social sciences:
one cannot explain a social phenomenon until one has “grown” it by simulating the
phenomena under study as emerging from the bottom up (cf. Hedström, 2005).
This agent-based research program accords with the strong program in the soci-
ology of science: individuals and their aggregates in institutions—agency—are
considered as the units that generate the dynamics of the sciences (Edmonds, Gilbert,
Ahrweiler, & Scharnhorst, 2011). The focus is on the “bottom-up” genesis of patterns
and not on the validity of the resulting constructs as reconstructions of selection envi-
ronments. While micro-founded at the level of individuals taking action (or not), the
sciences are thus considered as community-based beliefs attributed to agentswho can
be driven by a blend of socio-epistemic interests (Axelrod, 1997); the intellectual
organization of the sciences is considered as an attribute of their social organiza-
tion; content is defined in terms of the individual cognition of the interacting agents
(Payette, 2012; Sun, Kaur, Milojević, Flammini, & Menczer, 2013).10 Although the
agents may be able to perceive and understand the intellectual dimensions of their
activities, the interpretation of the results of their interactions remains agent-based
(cf. Bloor, 1976).
Edmonds et al. (2011), for example, stated that “science is substantially a social
phenomenon.” Furthermore, these authors claimed that “agent-based simulations of
social processes are able to incorporate lessons from qualitative social science studies
of what scientists actually do on a day-to-day level as well as insights from the more
naturalistic philosophers of science” (cf. Scharnhorst, Börner, & Van den Besselaar,
2012). McGlade (2014, at p. 295) noted that such an “agent-based ontology” entails
problems when simulating mental processes.
How would one be able to visualize the intellectual organization of cognitions?
Sun et al. (2013, p. 4) noted that “[f]uture ‘science of science’ studies have to
gauge the role of scientific discoveries, technological advances, and other exoge-
nous events in the emergence of new disciplines against the purely social baseline.”
Along these lines, Gilbert (1997), for example, replaced the agents at the nodes with
interacting “kenes”—the knowledge-based equivalents of genes. This allowed him
to show how these analytically hypothesized units of analysis can drive the evolution
of the sciences.
9Biological applications of cellular automata, such as in Artificial Life, preceded this development
by more than a decade (e.g., Allen, 1988; Langton, 1989).
10Given this focus on agency, references and citations can be understood as rhetorical devices in
practices (e.g., Cozzens, 1989; Gilbert, 1977; Gilbert & Woolgar, 1974).
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8.7.3 Visualizations of Anticipations
Using communications as units of analysis evolving in cellular automata, let me
illustrate the operation of the three layers (A, B, and C) distinguished in Chap. 4 by
elaborating an example. Figure 8.5 shows Van Gogh’s well-known “Langlois Bridge
at Arles” that I will use as an exemplary representation in the routines here below.
The height of this reproduction was set to 308 pixels and the width to 400 pixels.
However, Visual Basic counts the screen in twips, which are fine-grained and screen-
independent. In the simulation of the bridge at Arles, the equivalent of 308 * 400
pixels is (3322 * 4200 =) 13,952,400 twips.
Analogously to Table 8.1, the computer code in Table 8.2 provides an example (in
Visual Basic) for a recursive subroutine (Eq. 8.6) of the larger routine to be discussed
here below.
Two pictures are first distinguished: PicFrom(0) and PicTo(0). Horizontal (x) and
vertical (y) values are attributed to PicFrom(0) in lines 2 and 3, and PicTo(0) in lines
35 and 36. PicTo(0) serves for the reconstruction of the picture after each cycle.
One can find the logistic equation (Eq. 8.6) in lines 17–19 for the red, green, and
blue components at each specific position (x, y). I use the traditional red-green-blue
(RGB) decomposition for the colors. Since the logistic equation requires values for
x between zero and one, the color values (between 1 and 256) are first divided by
256 in lines 11–13, then transformed (lines 17–19) and renormalized into integers
before picturing the results in lines 29–31.
This example is only a subroutine of a larger program in which the bifurcation
parameter a can be provided interactively by the user. The bifurcation parameter is
here labeled “parameter” in lines 17–19. The DoEvents in lines 40–41 makes the
program sensitive to switching to other (sub)routines or exiting. The program runs
in two loops in order to capture the horizontal variation x (line 32) and the vertical
variation y (line 34), respectively; all the pixels are repainted in each cycle. After a
Fig. 8.5 Van Gogh’s
“Langlois Bridge at Arles” to
be used as input to the
routines. This image is in the
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Table 8.2 Transformation of a representation using the logistic equation (Eq. 8.6 above)
cycle, the original picture (PicFrom) is replaced by the newly generated one (PicTo).
For example, the representation can be expected to erode in a number of steps towards
chaos for values of a > 3.57 when using the logistic equation recursively (Eq. 8.6).
In summary, Fig. 8.6 is based on a routine which can be run interactively using
the program available at http://www.leydesdorff.net/simulation.2015/netsci.exe. The
recursive, incursive, and hyper-incursive routines are combined in a single context
so that they can be visually distinguished and compared in terms of their effects.
Figure 8.6 shows the different states of the system after a number of runs when the
bifurcation parameter a is set, for example, at a = 3.6. Since for a> 3.57, the “natural”
representation is decaying using the logistic equation in the left-top (PicFrom) and
middle-top (PicTo) representations that alternate; after each loop PicTo becomes
defined as the next PicFrom, etc. (Table 8.2, line 38).
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I have added two reflexive observers using incursive routine. The first observer is
generated in the left-bottom screen observing directly the original picture (PicFrom)
in the left-top screen.11 The observer generated in the right-bottom screen, however,
does not observe the original picture directly, but only its transformation using the
hyper-incursive equation operating in the screen box in the middle at the bottom.
Whereas the representation in this latter box seems almost to have disappeared, the
receiver at the right-bottom is nevertheless able to regenerate the picture.
The results (in Fig. 8.6) show the possibility of operationalizing reflexive trans-
missions without invoking a social process. This is a communication process making
a specific selection on the underlying social process. The state of mind of the local
observers and their social contexts are not relevant to the reception which, instead,
is determined by the communication dynamics. The specificity of this process is not
the social, but s multi-layered communicative dynamics.
8.8 Sociological Implications and Concluding Remarks
The focus in this chapter has been on how an evolving system of expectations can
be simulated without an a priori sociological interpretation. In the next chapter, I
shall show the relevance of incursive and hyper-incursive variants of the logistic
equation for addressing long-standing problems in sociology, such as how to opera-
tionalize “double contingency,” the organization of meaning and knowledge, and
their further self-organization. These problems could hitherto not be addressed
because the conceptualization of the social system of interhuman communications
as strongly anticipatory was lacking.
I have argued in this chapter against reification of the cognitive process, but as
against Husserl and Luhmann, I argue in favor of operationalization and measure-
ment. As Luhmann (1995, at p. 164; 1984, p. 226) formulated: “communications
cannot be observed directly, only inferred.” (italics in the original).Whereas commu-
nications cannot be observed, they can excellently be measured using Shannon’s
(1948) information theory and simulated using cellular automata. A focus on obser-
vations without prior specification of expectations, however, has hitherto blocked
this perspective.
The variants of the logistic equation used in Fig. 8.6 enrich the models by
showing their limitations. Different ontologies are indicated by using the various
time-subscripts in the equations. Whereas the recursive version of the logistic equa-
tion can be used, for example, to model the development of a biological population in
history, the observer at the left-bottom of Fig. 8.4 can be considered as an individual
mind using an incursive routine for the observation. Among other things, incursion
can be used to model the coupling of biological presence with mental representations
11For a more extensive discussion of the generation of an observer and observers observing each
other, see also Leydesdorff (2006a) and Von Foerster (1982).
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of present and future states. Incursive models are needed at the organizational level
since like individual action, institutional action remains historical.
The hyper-incursive routines refer to evolutionary dynamics that are no longer
necessarily historical. This order of conjectures can be elaborated into hypotheses
which can be entertained reflexively and further informed by observations. The refer-
ence is to an intersubjective communication domain of expectations. In other words,
this social order of communications does not exist (in history); it remains an order
of expectations operating on expectations to which human beings can have reflexive
access.
AsPopper (1972, pp. 262f.) noted: the knowledge-base is rooted upward. In empir-
ical terms, one can expect both upward and downward dynamics to be continuously
invoked as subroutines of cultural evolution. The theory and computation of antic-
ipatory systems provides the tools needed to take a further step: the simulation of
structures in systems of expectations. Given my own criteria, I have to complement
this “bottom up” genesis with a validation. The genesis shows only the historical
process; the validation of these equations and their mutual relations is the purpose
of the next chapter.
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Using a set of six equations, I propose tomodel “interactions,” the “organization ofmeaning,”
and “self-organization” as three coordination mechanisms among expectations; three further
equations can be derived to operationalize “double contingency,” “identity,” and “reflection.”
One can expect that the subdynamics update one another in co-evolutions as feedbacks and
feed-forwards. Interfaces among two (sub)dynamics can be expected to operate with time
differences (t). Interactions among horizontal and vertical time differences can generate
hyper-incursivity in interhuman communications. Hyper-incursion enables us to reconstruct
expectations. The social system is probably the only system which can be expected to carry
“strong” anticipation while being reproduced as expectations. A system of expectations is
not alive, is not constrained by a life-cycle, and does not need to “exist” otherwise than as
expectations. The dynamics against the arrow of time are “cultural”: they rest on codes as
the pillars of discursive knowledge driven upward into horizons of meaning.
In addition to his many discoveries about mental illnesses, Freud carved out the
epistemological boundaries of the psychological domainwith biology on the one side
and sociology on the other. Using the metaphor of Ego sitting as a rider on a horse
(Freud 1933), Ego is not to be considered as an energy system but as a “cybernetic”
(Parsons 1958, p. 88, note 16). In relation to sociology, Freud commented (at a
workshop in Vienna in 1926) “that he felt like the skipper of a barge who had
always hugged the coast, who had now learned that others, more adventurous, had
set out for the open sea.” He wished them well, but he could no longer participate
in their endeavor (Waelder 1958, at pp. 243f.). Parsons (1968), however, argued that
Freud himself—approximately at the same time as Durkheim (e.g., 1894, 1912)—
had discovered the social as the proper subject of sociology. He summarized Freud’s
demarcation of sociology from psychology, as follows:
Relatively early, Freud gained the insight that the expression of instinctual need was regu-
lated by the society’s moral standards—often, but in no simple sense always, in conflict
with instinctual needs—and that these standards were introjected into the personality itself,
becoming components of its structure. The final form of this conception crystallized about
the famous idea of the superego. Later this basic mode of conceptualization was extended to
This chapter is based on: Leydesdorff (2008).
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the social environment, conceived of as an environment much in the Cartesian-Durkheimian
sense. The famous “reality principle” came to focus on “object relations,” which for Freud
meant relations to other persons, especially the parents, considered as agents of socialization.
But these human objects were not only “adapted to” in the sense true for physical objects;
they were also introjected—or, as we now usually say, internalized—to form part of the
personality structure, particularly of the ego, in Freud’s sense. (p. 432).
Why had Freud himself become reluctant to investigate the social at the above-
individual level. Parsons (1952) formulated a begin of an answer to this question, as
follows:
The inescapable conclusion is that not only moral standards, but all the components of the
common culture are internalized as part of the personality structure.Moral standards, indeed,
cannot in this respect be dissociated from the content of the orientation patterns which they
regulate; as I have pointed out, the content of both cathectic-attitudes and cognitive-status
definitions have cultural, hence normative significance. This content is cultural and learned.
(p. 23)
Parsons saw a possibility to relate Freud’s concept of internalization to central
tenets of American pragmatism. “Society,” as Cooley (1902) argued, exists inside
the individual in the form of language and thoughts. Action is then based on reflexive
selections among options. On this basis, Parsons (1951, p. 94) formulated the concept
of double contingency as the cornerstone of social order.
“Double contingency” means that each of us (Ego) expects another human being
(Alter) to entertain expectations aswe entertain them ourselves (Elmer 1995; Vander-
straeten 2002). A second contingency among expectations comes on top of the first
contingency of empirical processes in the physical and biological domains. In this
model, both consciousness and communication develop in substantive and reflexive
layers in parallel. The communicative structures are double-layered: they are both
actions and pervade actions to various extents. However, the relations between the
two contingencies are asymmetrical. The first contingency (res extensa) is internal-
ized in the second (res cogitans); the second leaves traces (e.g., cultural artefacts at
the social level and memory traces at the individual level) in the first.
9.1 “Double Contingency” and Inter-human Interactions
“Double contingency”can elegantly be specified in terms of the theory of anticipatory
systems (using Eq. 8.8 in Chap. 8; cf. Dubois 2000, 2003) as follows:
xt = axt+1(1 − xt+1); 0 ≥ x > 1 (9.1)
In words: Ego (x) operates in the present (as xt) on the basis of an expectation
of her own next state (xt+1) and the anticipated next state of Alter (1 − x) t+1. Note
that the expectation of Alter (1 − x)t+1 is here defined in terms of Ego’s own expec-
tations about non-Ego; that is, (1 − x). The expectations constructed in one’s mind
about oneself and Alter precede possible communication between Ego’s and Alter’s
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expectations about each other. Alter is processed in terms of awareness (Husserl,
1931) without necessarily implying externalization into a communication (Nonaka
& Takeuchi, 1995).
Not incidentally, Husserl added the word “Cartesian” to the title of his Cartesian
Meditations.InDescartes’ philosophy,Alter of the contingentEgo is aTranscendency
(“God”). Ego knows herself to be fallible and uncertain, but Alter is Perfect and
Infallible from this perspective. In the (Christian) cosmology, God “is” beyond any
doubt because absence would be incomplete. Descartes himself thus constructed an
ontological proof of God’s existence.
More than 150 years later, Kant (1787: B620–B630) refuted Descartes’ inference.
He concluded that one can remain agnostic about the existence of God. However,
one cannot remain indifferent about the secularized Other. The relation to contingent
others is discussed by Kant (1788) in the Critiqueof Practical Reason which follows
upon the Critique of Pure Reason. Unlike Ego’s relation to God, its relations with
others are empirical.
How can relations in the second contingency be analyzed? The specification of
relations among expectations generates empty boxes to be potentially filled by obser-
vations—in other words, redundancy. Hesitant about the possibility to study these
empty boxes empirically, Ulanowicz (2014) proposed calling them “apophatic”: a
biologist has no instrument to measure or theorize empty boxes which do not “exist.”
Can one, alternatively, perhaps specify what they are not (Bateson 1934), and thus
specify ranges of possible expectations?
Double contingency provides a micro-foundation of the social. The expecta-
tion of Alter precedes the interaction, but cannot be reduced to individual action.
Parsons (1968) concluded that society therefore can be considered as a category
sui generis (Parsons, 1968). Luhmann (1977, at p. 70) added to Parsons’ defini-
tion that “double contingency” can also be considered as the auto-catalyst of social
processes between reflexive individuals. Furthermore, Luhmann added that reflexive
relations are possible not only among human beings, but also among the codes of the
communications (1995, pp. 105f.; cf. Künzler 1989; Strydom 1999). In another, but
similar formulation, Giddens (1979) denoted a “double hermeneutics” between the
analyst’s and the participant’s level of action and accounting. (The participant and
the analyst can be the same person embedded in different exchanges and discourses.)
Each perspective may lead to new horizons.
In such a complex dynamic, the algorithmic approach—using simulations—can
be helpful (Hanneman 1988). Simulations require less ambiguous and more parsi-
monious definitions. The time subscripts allow us to follow the developments when
the referent is changing with the description. Simulations can serve the analysis
by pointing to the unexpected or unintended consequences of interactions among
subroutines (Hedström 2005).
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9.2 Simulations of the Second Contingency
In this chapter, I elaborate on interaction, organization, and the self-organization
of meaning using the set of incursive and hyper-incursive equations developed in
Chap. 8. Two further equations will be derived which can be used to operationalize
“reflection” and “identity,” respectively. As in the case of “double contingency,”
these two hyper-incursive mechanisms can be expected to operate “genotypically”;
that is, as evolutionary dynamics without reference to a specific and historical state.
1. Eq. 9.1 (above) provided us with a model for double contingency. Double contin-
gency in mutual expectations precedes interaction. The term (1− xt+1) in Eq. 9.1
models a selection of Ego’s expectations of Alter as non-Ego.
2. Interactions imply a historical instantiation. However, one can expect each Alter
(y) to entertain as another Ego an analogous selection term (1 − yt+1). The
selection terms can operate upon each other and thus lead to the quadratic Eq. 9.2:
xt = b(1 − xt+1)(1 − yt+1) (9.2)
Equation 9.2 does not contain any reference to a previous state of the system
itself (xt-1). In this model, only expectations are operating selectively upon each
other. Unlike double contingency, however, this equation models the interactions
between Ego’s and Alter’s expectations.
3. Eq. 9.2 can be extended to more complex configurations by adding a third
selection environment. One can add this third (or each next) term as either a
hyper-incursive or incursive routine, and thus obtain the following two equations:
xt = c(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1) (9.3)
xt = d(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt ) (9.4)
Equation 9.3 is a cubic equation which models a “triple contingency” of expec-
tations. The third contingency closes the triad operationally. As argued in Chap. 5,
triadic closure is the basis of the system’smorphogenesis. All higher-order configura-
tions (quadruplets, etc.) can be decomposed into triads. Equation 9.3 is thus consti-
tutive of the social system of supra-individual expectations. As shown above, the
interactions among three selection mechanisms can generate redundancies.
In a paper entitled “Triple Contingency: The theoretical problem of the public in
communication societies,” Strydom (1999) argued that “the increasing differentiation
and organization of communication processes eventuated in the recognition of the
epistemic authority of the public, which in turn compels us to conceptualize a new
level of contingency.Afirst step is thus taken to capture the role of the public as a code
in communication societies. The code mediates and shapes a “triple contingency.”
According to Strydom, this differentiation of “public” versus “private” as codes
in the communication generated modernity. Note that the public is not considered
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as a sphere (Habermas 1974) or an audience (Latour 1988), but as a code in the
communication.
One can derive that Eq. 9.3 has one real and two complex roots. Since a system
cannot continue its operations with the complex solutions, Eq. 9.3 would evolve
increasingly into a single value (“eigenvalue”) for each value of the parameterC. The
parameter C can thus be considered as a representation of the code of the commu-
nication. Horizontal differentiation of this code can then be captured by writing
lower-case c1, c2, c3, …, cn, etc. I elaborate this below.
Note that if only a single fixed code-valueC would operate, the routinewould self-
organize “closure” into this value ofC. In a differentiated system of communications,
however, a number of values for the codes (c1, c2, c3, …. cn) can be expected to
disturb tendencies to such operational closure. As argued above in Chap. 5, three
(or more) contingencies operating selectively upon one another can shape a fractal
manifold containing trade-offs between tendencies to self-organizing closure and
organizational interruptions (Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2015).
4. Eq. 9.4 differs from Eq. 9.3 in terms of the time subscript in the right-most factor.
Equation 9.4 can be used to model a specific organization of meanings as an
instantiation in the present. The reference to the present in the third factor makes
this model historical, whereas the self-organizing system modeled in Eq. 9.3
operates hyper-incursively, in terms of interactions among expectations about
possible future states. An instantiation, however, requires (provisional) integra-
tion and organization at specific moments of time. In Eq. 9.4, the interaction
among expectations is instantiated as a specific configuration at time t = t.
In summary, Eqs. 9.3 and 9.4 model algorithmically the trade-off between the
evolutionary and historical perspectives in Triple-Helix relations as discussed in
terms of redundancy and information generation in Chap. 5 above.
5. Two more hyper-incursive equations follow as possible members of this family
of equations. Analogously to Eq. 9.1, one can formulate as follows:
xt = axt (1 − xt+1) (9.5)
xt = axt+1(1 − xt ) (9.6)
Equation 9.5 evolves into: x = (a − 1)/a (see Eq. 8.11c on p. 157 for the derivation
of this equation as a steady state). It follows that x is a constant for all values of
a. I submit, as an interpretation, that this evolution towards a constant value of the
system (x) through anticipation can be considered as the self-reference of an expected
“identity.”
In the second contingency, identity is based not on the history of previous states,
but on entertaining the expectation of continuity of the “self.” The identity in the
network “me” can be distinguished from the “I” (Mead, 1934, at pp. 26f.). Like
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individuals, organizations can be expected to develop a symbolic identity in the
second contingency.
Equation 9.6 can be developed as follows:
xt = axt+1(1 − xt ) (9.6a)
axt+1 = xt/(1 − xt ) (9.6b)
xt+1 = (1/a)[xt/(1 − xt )] (9.6c)
This model can be simulated (Fig. 9.1): when xt > [a/(1+ a)], a pulse is generated
which first overshoots the value of one (in a virtual domain of possible expectations),
but then generates a negative value. This negative value leads to a mirror image
of a representation at a specific moment in time, and can thus be considered as a
reflection.Reflections enable us to bounce a communication between communication









1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time steps →
x ↑
Fig. 9.1 Simulation of Eq. 9.6: the value of x at t = 1 is drawn randomly (a = 4). (For a = 4, the
pulse is generated for values of xt > 0.8.)
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Dubois (personal communication, 16 July 2008)1 noted that Eq. 9.6 can be derived
as the time inverse of the incursive (Pearl-Verhulst) equation [xt = axt−1 (1− xt)]. In
Leydesdorff andDubois (2004),we showed that the sole assumption of social related-
ness as a variable among groups of agents provides a sufficient basis for deriving the
logistic map as a first-order approximation of the social system. Secondly, I derived
the anticipatory formulation of this equation for anticipation in both the interaction
term and in the aggregation among subgroups. I will not repeat this argument, but
instead follow a more intuitively accessible reasoning based on the perturbed recur-
sion model in order first to derive a generalization of the family of logistic equations
under discussion here.
9.3 Perturbed Recursions and Incursions
Andersen (2002, at pp. 170 ff.) discussed the logistic equation as a special case of
his so-called perturbed recursion model. The model can be depicted as follows:
In Fig. 9.2, F is a recursive function that transforms state St−1 into a new state St ,
using a set of parameters P = p1, …, pn modelling disturbances. In formula format:
St = F(St−1, P) (9.7)
Baecker (2002, at pp. 86 ff.) noted that the function F can be considered as the
operator of the communication system (S) in Luhmann’s model; he used the word
“eigen-function” for this recursive loop (cf. von Foerster, 1960). However, more than
a single such eigenfunction (i.e., code) can be expected in a differentiated system.
Each code structures variation differently. In other words, the recursive selections
can be expected to codify different meanings along the main axes of the network.
1Dubois added to this communication the following derivation as evidence:
xt+1 = axt (1 − xt+1) (n9.6a)
is equal to the following equation for dt = 1:
xt+dt = axt (1 − xt+dt ) (n9.6b)
The time reverse of this equation is obtained for dt → –dt, with the negative discrete time –dt:
xt−dt = axt (1 − xt−dt ) (n9.6c)
or, with –dt = –1:
xt−1 = axt (1 − xt−1) (n9.6d)
So with a time translation of t → t + 1 for the whole equation, one obtains:
xt = axt+1(1 − xt ) (9.6)
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Fig. 9.2 The perturbed recursion model (Adapted fromAndersen, 2002, at p. 170 and Leydesdorff,
2001, p. 102.)
Following Baecker (2002), one can add a subscript c (of coding) to the operation and
use the E of environment as the source of disturbances; one can then rewrite Eq. 9.7
as follows:
St = Fc(St−1, E) (9.8)
When differentiation prevails, the environment E of each subsystem is composed
of the other subsystems, with a remaining term ε as representation of the residual
(that is, as yet undifferentiated) environment. Using the lower-case f and s for the
subsystems, one can then rewrite Eq. 9.8 as follows:
si,t = fi
(
si,t−1, s j,t−1, sk,t−1, sl,t−1, . . . , ε
)
(9.9)
The windowing of the subsystems upon each other is based on horizontal differ-
entiations. Each subsystem (i) codes (using f i) its own previous development and the
development which it finds in its (selection of) relevant environments. However,
meaning can be provided to this development by the other (selecting) subsys-
tems from the perspective of hindsight. This adds a vertical differentiation between
historical recursion and reflexive incursion, as follows:
si,t = fi
(
si,t−1, s j,t , sk,t , sl,t , . . . , ε
)
(9.10)
The vertical differentiation between recursion and incursion is based on the
dynamics of meaning and codification; the horizontal one is based on functional
differentiation. The state of a specific subsystem (si,t) can now be dependent both
on the previous state of this subsystem (si,t-1), and on the previous and the current
9.3 Perturbed Recursions and Incursions 183
states of the other subsystems. Systems and subsystems continue to operate histori-
cally (Eq. 9.9) and to provide meanings to one another (Eq. 9.10). In discrete time,
however, the recursive and incursive operations are not ex ante synchronized and
can therefore be expected to differ with a t at each interface. One can expect the
routines to update one another.
At all these interfaces one can thus expect asynchronicities. Using these asyn-
chronicities from the backward perspective of incursion, meanings can be propelled
both horizontally and vertically. The incursions can be formalized in a manner analo-
gous to that of the incursive formulation of the logistic equation provided in Eq. 9.5,





(1 − x j,t ) · ε (9.11)
In Eq. 9.11, n represents the theoretically expected number of subsystems. While
this number was analytically restricted in Parsons’s structural-functionalism—using
his so-called four-function paradigm—this number can vary in Luhmann’s (1997)
theory with the historical development of the media of communication and their
symbolic generalization into codes (Distin, 2010; cf. Merton, 1938, 1948). As
noted, Simon (1973) conjectured that there may be an alphabet of possible codes
in interhuman communications.
On the basis of this general model one can consider, for example, the incur-
sive and recursive version of the Triple-Helix model as special cases. Incursively,
three relevant selection environments operate on the development of the resulting
arrangements, as follows:
xit = ax j,t−1
(





) · ε (9.12)
In other words, the evolutionary TH model is incursive; the institutional one
focuses on historical recursions, such as trajectories and historical transitions
following the arrow of time.
9.4 Transversal and Longitudinal Propagation of Meanings
Because the differentiation can lead to asynchronicities and therefore T-values
specific for each interface, some models can be expected to advance more rapidly
than others. For example, the market can be expected to operate faster than a research
process; the difference in speed may lead to delays at each interface. Interface
management in a knowledge-based corporation is meant to align time horizons:
“whichtechnology can be introduced on the market at which moment in the future?”
The models are synchronized at t = t by decisions about future options and historical
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constraints at interfaces. This synchronization is based on an expected time difference
at interface.
While vertical differentiation—in terms of interactions, organization, and self-
organization—was already available in pre-modern societies (High Cultures, as in
the Middle Ages), updates over time provide modern societies with another, that is,
secondmechanism for organizing reflexive communications in an anticipatorymode.
The horizontal differentiation is subordinate to the vertical in pre-modern societies;
in modern societies, however, the horizontal differentiation is coded, and this coding
provides another degree of freedom. The acceleration by organization in a High
Culture is replaced by one based on trade-offs between stabilizing organization and
globalizing self-organization in the communications.
Each interface—both in the horizontal and vertical dimensions—can contain a
time difference t. The two incursive terms in the corresponding equations can also
operate upon each other. This may lead to hyper-incursion. Hyperincursion at the
regime level cannot be historically manifest, but the feedback of hyperincursion on
the incursion can leave a footprint. The hyper-incursive regime and the historical
trajectory co-evolve in terms of providing (potentially different—local and global)
meanings to the events.
Each incursive equation contains a reference to the historical dynamics and
another to the evolutionary one. Interactions between vertical and horizontals incur-
sions cangenerate a quadratic incursionor, in otherwords, next-order hyper-incursion
(Fig. 9.3). Since a hyper-incursive system operates against the arrow of time, one can
expect this routine to generate redundancy instead of information, since the arrow
of time is inverted.
Incursions contain both a reference to the current and the previous state. When
historical incursions interact recursively, a variation (entropy) is generated. However,
Incursion 1
referential to t = t
Incursion 1
referential to t = t + 1
Incursion 2
referential to t = t + 1
Incursion 2
referential to t = t 
Selection 3:
Hyper-incursion with two references to t = t + 1
Fig. 9.3 Hyper-incursivity at the interface emerging at t = t + 1 between two incursive routines.
Source Laydesdorff (2009, p. 21)
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when two different incursions are interfaced incursively, hyper-incursion can be
expected. Each incursion generates both information andmeaning, and thus becomes
organized both historically (with reference to t = t) and reflexively (with reference
to t = (t + t)). However, a hyper-incursive equation cannot be organized and
materialized at t = t because it only contains references to future states [at t = (t
+ t)]. The resulting hyper-incursion builds on the interactions between references
to present or future states in two (or more) underlying incursions. Since this hyper-
incursion no longer contains a reference to historical time, an incursive subdynamic
is additionally needed for making the (interactions among) expectations historically
relevant (Eq. 9.4).
Luhmann (2000) hypothesized that self-organization among the differently coded
fluxes of communication can be brought under organizational control by decisions.
This formulation may sound action-based, but this inference would be too fast.
The third contingency can be provided by another code operating incursively; for
example, by taking decisions.
9.5 Decisions and Decision Rules
In Chap. 8, the hyper-incursive formulation of the logistic equation (Eq. 8.8) was
elaborated into:
xt+1 = 1/2 ± 1/2
√
[1 − (4/a)xt ] (9.13)
Depending on the plus or the minus sign in the equation, two future states are
generated at each time step. Since this formula is iterative, the number of future
states doubles with each next time step. After N time steps, 2N future states would
be possible. For N = 10, the number of options is more than one thousand.
Dubois (2003, at p. 115) proposed a decision function u(t) for making a choice
between one of two options:
u(t) = 2 d(t) − 1 (9.14)
It follows that u = + 1 for the decision d = 1 (true), and u = –1 for the decision
d = 0 (false). In a social system, however, more choices than these two extremes
may be possible. Social systems operate in a distributed mode with a probability
distribution of preferences. In distributed systems, decisions can be organized and
codified into decision rules (Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1989). Luhmann (2000) argued
that organizations can be considered as the results of codifications in the dynamics of
decision-making. The stabilization of decisions in rules, for example, can generate
an institutional layer of the social system in which decision-making can develop
routines and thus follow trajectories.
Note that the decisions (at the individual level) or decision rules (at the organi-
zational level) do not determine the hyper-incursive dynamics of the self-organizing
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regime, but only guide these dynamics historically as instantiations along trajecto-
ries. Autopoiesis controls its own operation (Varela, 1979); decisions do not have to
be taken at each step. The distribution of decisions and non-decisions changes the
historical conditions by inducing reorganization. Without this historical opportunity
to anchor the routines, the interfacing of expectations would remain in an elusive
realm of expectations operating on expectations.
9.6 Inter-human Coordination in the Second Contingency
I distinguished three coordination mechanisms above: interaction, organization, and
self-organization. I will now discuss these three equations in more detail.
9.6.1 Interactions
As noted, anticipatory interaction can be modeled based on the mutual selections of
Ego’s and Alter’s expectations of each other, leading to Eq. 9.2 (above):
xt = b(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1) (9.2)
Equation 9.2 does not include a term referring to previous states; only expectations
are operating selectively upon each other. Unlike “double contingency,” interaction
is a social dynamic and no longer an individual (mental) one. (I use “b” instead of
“a” for the parameter in order to highlight this difference.)
Equation 9.2. can be elaborated as follows:
xt = b(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1) (9.2)
xt/b = 1 − 2xt+1 + x2t+1 (9.2a)
x2t+1 − 2xt+1 + (1 − xt/b) = 0 (9.2b)
xt+1 = 1 ±
√
xt/b (9.2c)
This interaction system can be simulated as the following oscillation (Fig. 9.4):
The interactions oscillate in Fig. 9.3 around the value of one. The system reaches
its largest fluctuations (between zero and two) for b = 2.2 On each side, the interaction
2The system vanishes for b < 2 because the term under the root can then become larger than one,
and therefore xt+1 < 0 in case of the (possibly) random choice of the minus sign in Eq. 9.2c.






10000 10010 10020 10030 10040 10050
t →
x ↑
 b = 4
 b = 8
Linear ( b = 8)
Fig. 9.4 Simulation of hyper-incursive interactions
can be continued for a number of iterations before the alternate resumes its opera-
tion. I modeled this here (in Excel) by using a random number to choose the plus or
minus sign in the evaluation of Eq. 9.2c. The (potentially random) variation warrants
the continuation of the interaction. In other words, these hyper-incursive interactions
serve to generate variation in the cogitatum, such as, among other things, the commu-
nication of newness supporting and inducing the morphogenesis of organization and
self-organization (Achterberg & Vriens, 2009).
9.6.2 Organization versus Self-organization
Whereas two selection environments are needed for interactions, one can add either
a hyper-incursive or an incursive subroutine to Eq. 9.2 (above) for modelling
organization and self-organization. At each addition, one obtains two possible
equations:
xt = c(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1) (9.3)
xt = d(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt ) (9.4)
As noted, Eq. 9.4 differs from Eq. 9.3 in the time subscript of x in the third factor.
The reference to the present in this third factor bends the system back to its present
state and thus makes this model historical, whereas the self-organizing system of
Eq. 9.3 operates hyper-incursively. In the case of Eq. 9.4, however, the interaction
among expectations can be instantiated by a specific historical organization at t = t.
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The roots of Eq. 9.4 can be derived (analogously to Eq. 9.2) as follows:
xt = d(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt ) (9.4)
x2t+1 − 2xt+1 + 1 − xt/[d(1 − xt )] = 0 (9.4a)
xt+1 = 1 ±
√
xt/d(1 − xt ) (9.4b)
Simulation of this system shows that the organization of communications vanishes
after a variable number of steps for all values of the parameter d (Fig. 9.5).
Figure 9.5 shows this development using Excel for the simulations. However,
Excel depicts the historical end of the organization of communications as zeros,
while these zeros may be based on values of x > 1 which lead to a negative value of
the denominator of the term under the root in Eq. 9.6b. In this case, the root of this
equation is complex and can no longer be evaluated. In other words, the organization
does not disappear in the sense of “dying,” but its historical development can be
insufficiently complex to instantiate self-organization among the fluxes of commu-






























Fig. 9.5 Organization of interactions for different values of the parameter d
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9.6.3 Self-organization
Equation 9.3 can be developed as follows:
xt = b(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1)(1 − xt+1) (9.3)
xt
b
= (1 − xt+1)3 (9.3a)
( xt
b
)1/3 = (1 − xt+1) (9.3b)





Equation 9.3 has three roots of which two are complex (Mike Burke, personal
communication, 10 October 2008). The real solution of Eq. 9.3c can be denoted as:





and the two complex roots are:









Since the further operation cannot evaluate the complex solutions in a next time-
step, the system in this case can be expected to continue with the real solution. This
leads to a single and stable solution for each value of b. At the level of subsystems,
these relative constants can be considered as the codes of the communication.
9.7 Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter, I have related Dubois’ incursive and hyper-incursive equations
modeling anticipatory systems (Dubois, 1998, 2000, 2003) to Luhmann’s (1995
[1984]) social systems theory. I used both theories heuristically; the construction of a
relation between Luhmann’s theory and Dubois’ computations required a translation
of the one theory into the other, and therefore minor changes.
Luhmann (1984, p. 605; 1995, pp. 446f.) noted that “[s]elf-referential, autopoietic
reproduction would not be possible without an anticipatory recursivity.” However,
he did not specify the anticipatory mechanisms. In his final and summarizing book,
Luhmann (1997) returned to this issue and provided two references to Rosen’s (1984)
book entitled Anticipatory Systems. However, these references were framed in a
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biological context ([1997, pp. 206 and 820] 2012, Vol. 1, p. 123 and Vol. 2, p. 137).
Luhmann added (at p. 821) that in the domain of meaningful processing of informa-
tion one cannot avoid a reference to the present when defining the relation between
past and future. This time-dimension with the present at its origin is elaborated
as a degree of freedom in the theory and computation of anticipatory systems. In
other contexts, Luhmann (e.g., 1990a, b, p. 98, n.10) developed a semantics for the
discussion of “time.”
Relevant for this study is furthermore his distinction between social differentia-
tion and systems differentiation (Luhmann, 1997)which accords to a high degreewith
Simon’s (1973) distinction of horizontal versus vertical differentiation. Social differ-
entiation is possible in the communication because communications can be coded
in a variety of ways in language, and codes of communication can be generalized
symbolically (Distin, 2010).
The different subsystems operate in parallel, but not necessarily synchronously.
As Luhmann (1984, at p. 128) formulated: “Social differentiation serves as an uncou-
pling mechanism. It divides the time-orientations in the different systems and there-
fore accepts that things can be urgent in one system, while another system can take
its time” (italics added, L.). Systems differentiation, however, organizes the social
system at different levels. This differentiation of micro-level interactions, meso-level
organization, and macro-level self-organization in the processing of meaning could
be elaborated in this chapter in terms of six equations.
Furthermore, the model of recursive perturbations could be used to consider the
various formulations of the logistic map as a family of equations. The spanning
of the time dimension enabled me to reformulate some “paradoxes” in Luhmann’s
social-systems theory as questions amenable to empirical research about trade-offs:
is positive entropy or redundancy (negative entropy) generated by self-organization
prevailing? The duality of structure in social systems (Giddens, 1979, 1984) could
thus be considered as a consequence of the difference between the forward and
backward arrows represented as time-subscripts of Eqs. 9.3 and 9.4 (above),
respectively.
Unlike interaction and self-organization, the organization of meaning is histori-
cally constrained; specific organizational forms can be replaced with other organiza-
tions in relation to (i) the ongoing interactions—generating variation from below—
and (ii) the hyper-incursive self-organization of the communication into codes at
a relatively global level (Eq. 9.4). Luhmann (1995, at p. 600n.[1984. at p. 551n.])
expressed the relationship among the three coordination mechanisms of expectations
as follows:
[…] in all social relations, under all circumstances a difference between society and inter-
action is unavoidable, but not all societies are acquainted with organized social systems. We
therefore exclude organizations, but only from treatment on the level of a general theory of
social systems. On the next level, that is, of concretizing the theory, one would perhaps need
to distinguish between societal systems, organizational systems, and interaction systems and
develop separate theories for each type because these three separate ways of forming systems
(i.e., dealing with doubling contingency) cannot be reduced to one another.
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Organization structures communication at specific moments of time by using
incursion and thus remains rooted in history. As against double contingency as the
micro-foundamental operation at the level of the mind participating in communica-
tion, organizations can entertain different expectations synchronously because orga-
nizations are interfacing expectations (in the first two terms of Eq. 9.4) and looping
into the present state xt (in the third term of Eq. 9.4). From this perspective, the
individual cogitans might be considered as a minimal form of organization among
expectations. Agents can take decisions on the basis of trade-offs between differently
coded considerations.
Organization in the communication of meaning is historical and can therefore
be expected to develop along a trajectory for a number of time-steps. However,
without further variation as input from below or codification from above, any specific
organization of communications can be expected to erode in due time because the
construction remains a superstructure on an underlying information flow generating
uncertainty (Schattschneider, 1975). The organization of communication provided us
with a basis for measurement. Meaning is historically instantiated in organizations;
the imprint of self-organization at the organizational level can bemeasured as mutual
redundancy (Chaps. 4–6 above). The suggested calculus of redundancywould enable
us to test theoretical expectations empirically—and thus to obtain counter-intuitive
results—whereas the calculus of anticipations in terms of incursions and hyper-
incursions can be elaborated in terms of simulations which may enrich the intuitive
understanding.
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Chapter 10
Cultural and Biological Evolution
Although there is no necessary relation between “big data” and “monism”—the program
of reducing cultural and mental processes to computational and biological principles—both
these programs reject a dualism between res extensa and res cogitans. Opposing this philos-
ophy of science, I have argued in the above chapter that a second contingency of possible rela-
tions and expectations feeds back on the manifest relations. This second contingency cannot
be studied from a natural-science or life-sciences perspective, but is the proper domain of the
social sciences, where the focus is onwhat thingsmean as different fromwhat they are. Next-
order selection mechanisms can take evolutionary control. The complexity of the commu-
nication evolves against the arrow of time in terms of interacting codes, which generate
redundancies and therefore new options. As human beings, we can follow the potentially
unintended consequences of the communication dynamics reflexively. Both consciousness
and communication are self-organizing and thus resilient against steering.
10.1 Monism versus Dualism
In his book Descartes’ Error, Antonio Damasio (1994) made an argument for
monism. In this author’s opinion, Descartes’ statement Cogito ergo sum (“I think
therefore I am”) has been a major source of error in Western philosophy. Damasio
formulated as follows: Taken literally, the statement illustrates precisely the opposite
of what I believe to be true about the origins of mind and about the relation between
mind and body” (p. 245).
Although there is no necessary relation between “big data” and “monism”—the
program of reducing cultural and mental processes to computational and biological
principles—both these programs reject a Cartesian dualism between res extensa and
res cogitans. In a paper entitled “The End of Theory,” Anderson (2008), for example,
formulated the program of “big data” as follows:
This chapter is partly based on: Leydesdorff, L., & Hoegl, F. (2020). The Evolutionary Dynamics
of Expectations: Interactions among Codes in Inter-Human Communications. Biosystems, 198,
104236. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2020.104236
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This is a world where massive amounts of data and applied mathematics replace every other
tool that might be brought to bear. Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics
to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what
they do? The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity.
With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.
In a similar spirit—but with another methodology—Ramstead, Badcock, and
Friston (2017), for example, presented “a hierarchical multiscale free energy formu-
lation […] that offers the sciences of life, mind, behaviour and society with a prin-
cipled, computationally tractable guide to discovery” (p. 13). In this ontology, the
system levels self-organize into a hierarchy. Homo sapiens sapiens is then placed at
the top of this hierarchy as “the world’s most complex living system.” Humans are
said to generate “(epi)genetically-specified expectations that have been shaped by
selection to guide action-perception cycles toward adaptive or unsurprising states”
(p. 12; cf. Leydesdorff, 2018).
These various authors have in common that their program is to reduce cultural
phenomena to biological and computational principles (Porankiewicz-Żukowska,
2017). My argument in this study has been that the exchanges of and interactions
among expectations are not epi-genetic, but shape a cultural layer with a dynamic
operating as a feedback on the (human) carriers of this cultural evolution. Unlike
biological evolution which follows the entropy flow, codes in the communication can
generate redundancies; for example, by refining distinctions. In this model, however,
humans are not at the top of “the” hierarchy, but can function as infra-reflexive
linchpins among hierarchies and heterarchies of variably codified communications.
Not Homo sapiens sapiens but the complexity of the communication among humans
is further evolving in terms of new recombinations and differentiations among codes.
10.1.1 Descartes’ Error
In my opinion, Damasio’s rejection of Cogito ergo sum in favor of monism is based
on a misreading of Descartes (cf. Gluck, 2007). This misreading, however, is more
wide-spread: the sociologist Schutz (1975, at p. 82), for example, criticized Husserl’s
([1929] 1960) Cartesian Meditations in a similar vein, as follows:
[…]As a result of these considerationswemust conclude thatHusserl’s attempt to account for
the constitution of transcen-dental intersubjectivity in terms of operations of the conscious-
ness of the transcendental ego has not succeeded. […] As long as man is born of woman,
intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the foundation for all other categories of
human existence. The possibility of reflection on the self, discovery of the ego, capacity
for performing any epoch, and the possibility of all com-munication and of establishing
a communicative surrounding world as well, are founded on the primal experience of the
we-relationship.
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Schutz (1975, p. 72) opposed Husserl’s position that all communication is consti-
tuted by communication. Schutz argued that the “we-relationship” remains funda-
mental. In otherwords, one can consider Schutz’s (micro-)foundation as existential—
grounded in relations—whereas Husserl grounded intentionality in interpersonal
expectations.
In my opinion, both Schutz and Damasio misread Descartes from a present-
day perspective: the words are provided with empirical meanings that are different
from their philosophical meanings at the time. Descartes did not wish to make an
empirical inference about thinking and being, or the genesis of consciousness in the
mother-child (“we”-)relationship. Cogito ergo sum is meant to be the formulation
of a “first principle” in Descartes’ philosophy. Although Damasio (1994) mentioned
this alternative interpretation as possible (at p. 249), he did not elaborate on it.
Descartes (1637) specified Cogito ergo sum in Discourse on Method (Part 4), and
formulated as a conclusion1:
[…] the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more
easily known than the latter, and is such that even if the latter were not, it would still continue
to be all that it is.”
The “mind by which I am what I am” is not an empirical subject of study, but a
philosophical grounding which “is even more easily known” than the body, because
the body can be an empirical object of study. Cogito, however, is not empirical;
it belongs as a first principle to what the Greek philosophers characterized as “the
mathematical.”Cogito ergo sum is a statementwith a status similar to “two plus two is
four” (cf. Hoegl, 2003). The statement can be made on the basis of a priori reasoning.
Heidegger ([1962], 1970, p. 70), for example, explained the text as follows:2
The formula […]“Cogito ergo sum” suggests the misunderstanding that it is here a question
of inference. That is not the case and cannot be so, because this conclusionwould have to have
as itsmajor premise: Id quod cogitat, est—“that which thinks, exists.” […]Descartes himself
emphasizes that no inference is present. The sum is not a consequence of the thinking, but
vice versa; it is the ground of thinking, the fundamentum. In the essence of positing lies the
proposition: I posit. […] The I is the subjectum of the very first principle. Before Descartes
everything present-at-hand for itself was a “subject”; but now the “I” becomes the special
subject, that with regard to which all the remaining things first determine themselves as such.
([at p. 82], p. 69f.)
Descartes’ ontological proof of the existence of God became unconvincing with
the further development of the sciences, epistemology, and the precursors of the
philosophy of science in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As
noted in Chap. 9, Kant concluded that one can remain agnostic about the existence
of God or a transcendental reality. However, one cannot remain indifferent in one’s
relations to others. The relation of Ego to other human beings is discussed by Kant
(1788) in the Critique of Practical Reason from an ethical and moral perspective.
1https://www.literatureproject.com/discourse-reason/discourse-reason_4.htm. I have used this
translation with minor changes.
2On the moral issue of using Heidegger’s writings, see, for example, Bernstein (1995, pp. 79–141).
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10.2 The Secularization of Alter
Can the contingent relations with Alter as “another human being” offer an alterna-
tive foundation ofEgo? Can “God” be replacedwith “intersubjective intentionality”?
By thus secularizing the transcendental relation to God into expectations of contin-
gent relations with other human beings, the domain which transcends the individual
becomes a second contingency in which human beings provide meanings to things
and events.
As against the studyof behavior in thefirst contingency, interactions of judgements
and expectations in the second contingency are not directly observable. However,
these second-order relations can be expected to leave observable effects in the first
contingency, such as cultural artefacts. In the first contingency one can touch, feel,
observe, and directly relate to other human beings. In the second, one provides
meanings by partaking in the social (re)construction of meanings among humans.
Meanings can be expected to loop in cycles on top of the entropy flow. The two
contingencies can operate in parallel or in an intermingled process; the repetition in
the loops can be expected to generate redundancy, and thus span another domain. A
number of authors from approximately 1900 onwards (Durkheim, Freud, and others)
began to formulate theories about the social as a qualitatively different domain. The
constitutive role of the Other in the shaping of the I was elaborated, for example, by
the American pragmatists. George Herbert Mead (1934), for example, formulated as
follows:
If one is to speak of a transcendental “consciousness in general,” if I, this singular, individual
ego, cannot be the bearer of the nature-constituting understanding, must I not ask how I can
have, beyond my individual self-consciousness, a general, a transcendental-intersubjective
consciousness? The consciousness of intersubjectivity, then, must become a transcendental
problem; but again, it is not apparent how it can become that except through an interrogation
of myself, [one that appeals to] inner experience, i.e., in order to discover the manners of
consciousness through which I attain and have others and a fellow mankind in general, and
in order to understand the fact that I can distinguish, in myself, between myself and others
and can confer upon them the sense of being “of my kind.”
In my opinion, this second contingency of expectations is the proper domain
of the social sciences and humanities. In parallel with investigating events in the
natural and life-sciences, one can always ask “what do things mean?” Attempts
to make this domain the subject of the natural and life sciences in the name of
ideals such as “the unity of science,” “monism,” or a “grand synthesis” tend to
reduce the social sciences to a relatively irrelevant commentary to the “real” world
of science and “hard” scientific facts. On the basis of the philosophical a priori
of “monism” and “big data,” the social sciences would no longer be developed as
theoretical research programs in their own right; our knowledge about the dynamics
of expectations would then remain poorly developed. Accordingly, policy advice
about the knowledge-based economy would be based on political economy instead
of a model with requisite variety (Ashby, 1958).
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10.3 Habermas’ Knowledge Interests
The discussion about monism repeats in many respects the older one about posi-
tivism (e.g., Adorno et al. 1970; Popper, 1959 [1935]). As mentioned in Chap.
1, Habermas (1968b), for example, distinguished among three epistemologically
different knowledge interests: (i) the technological one of the natural sciences,
(ii) the historical-hermeneutical one of understanding in the humanities, and (iii)
an emancipatory interest in social change on the basis of reflection and critique.
According to Habermas, one would expect scholars working in these three domains
to develop different criteria for “objectivity,” namely: nomothetical, hermeneutic,
and ideology-critical, respectively.
The Habermas-Luhmann discussion in the early 1970s made clear (at least to
me) that the three epistemic domains of science were not yet properly specified by
Habermas (1968a; 1971a and b). While the historical perspective is embedded and
its method accordingly hermeneutic, the critical position is potentially disruptive.
“Critical” refers to “crisis:” the crisis makes it necessary to revise.
The distinction between the second and third knowledge interests can also be
framed in terms of historicism versus the commitment to value-freeness (e.g., Popper,
1967; Weber, 1917). Value-freeness serves the analysis of values because the analyst
avoids an a priori commitment to the values of the subject(s) under study. This
distancing does not imply a reduction to explaining behavior; “understanding”
(Verstehen) can be methodologically secured by value-freeness. Without commit-
ment to value-freeness, “understanding” tends to engagement with the normative
and historical perspectives of the subjects under study, and thus to be subjective.
The third (emancipatory) interest is based on distancing oneself from the historical
givens on the basis of reflection and reasoning, and is thus part of the second layer of
Giddens’ so-called “double hermeneutics.” The analytical discourse is theoretically
constructed as a system of rationalized expectations feeding back on the commu-
nications under study. The substantive and the reconstructing layer can couple on
each other. However, these couplings are empirical and thus leave room for empirical
research in science and technology studies. The expectation is that the sciences are in
important respects different from each other. This includes differences in the relevant
couplings with professional practices (Whitley, 1984).
In sum, I suggest reading Habermas—despite his intentions at the time—as
committed to values and operating in an historical-hermeneutical approach. The
Habermas of the debate in the 1970s was still committed to the neo-Marxist values
of the Frankfurter Schule (Horkheimer & Adorno, [1947], 1969). In his later theory
of communicative action (Habermas [1981], 1987), other commitments such as
unrestricted discussion (“herrschaftsfreie Diskussion von allen mit allen”) became
normative objectives of the theorizing, leading eventually to a discussion with Pope
Benedikt XVI (Benedikt XVI & Habermas, 2006).
Despite his aversion to formal methodology and statistical testing, Luhmann,
however, sided with an analytical approach against historicism; for example, he
formulated that “[science] cannot offer basic principles, arguments or even certainty.
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It can no longer be understood as a theory of the founding of knowledge. The
opposite is true: it analyzes the uncertainty of knowledge and gives reasons for it”
(Luhmann, 1990a, at p. 81). From this perspective, organized knowledge production
does not have binding implications, whereas the critique of the technocratic impli-
cations of systemic developments was crucial and normatively binding, for example,
in Habermas’ (1968b) critique of Marcuse’s (1964) book One-Dimensional Man.
Both approaches—historical-hermeneutical understanding and a commitment to
value-freeness—go back to Weber, but the commitment to value-freeness is central
to Weber’s epistemology of the social sciences; this commitment drives the differen-
tiation between scholarly and normative discourses in social theory. This distinction
and the corresponding one between cognitive and normative learning by the carrying
agents can be considered as the differentia specifica of a cultural evolution that is
knowledge-based.
10.4 Meta-Biology and Reification
More than a decade after the Habermas-Luhmann discussion, Habermas (1987)
returned to this debate with the argument that Luhmann’s (1984) magnum opus had
made clear to him that social-systems theory can be considered as a meta-biology.
Habermas commented as follows:
In thisway, subject-centered reason is replaced by systems rationality. As a result, the critique
of reason carried out as a critique of metaphysics and a critique of power, which we have
considered in these lectures, is deprived of its object. To the degree that systems theory
does not merely make its specific disciplinary contribution within the system of the sciences
but also penetrates the lifeworld with its claim to universality, it replaces metaphysical
background convictions with metabiological ones. (p. 385).
Following Gumbrecht’s (2006) distinction between Luhman I, II, and III (see
Chap. 1), this critique addresses “Luhmann II” as the author of the (1984, 1995)
book entitled Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie [Social Systems:
Foundations of a General Theory]. At the time of the discussion between Habermas
and Luhmann in the early 1970s, however, “Luhmann I” (1971) made an argu-
ment for distinguishing between “meaning” and “information.” Luhmann proposed
“meaning” as the basic concept of sociology, when formulating as follows:
What one person takes for granted might be surprising to someone else; and the same is
true across time: a book that today is hard to understand and full of needlessly complicated
sentences may seem quite informative tomorrow.
In my opinion, this program of studies is dualistic, since a dynamic of under-
standing (“meaning”) is distinguished from the dynamics of the historical events
(“information”). However, Habermas’ (1987) characterization of Luhmann’s work
as “metabiology” was a reaction to Luhmann II’s (1984) book which opened upfront
by stating the assumption daß es Systeme gibt (1984, p. 30; 1995, p. 12). From this
perspective, biological, psychological, sociological, and organizational theories of
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autopoiesis were considered as species of a general theory of autopoietic systems
(Luhmann, 1984, p. 16; 1995, p. 2),3 and an evolutionary tree was sketched as a
hierarchy among them.4
A decade later (that is, after 1990), Luhmann III argued that his general theory
could be grounded in a theory of “observation” based on Spencer Brown’s (1978)
Laws of Form. In my opinion, this argument contains a number of steps which are
problematic.
1. Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form is a mathematical study. The laws of form there-
fore are content-free (as is “information” in Shannon’s mathematical theory of
communication; cf.Baecker, 2017).On the last page (p. 76) of this study, however,
SpencerBrown formulated as an implication and example that “an observer, since
he distinguishes the space he occupies, is also a mark.” Whereas an observer can
be considered as a mark, not all marks are also observations.
For example, a predator observes its prey by distinguishing and identifying it. As
against biology, however, a distinction that is identified in a discourse specifies
only an observational category. The value of the observation has still to be
determined empirically, for example, by measurement (De Zeeuw, 1993). In
other words, by identifying a distinction only an expectation is specified, but not
yet an observation. Since empty, the new boxes add only to the redundancy.
2. The biologist Maturana (1978) stated explicitly that his studies of “the biology
of language and knowledge” focus on observable “languaging” as behavior and
not on the content of what is communicated. Human language, in Maturana’s
opinion, is used by “super-observers” (1978, pp. 56f; cf. Maturana, 2000), who
are able to take part in a scientific discourse that is different from the biological
communications under study such as among “languaging” monkeys, ants, or
whales.5 Maturana could thus avoid having to argue at the meta-biological level
of sociology.
When the communications under study are human, reflexive participants and
analysts are able to change roles. This “double hermeneutics” is specific for the study
of inter-human interactions (Giddens, 1976, at p. 162). When sociology is reduced
to a meta-biology studying observables without the surplus of theoretical under-
standing, however, the surplus of the social sciences, that is, the study of this double
hermeneutics and therefore the option to translate meanings among discourses, is
lost; the communicative translation is reduced to action.
Biological metaphors are not only misplaced but potentially confusing; the soci-
ological finesse in distinguishing among texts and subtexts disappears. For example,
thesemetaphorsmay lead to research designs inwhich observations and expectations
are no longer clearly distinguished. Furthermore, the application of biological theory
to social systems in “social Darwinism” and socio-biology has historically been a
3A general theory of social systems was suggested by Luhmann (1981).
4This tree was further elaborated in Luhmann (1986a, b, pp. 172f.).
5Dodig-Crnkovic (2014) argues that theoretical biology has nowadays reflexively abandoned the
focus on observing in favor of computational modelling of the construction.
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disaster. In the German context, Habermas’ critique using the attribution of “meta-
biological” is almost offensive. As noted in Chap. 1, Giddens (1984, at p. xxxvii)
stated that he deemed it “necessary to repudiate the newer versions of Parsonianism,”
including both Habermas and Luhmann, for similar reasons. The noted risk of an
invocation of “magical explanatory properties of social reproduction” is based on a
meta-biological reading of these authors.
Undoubtedly aware of these critiques, it is somewhat surprising that Luhmann
never6 problematized the abuse of biological metaphors in Nazi Germany (e.g.,
Weingart, Kroll, & Bayertz, 1988).7
10.5 Towards a Calculus of Redundancy
In an email to the list of the American Cybernetics Society, Krippendorff (9 June
2010) distanced himself from systems theory as a theory of everything with roots in
biology; he claimed another epistemology for cybernetics (Ashby, 1947), when he
formulated as follows:
[…] cybernetics starts with conceptualizing all possible systems, regardless of whether they
exist, and it is informedwhen some of them cannot be built or found in nature. […]Conceptu-
alizing all possible systems before enacting some of them implies both creativity and action
in a circular relationship. […] Cybernetics paints a reflexive picture of the world of active
participants, not of a holistic system of subsystems. (italics added, L.)
Cybernetic models are content-free; they allow for translating models devel-
oped in one substantive domain into another as hypotheses. On the basis of specific
hypotheses, observations can corroborate the assumptions. In other words: analyt-
ical distinctions have priority, and the hypothetical status of knowledge remains
assumed. As Popper (1972, pp. 259f.) put it: “observation comes after expectation
or hypothesis.”
The empty boxes generated by distinctions add redundancy to the maximum
capacity. The empty boxes can be filled with values on the basis of observations. In
his book Incomplete Nature, Deacon (2012, at p. 3) called for a focus on the zeros:
What is absent matters, and yet our current understanding of the physical universe suggests
that it should not. A causal role for absence seems to be absent from the natural sciences.
[…] This something-not-there permeates and organizes what is physically present in these
phenomena. Its absent mode of existence, so to speak, is at most only a potentiality, a
placeholder. […] Zero is the paradigm example of such a placeholder. (p. 10.)
6The exception are some statements about antisemitism in interviews (Klaus Dammann, personal
communication, 8 November 2019; cf. Dammann, 2014, p. 171). Of course, the issue is sensitive.
7Luhmann was obliged to enlist the Hitlerjugend in 1944 at the age of 17. Before that date, he
applied (perhaps non-voluntarily) for membership in the NSDAP with the number 9935113, 20
April 1944; that is, on the occasion of Hitler’s 55th birthday (Der Spiegel, 25 July 2007, pp. 134 f.;
Dammann, forthcoming).
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The biologist Ulanowicz (2014) argued that the apophasis (A)—redundancy—
cannot teach us anything about historical events. A biological system with more
options than are realized (A > D) is vulnerable to perturbations to the extent that
a catastrophe would be unavoidable (Ulanowicz, 2014, p. 26; see also Ulanowicz,
1986, p. 92). In my opinion, the codes in the communication provide support to
psychological and social systems and enable them to operate with volatility “at the
edge of chaos” on top of biological systems such as bodies and populations.
Unlike biological systems, systems of expectations do not need to bematerialized.
Reflexivity can provide these systems with other types of operation (e.g., incursivity;
see Chap. 8) and next-order buffering capacities (hyper-incursivity) so that their iden-
tities can be maintained beyond the historically observable stability or instabilities.
Whereas psychological (action) systems are supported by their carrying bodies, the
codes in inter-human communications provide additional stability by structuring
the communications from above (at the supra-individual level). The codes refer to
horizons of meaning. Beyond stabilization in history, globalization can operate as a
selection mechanism in a regime of expectations.
Ulanowicz’s “apophasis minus didactics” (Φ = D – A) can perhaps be consid-
ered as another formulation of the trade-off between information and redundancy
generation discussed as the Triple-Helix indicator in Chaps. 4–7. However, I have
taken these programmatic statements further by proposing a calculus of redundancy
in analogy to Shannon’s (1948) calculus of information (Bar-Hillel, 1955). Against
the idea that the zeros and the missing cases are not informative, I submit that the
social sciences not only construct the empty boxes and fill out the zeros by specifying
values; they can also provide us with insight into the potentially negative values of
the intangibles that organize our understandings into discourses.
10.6 Consequences for Evolutionary Economics
When selection is no longer considered as “natural selection,” selection mechanisms
have to be specified on theoretical grounds. Case descriptions by historians—or, in
the terminology of evolutionary economics, “stylized facts” (e.g., Malerba, Nelson,
Orsenigo, & Winter, 1999)—and indicators generated in quantitative science and
technology studies provide mainly descriptive statistics. However, one is not allowed
to infer from observable variation to selection mechanisms.
The specification of selection mechanisms other than the market has been central
to evolutionary economics. Nelson and Winter (1977, 1982) first specified the inter-
actions between market and non-market selection environments. In these models,
however, selections are made by agents (firms) who are bounded by the rationality
of the selection environments (Alchian, 1950; Simon, 1955). If the firms themselves
were selecting as agency, however, a theory of the firm would eventually be the
unavoidable result (Casson, 1997). In other words, Nelson andWinter (1982) did not
specify selection mechanisms, but the selection environments of firms.
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With a reference to Hayami and Ruttan (1970), Nelson and Winter (1982,
pp. 258f.) distinguished these selection environments as production functions at the
trajectory level from meta-production functions at the regime level. In their earlier
article entitled “In Search of a Useful Theory of Innovations,” Nelson and Winter
(1977, p. 49) had taken this broader perspective and distinguished between struc-
tures on the technological side (such as trajectories and regimes) versus selection
environments, as follows:
We are attempting to build conformable sub-theories of the processes that lead up to a new
technology ready for trial use, and of what we call the selection environment that takes the
flow of innovations as given. (Of course, there are important feedbacks.)
In my opinion, the feedbacks, which were literally bracketed in the above
quotation, can be elaborated into a hitherto missing third selection dynamic of
communication-based translations and controls. I argued in Chap. 5 how re-
combinations among differently codified communications can transform political
economies into knowledge-based ones (Arthur, 2009). Instead of endogenizing the
hypothesized feedbacks into their theory—as was originally the intention—these
authors put the knowledge-based transformations between brackets—as an external
given—and eventually formulated normative policy-oriented instead of theoretical
conclusions. For example, as follows:
We have put forth the proposition that underlying natural trajectories there is a certain body of
knowledge that makes the traverse relatively easy, and that in the recent half century formal
science has been an important part of that knowledge. The key question then becomes: to
what extent are the directions in which science advances inevitable, and to what extent can
these be molded by conscious policy. (p. 73; italics added, L)
In a critique of these “post-Schumpeterian contributions,” Andersen (1994,
pp. 188f.) argued that the main and largely unresolved question remains to specify
“What evolves?”
The question (of “what evolves,” L.) is so important that we repeat it in an unforgettable
way which is recorded by Boulding, a contributor to post-war non-formalized evolutionary
economics, who got fascinated by Schumpeter and economic evolution while he was a
pre-war student at Oxford University:
My Oxford philosophy tutor, who had the curious habit of crawling under the table while
giving his tutorials, commented in a high British voice coming from underneath the table on
a paper I had given on evolution, “It is all very well to talk about evolution, Mr. Boulding,
but what evolves, what evolves, what evolves?” (Boulding, 1978, 33) […]
Forty years after this conspicuous form of pedagogics, Boulding had a ‘glimmering’ of an
answer: ‘What evolves is something very much like knowledge.’ (ibid.) While this answer
is undoubtedly correct, it is also radically incomplete in relation to the development of an
analysis of economic evolution. Especially, we would like to find an evolving substance
which has a much less amorphous character than the common-sense kinds of ‘knowledge.’
To be able to give rise to an evolutionary process, the ‘thing’ we are studying should have
an aspect of preservability, mutability and selectability.
I have argued in this study that the complexity of the communication evolves, and
not the bounded rationality in the behavior of firms or other agency (Alchian, 1950).
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Agents and their behavior are historical phenomena; they make choices and generate
new variants. The bounded rationality of their decisions depends on their capacity
to learn reflexively and recognize opportunities. However, evolution is taking place
in terms of what is genotypically binding (the codes of the communication) and not
in terms of variation phenotypically bounded by the codes (Hodgson & Knudsen,
2011). The coordination mechanisms of society have become knowledge-intensive
and therefore increasingly transparent and available for reconstruction.
On the basis of the distinction between historically observable developments and
the evolutionary dynamics in the background, I distinguished (in Chap. 5) two Triple-
Helix variants (Eqs. 9.3 and 9.4): an entrepreneurial and a neo-evolutionary one. The
entrepreneurial model shares with Nelson and Winter’s models a focus on institu-
tional arrangements and entrepreneurship. The neo-evolutionary Triple-Helix model
of wealth generation in industry, novelty production in academia, and governance
can be further specified as a manifold—in which synergies can be generated as a
result of interactions among both horizontally and vertically differentiated commu-
nications. The relationship between innovation and entrepreneurship can be further
analyzed from this evolutionary perspective.
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Three themes have been central to my research program: (1) the dynamics of science,
technology, and innovation; (2) the scientometric operationalization and measurement of
these dynamics; and (3) the Triple Helix (TH) of university-industry-government relations.
University-industry-government relations provide an institutional infrastructure carrying the
potential of self-organization in the knowledge base of an economy. I elaborated these
themes into the problem of relating (i) Luhmann’s sociological theory about meaning-
processing in communications with (ii) information-theoretical operationalizations of the
possible synergies in Triple-Helix relations, and (iii) anticipatory mechanisms in cultural
evolutions.
11.1 The Sociocybernetics of Scientific Knowledge
How are meaning and information processing related, and how are they re-combined
in the shaping and self-organization of discursive knowledge? Whereas knowledge
is often attributed to individuals in the history and philosophy of science or, from
a sociological perspective, to communities as belief structures, a perspective on
the sciences using communications as units of analysis enables us to proceed to
measurement. The aggregated citation relations among journals, for example, can be
used to visualize disciplinary structures (Chap. 2, Fig. 2.3). The journal network, for
example, can be considered as a construct at the supra-individual level structuring the
variation.Acognitive structure canbe revealed that operates as a selectionmechanism
on thehistorical (bottom-up) generationof knowledge claims that feed thepublication
process. The knowledge claims in articles provide the variation; the cognitive, social,
and textual contexts operate as selection environments.
When both variations and selections can operate upon each another and among
themselves, one can expect the generation of both information (that is, uncertainty)
and redundancy (that is, reduction of uncertainty). The evolutionary dynamics of
© The Author(s) 2021
L. Leydesdorff, The Evolutionary Dynamics of Discursive Knowledge,
Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Scientific and Scholarly Communication,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59951-5_11
209
210 11 Summary and Conclusions
interactions between selection environments are different from interactions among
historical agents. The variations generate uncertainty (along the arrow of time).
Interactions among selection mechanisms can also reduce uncertainty by generating
redundancy (against the arrow of time).
In Chap. 3, I discussed how “heterogeneous networks” have been studied in terms
of practices and actor-networks in the sociology of scientific knowledge and the soci-
ology of translations, respectively. From these perspectives, authors, texts, cognitions
(and in the case of the sociology of translation even the objects under study) have been
analyzed as symmetrical sources for the construction of techno-scientific artefacts
(e.g., Callon, 1986).
In my opinion, scholarly practices are intellectually structured by codes emerging
in the communications. The codes operate as selectionmechanisms by spanning hori-
zons of meaning as selection environments. Different from the symmetry principle
used as a normative yardstick in the constructivist sociologies of science, selections
can be expected to generate asymmetries between selected and de-selected variations.
Cognitive structures thus interact and co-construct the organization of scholars and
discourses into research programs, specialties, and disciplines. In other words: the
intellectual organization of the sciences adds to and asymmetrically feeds back on
the configurations of authors and texts.
In Chap. 4, I proceeded to the operationalization and measurement of the
interacting dynamics of communications and meanings using information theory.
Shannon’s co-author Weaver (1949, p. 8) warned against confusing information and
meaning. He distinguished three layers which I further elaborated in a model: (i)
at level A, events are sequenced historically along the arrow of time, generating
uncertainty; (ii) the incursion of meanings at level B is referential to (iii) horizons of
meaning spanned by codes in the communication at level C. I propose to distinguish
accordingly: the interactive communication of information at level A, the organiza-
tion (e.g., sharing) of meanings at level B, and the generation and self-organization
of discursive knowledge at level C.
The three levels can be operationalized in a measurement theory, as follows: rela-
tions (at level A) can be distinguished from correlations among patterns of relations
and non-relations at level B. The correlations span a vector space on the basis of a
network of relations. Relations and relating nodes are positioned in this vector space
and can then be provided withmeaning. Different positions provide other horizons of
meaning spanned by codes in the communication. The codes can interact and overlap
(for example, in university-industry-government relations.) Overlapping codes may
generate new codes and therefore redundancies—that is, options which are still open
for realization. From this (evolutionary) perspective, the realized—that is, historically
observable—networks can also be considered as retention mechanisms.
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11.2 Synergy in Triple Helix Models
The Triple Helix of university-industry-government relations provides an empirical
model combining the vertical differentiation among the levels in terms of relations,
correlations, and eigenvectors (as operationalizations of the codes) with horizontal
differentiation among the codes (e.g., markets, technologies, politics, etc., operating
in parallel). The institutional TH model focuses on the observable relations among
horizontal differentiations in the networks and the neo-evolutionary on interactions
among selection mechanisms. The relative weights of the historical and evolutionary
dynamics in generating information and redundancy can be measured as a trade-off
in empirical configurations. The generation of redundancy in interactions among
latent codes is a measure of the additional synergy in configurations of relations;
options reduce uncertainty, as in a niche. In a knowledge-based economy, one can
exploit this synergy as a source of wealth.
In Chap. 6, regional and national systems of innovations in Italy were analyzed
as an empirical example. The Italian systems of innovation are interesting because
the Italian economy is both knowledge-based and knowledge-intensive. Using firm-
level data collected by Statistics Italy for 2008, 2011, and 2015, synergies among the
geographical and size distributions of firms and technology classes can be measured
at both national and regional levels. As against the statistical classification into twenty
regions, or intoNorthern, Central, and Southern Italy, the greatest synergy is retrieved
by defining the country in terms of Northern and Southern Italy as two sub-systems,
with Tuscany included as part of Northern Italy.
Different innovation strategies could be developed for these two parts of the
country. The current focus on twenty regions for innovation policies may to some
extent be an artefact of EU policies. In terms of sectors, both medium- and high-
tech manufacturing (MHTM) and knowledge-intensive services (KIS) are integrated
proportionally in the various regions in Italy. In Spain, for example, the knowledge-
based sectors are highly concentrated in Madrid and Barcelona as two metropolitan
innovation systems (Leydesdorff & Porto-Gomez, 2019).
In Chap. 7, the Triple-Helix synergy indicator was formalized and generalized
as a methodology for the measurement of synergy and systemness. A routine for
thismeasurement ismade available at https://www.leydesdorff.net/software/synergy.
triads. The routine evaluates all possible permutations among three column vectors in
terms of their contribution to synergy generation. This enables us to compare config-
urations in terms of possible synergies. Since the routine is based on the Shannon
formula, synergies can be summed (after proper normalization). For example, one
can compare two regions in Italy—e.g., Tuscany and Piedmont—in terms of the
Triple-Helix dynamics of geographical, technological, and organizational variety
(e.g., of firms). One could ask, for example, how much a change in one of these
distributions would increase the number of options.
When policy-makers call for “interdisciplinarity,” they often mean “synergy.” In
collaborations with third parties, however, “interdisciplinarity” can also be consid-
ered a means for creating “synergy. Synergy is generated when the whole offers
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more possibilities than the sum of its parts. I discuss recent advances in the opera-
tionalization and measurement of “interdisciplinarity” and propose a methodology
for measuring “synergy.” An increase in the number of options above the sum of the
options in subsets can be measured as redundancy, that is, the number of not-yet-
realized options. Increasing redundancy reduces the relative uncertainty. The opera-
tionalization of the two concepts—“interdisciplinarity” and “synergy”—as different
outcome indicators enables us to distinguish between the effects and the effectiveness
of interventions in research priorities.
11.3 Anticipatory Dynamics and Simulations
Knowledge bases can drive the transformation in the present from the perspec-
tive of expected states. In Chaps. 8 and 9, I analyze the feedback of an emerging
communication dynamic as a local inversion of the arrow of time in terms of the
theory and computation of anticipatory systems. Using a set of recursive, incur-
sive, and hyper-incursive equations derived in Chap. 8, I specify six subdynamics
of anticipation operating in the second contingency of knowledge-based systems in
Chap. 9: (i) three coordination mechanisms among expectations at different levels of
aggregation (interactions, the organization of meaning, and self-organization), and
(ii) three further equations that operationalize “double contingency,” “identity,” and
“reflection,” respectively.
These subdynamics update one another dynamically in co-evolutions of histor-
ical recursions and anticipatory incursions. In this complex dynamics, vertical and
horizontal differentiations can be expected to generate time differences (t) at inter-
faces. Interactions among timedifferences in horizontal andvertical incursions canbe
multiplied and generate hyper-incursivity. Hyper-incursion drives the layer of ratio-
nalized expectations. The social system of communications is unique in its ability to
build on interactions among meanings in the second contingency.
11.4 Against Monism
In an epilogue (Chap. 10), I discuss, among other things, the differences between the
dualistic sociology of science and the monistic program claiming a research perspec-
tive for a meta-science based on “big data.” Both “big data” and “monism”—the
program of reducing cultural and mental processes to computational and biological
principles—reject a dualism between a physical and biological reality (res extensa)
and our knowledge of this reality (res cogitans). However, I have argued throughout
this study that on top of the manifest relations, a second contingency of possible
relations and expectations can be envisaged. This second contingency is the proper
domain of the social sciences, where the focus is on what things mean and how
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these appreciations can change. In other words, I have argued against monism and
historicism.
In my opinion, a major contribution of this study is the focus on redundancy as a
measure of the number of cases that could have occurred or the meanings that could
have been provided. The possible meanings refer to “horizons of meaning.” These
horizons are contingent (for example) upon positions and perspectives. However, the
second contingency operates differently from the first contingency,with aminus sign.
A complication is the time factor; the linear arrow of time accords with the entropy
law in thermodynamics, and thus with Shannon’s probabilistic entropy. However,
the possible states of a system cannot be learned from its history because a system’s
history is by definition only its genesis in a lower dimensionality. If one wishes to
envisage the range of possibilities, one first has to specify expectations. Inmost boxes
one finds a zero, indicating redundancy.
Furthermore, this study contributes to the construction of a relation between social
theory, on the one hand, and the specification of a measurement theory in terms of
information, redundancy, and meaning, on the other. The relations between these
discourses have hitherto been scarce. In artificial intelligence, themain focus has been
on relating biology and psychology at the level of individuals and with the purpose
of explaining agency. Agency can be observed as behavior (of, for example, persons,
institutions, or principal agents). Behavior provides us with a point of entrance to
study individual intentions. However, the relations between science, technology, and
society are structural at the above-individual level. Structures can be expected to
operate as selection mechanisms on both variation (e.g., actions) and on interactions
among differently coded structures (e.g., co-evolutions, Triple- and Quadruple-Helix
models, etc.). Since one can no longer expect a single (“natural”) selection, the
interactions among selection mechanisms can also become sources of variation in a
complex dynamic.
At the level of above-individual expectations, selection mechanisms can also be
considered as coordination mechanisms. Codes can be expected to emerge in the
communications when selections operate on other selections or previous selections,
Selections which operate on selections, may lead to stabilization and also global-
ization. Codes provide meta-stable selection criteria which operate in parallel. In
addition to a horizontal differentiation in terms of codes, structures are differentiated
vertically in layers (e.g., information, meaning, and knowledge). Organization is a
specific function and a layer, and thus links the vertical andhorizontal differentiations.
Simon (1973, pp. 19f.) hypothesized that there might be an alphabet of possible
codes. For example, other dimensions of the communication are backgrounded when
we focus in scholarly discourse on substantive issues or in policy-making on choices.
The routines can be interrupted by otherwise coded communications. The inter-
ruptions disturb system-building and thus shape a “fractal manifold” (Ivanova &
Leydesdorff, 2014). In sum, one expects neither Triple nor Quadruple helices of
co-evolutions (Carayannis & Campbell, 2009), but one can expect fractals and frag-
ments; for example, a dimensionality of 3.1. In this domain of incompleteness, the
derivatives from the Latin verb esse (“to be,” “exist,” and “ontology”) are superseded
by derivatives of frangere such as “fractal,” “fragment,” “fragile.”
214 11 Summary and Conclusions
Add to the dynamics of the second and first contingencies—and their interac-
tions—the possibility to invert the time-axis to different degrees in each receiving
systems. Meanings incur on events against the arrow of time, and interactions among
incursions can induce hyper-incursive operations (Chaps. 7 and 8). For example,
expectations organized in models enable us to add new dimensions to the communi-
cation.Whereas agency constructs piecemeal, along historical trajectories, the social
can be expected to self-organize and hyper-incursively reconstruct virtual structures
of expectations.
The codes emerge over time in a morphogenesis, but when sufficiently populated,
the next-order can take over control because it is based on selections. These asym-
metrical transformations of contents between the level of incursive individuals and
hyper-incursive expectations show the operation of communications as mediating
structures with the potential of control. Measurement is needed for the specification
of the extent to which organization or self-organization prevail.
I have used the three, in my opinion, most relevant theories for addressing these
dynamics at the supra-individual level: Luhmann’s sociology, Shannon’s information
theory, and Rosen’s and Dubois’s theory of anticipatory systems. These theories
enabled me to approach the problems from different angles. However, the objectives
of these theories are very different: information theory is operational and provides
primarily a measurement theory (Theil, 1972); Luhmann’s (1997a, 1997b, 1984,
1995, 2012) sociology has remained theoretical and sometimes even speculative. In
my opinion, the latter has been hitherto the most systematic effort to remain at the
level of a second-order cybernetics of communicationwhile specifying a sociological
dynamics; Rosen’s (1985) theory and Dubois’ (1998) computation of anticipatory
mechanism are expressed in algorithms that can be simulated.
I submit that only the social system can be hyper-incursive—that is, without
historicity, since operating hyper-incursively from the perspective of the future. In
the computation of anticipatory systems (CASYS), onemay therefore need this focus
on the social as a unique example of strong anticipation. A research program can
here be envisaged.
The objective of this study has been to make the three perspectives of commu-
nication theory, information theory, and socio-cybernetics relevant for one another.
Reading these sociological and computational theories together can broaden the
scope for each of them. The focus shifts from explainingwhat “is” towhat “might be”
or “could have been”; that is, from information to redundancy. However, the surplus
of combining these approaches is first analytical; the focus is on the specification
of expectations. The purpose is to provide suggestions for further research. These
theories had not yet been brought together with a perspective on further research—
operationalization and measurement—because of their very different theoretical
backgrounds and respective semantics.
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